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Abstract 
According to the traditional Marxist Sociology and the classical theory of social 
movement, exploitation or structural strain will lead to political resistance, which aims at 
overthrowing the unequal relationship between the oppressed and the oppressor. 
However, this idea does not apply to all situations, at least not to the situation of the 
pearl River Delta, where political struggle seldom occur, despite the fact that the migrant 
workers there have to face adverse social exclusion and exploitation from the local 
people and the foreign employers. 
In this study, I would like to highlight the non-political strategy---economic 
retreatism---of the migrants (oppressed) in response to the exploitation or structural 
strain. I will argue that due to their marginal position and the lake of social protection, 
the migrants tend to employ exit and family support instead of struggling with the 
oppressor in order to accommodate the oppression and to defense their subsistence level. 
Therefore, the unequal social order there has not been challenged politically by the 
migrants. 
This study will shed light on the migrants in the township-and-village areas of the 
Pearl River Delta and focus on their subjective perceptions. These will show a picture 
quite different from the one the previous urban-based studies concerning migrant 
workers show. I would emphasize that although the migrants are too powerless to have 
the whole adverse conditions improved, they are not totally passive and submitted to the 



















In July 1993, during a two-day railway trip from Hangzhou to Guangzhou, I met 
some migrant workers at the hard-seat class for the first time. The train was heavily 
overloaded. The three-seat chairs were squeezed by five people, and the passageway, 
and even the toilet, were also packed out. Luckily, my two classmates and I could have 
seats, because we could buy the seat-tickets. But those who bought the standing-tickets 
could only sit on the floor or stand for the whole trip, 35 hours! Most passengers were 
youngsters looking like refugees. They were dirty, spitting and throwing peel on the 
floor without any concern. Moreover, the three boys sitting opposite to us were always 
playing with their knifes. It made us most worried. I remembered the term "blind 
wanderers", which was referring to poor, criminal and social disorder. It was my first 
impression on the migrant workers. When the train reached Guangzhou, thy all jumped 
off the train through the windows, instead of getting off from the doors. Amazing! 
At the later time, I can often see the migrant workers crowding at the square of 
Guangzhou railway station and hear of their bad news from the mass media. Meanwhile, 
I have leamt that my hometown, Tianshen, is also full of migrant workers. They have 
pushed on the local industrialization and contributed to the well-being of the local 
people, but they themselves are in adverse conditions. The training of Sociology makes 
me realize that it is a typical case of social stratification. I am curious about how those 
poor outsiders perceive and react to their situations. This curiosity gives rise to this 
study. 
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I am very grateful to Prof. Chan Kin-man, my thesis supervisor. He has offered 
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theoretical framework and laid the foundation for the later processes. Besides the 
academic work, Prof. Chan is also very supportive and always gives constructive 
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Chapter 1 
Going into migrants in the Pearl River Delta 
Modern industry has converted the little workshop of the patriarchal 
master into the great factory of the industrial capitalist. Masses of 
labourers, crowed into the factory, are organized like soldiers. As 
privates of the industrial army they are placed under the command of a 
perfect hierarchy of officers and sergeants. Not only are they slaves of 
the bourgeois class, and of the bourgeois State; they are daily and 
hourly enslaved by the machine, by the overlooker, and, above all, by 
the individual bourgeois manufacturer himself. The more openly this 
despotism proclaims gain to be its end and aim, the more petty, the 
more hateful and the more embittering it is. 
---Marx and Engels, Manifesto of the communist party 1998 
The Chinese communist party has dreamed to establish a socialist or a 
communist country, where there is no class, no exploitation and no oppression. 
However, before the fantasy was realized, it has been totally shattered by the 
economic reforms starting from late 1970，s. Since then, equalitarianism is replaced 
by economic development. Some social phenomena such as the emergence of 
capitalists, class inequality and exploitation, which have once been seen as 
intolerable in the past, are now seen as something normal by both the state and the 
society in China. 
Since the end of 1970s, in response to Deng's promotion of "letting some 
people get rich first", one of the most obvious changes is the uneven development 
between the coastal and inland areas. It marks the regional inequality of China. The 
Pearl River Delta has dramatically changed from an agricultural region to a 
production workshop, serving the production industries of foreign countries or 
districts, especially Hong Kong and Taiwan. The rapid industrialization in South 
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China has greatly improved the living standards of the local people and pushed up 
the demand of factory workers. Therefore, a large amount of floating population, 
who hope to ameliorate their living, is attracted from all over China to serve as cheap 
labor power there. 
Accordingly, a "two-class structure" (Solinger 1995a) has formed in the Pearl 
River Delta, in which the well being of the locals contrasts sharply with the poverty 
of the migrants. Undoubtedly, not all the migrants are poor. Some of them are 
professionals earning high salaries. However, being the outsiders working in the 
Pearl River Delta, the migrants not only face the economic problem, but also the 
social exclusion from locals and institutional barrier of the hukou system. Observing 
this situation, I cannot help asking, “How can the migrants survive in such an 
extremely exploitative and exclusive environment?" "Why can the Pearl River Delta 
avoid the political struggle from the migrants?" These two questions touch off this 
study. 
I. The living strategy besides political resistance 
In this study, I would focus on how and why the migrants react to the repressive 
environment and see their implication to the social stability of the Pearl River Delta. 
An anomaly concerning the migrants' living strategy has emerged in this study. It 
deviates from the general view of traditional Marxist Sociology, which stresses 
political resistance as the only reaction to exploitation. 
The migrants in the Pearl River Delta are facing extremely unfavorable 
conditions. The bitter encountering of labors described by Marx and Engels about 
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one hundred and fifty years ago reappears everyday in the present South China. 
According to Marx and Engels, the exploitation or inequality between proletarians 
and bourgeois will arouse discontent among proletarians, which in turn will trigger 
class struggles and lead to the overthrow of the bourgeois: 
The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. 
Freeman and slave, patrician and plebian, lord and serf, guild-master and 
journeyman, [bourgeoisie and proletariat], in a word, oppressor and 
oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an 
uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, 
either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the 
common ruin of the contending classes. 
...What the bourgeoisie, therefore, produces, above all, is its own 
grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally 
inevitable. (Marx and Engels 1998: 5-24) 
Clearly, to Marx and Engels, class struggle is the only mean of proletarians to 
release themselves from the oppression of the bourgeoisie and to achieve an equal 
society. If their viewpoint is correct, the inequality between the migrants and the 
locals or the employers in the Pearl River Delta will be a reason causing social and 
political instability. 
Besides the Marxist tradition, the classical theory of social movement also 
relates structural strain directly to the happening of collective resistance. As Smelser 
suggests: 
"Many strains are institutionalized; they follow the lines of ethnic, 
political, class, religious, and other cleavages...such strain[s] in our 
society are the chronic conflicts of interests between management and 
labor, Democrat and Republican etc. If such cleavages are accompanied 
by stereotypes that assign responsibility for evils to other groups, strains 
3 
are built into the social situation and ready to be combined with other 
conditions 1 that might permit hostile outbursts.. .”(Smelser 1962: 241) 
The structural strain, existing in various forms of ambiguities, deprivations, 
conflicts and discrepancies, refers to the impairment of the relations among parts of a 
system and the consequent malfunctioning of the system. Smelser points out that 
although the strain itself is not sufficient in causing social movement, it is 
nonetheless a necessary condition for it. Therefore, all social movements have either 
one or several forms of underlying strain. 
Similar to the Marxist tradition, the classical theory of social movement also 
reveals that the discontent generated by structural strain can be transformed to a 
collective action, in which a hostile outburst or a political action will be carried out 
by the participants to change the disturbing state of affairs. However, neither of them 
has clarified how large the structural strain and how much the discontent are 
necessary to trigger a political action. Are the exploitation and exclusion experienced 
by the migrants in the Pearl River Delta strong enough to cause the political 
resistance? Moreover, structural strain and discontent exist among the oppressed in 
all societies at all time, why don't hostile outbursts always happen? 
The studies of Scott (1976) and Popkin (1978) on peasants in Southeast Asia may 
supplement the omissions of the Marxist tradition and the classical theory of social 
movement. They introduce respectively moral and rational conditions to explain the 
outbreak of political actions. Scott points out that although landlords and peasants are 
unequal, peasants do not intend to resist if landlords have secured their subsistence 
1 According to Smelser, the other conditions are structural conduciveness, generalized belief, 
precipitating factors, mobilization and social control. 
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level in bad time, while Popkin emphasizes the cost and the benefit calculation of 
peasants, who would resist whenever the potential gain is greater than the cost of 
carrying out a resistance. In other words, class inequality is also presumed in both 
Scott's and Popkin's cases, but whether peasants would resist depends on the moral 
or rational consideration. If the moral standard has not been violated (Scott's case) or 
the potential gain is too little to cover the cost (Popkin's case), peasants would not 
resist even if the exploitation or the structural strain is great. 
Scott and Popkin, undoubtedly, have indicated more concretely the conditions of 
peasants' resistance, but they have not gone beyond the category of the Marxist 
tradition and the classical theory of social movement that see political resistance as 
the only and inevitable mean to achieve the aim, either to reconstruct the moral 
standard or to gain more economic return. More specifically, all the viewpoints 
above deem that the oppressed can merely choose either to resist or to submit to the 
oppressors, and there is no other alternative besides it. However, in this study, I am 
going to propose that a non-political strategy has dominated the migrants' reactions 
to the adverse environment. The migrants are reluctant to resist, and tend to shun the 
excessive exploitation and exclusion from the locals and the employers in order to 
secure their subsistence level. I call the strategy "Economic retreatism", which is 
characterized by moderate rather than radical, individual rather than collective, 
safety-first rather than longing-for-more reactions. Economic retreatism does not 
imply a complete passiveness of the migrants. On the contrary, it is a rational living 
strategy, showing the endurance of the migrants in the unfavorable environment. 
However, why do the migrants intend to retreat instead of resist? In order to 
answer this question, I would first examine the migrants' subjective perception 
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concerning how they define their situations, how they weigh different living 
strategies and why they choose this specific one. Exploring their own experience 
would provide convincing reasons for their behaviors. In addition, I would like to 
construct a theoretical framework by borrowing the conception from Scott, Popkin, 
Hirschman and the studies of Chinese familism. Apart from Scott's and Popkin's 
elaborations on exploitation and resistance, Hirschman's conception of exit, voice 
and loyalty are also very useful in augmenting the possibilities of reaction to 
dissatisfaction. It enables me to go beyond the boundary of political resistance and 
expand my comprehension to the economic realm. The studies of Chinese familism 
would point to the mutual support among the migrants of the same extended family, 
and the resulted facilitation to economic retreatism. Through this framework, I hope 
to achieve a theoretical understanding of the migrants' reaction to the structural 
strain or the exploitation and thus provide a supplement to the existing literature 
concerning political resistance of the oppressed. 
II. Exploring the migrants in township-and-village areas of the Pearl River 
Delta 
Most studies of the temporary migrants focus on the realms of cities (Mallee 
2000; Solinger 1995a, 1995b, 1999; Ma and Xiang 1998; Goldstein and Goldstein 
1994; Knight, Song and Jia 1999; Jacka 1998 etc.). However, by mid-90's, 
township-and-village enterprises (TVEs) have absorbed nearly one third of rural 
labor forces. In the Pearl River Delta, almost all townships and villages (TVs) are 
highly industrialized and a huge pool of migrants are recruited from all over China. 
In many TVs, the migrants have largely outnumbered the locals. The ratio of 
migrants to locals can go up to about twenty times. If not in all, it is, at least, in the 
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field site of this study. Locals in TVs become the privileged minority surrounded by 
the sea of migrants. It exhibits a landscape very different from that of the cities and 
makes the inequality between the migrants and the locals much more obvious. 
In addition, although the TVs are highly industrialized, their level of 
urbanization is relatively low. They are actually on the stage of an “intermediate 
society" (Simic 1973). Some traditional features such as introversion and xenophobia, 
which are almost absent in cities, still prevail among the locals in TVs. Therefore, the 
migrants in TVs have to face a stronger social exclusion than their counterparts do in 
cities, and thus find it harder to integrate themselves into the local community. In this 
study, I would like to illustrate the particularity of TVs and try to reconstruct the 
relationship between the locals and the migrants in order to show the inequality and 
the hostile discrimination the migrants face. 
Last but not least, different districts have different economic modes. These 
differences may result in different relationship between the locals and the migrants, 
and also variation of the migrants' perception and reaction. Undoubtedly, the given 
conditions are not wholly decisive to human actors' behaviors. As Scott notes: 
"To be sure, the economic givens are crucial; they define much, but not 
all, of the situation that human actors face; they place limits on the 
responses that are possible, imaginable. But those limits are wide and, 
within them, human actors fashion their own response, their own 
experience of class, their own history." (Scott 1985: 42) 
However, even though we recognize the importance of human agency, we 
should first clarify the social background before we can understand how the actors' 
responses are formed and why their reactions are meaningful. Since different 
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environments place different limits on the actors, I would like to highlight the 
specific economic mode of the field site, which I call "Renting economy". It is 
characterized by the heavy dependence on the receipt of rent of the local economy, 
and the subsequent promotion of the pro-investor inclination of the local 
governments and people. It is interesting to see what constraints the renting economy 
places on the migrants and how the migrants react to the predicaments under this 
particular economic environment. 
In fact, the migrants working in TVs in the Pearl River Delta not only face the 
institutional barrier from the Household Registration System (hukou system), but 
also the social exclusion due to traditional xenophobia of the locals and the ruthless 
exploitation promoted by the renting economy. Therefore, the previous studies of 
migrants in cities, which mainly account for migrants' encountering by the 
institutional barrier {hukou system), may be too restricted to extend to the cases of 
non-urban areas. In order to have a fuller understanding to the migrants in TVs, we 
have to take the social and economic factors into consideration, in addition to the 
institutional factor. 
Researchers of Chinese temporary migration seldom pay special attention to the 
migrants in TVs, since cities (or urban areas) are always regarded as more important 
than the non-urban areas. However, due to the huge amount of migrants and the 
extremely exploitative and exclusive conditions in TVs, whether they feel discontent 
to the structural strain or exploitation and in what ways they express their 
dissatisfaction have significant implications to the social stability of the Pearl River 
Delta. In this study, I will focus on the migrants in TVs and argue that although they 
are very dissatisfied with the adverse conditions they are facing, they tend to 
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"retreat" (economic in nature) rather than "resist" (political in nature). That is why 
the Pearl River Delta can maintain its social stability, even though the structural 
strain between the oppressor and the oppressed is so great. Throughout this study, I 
would focus on three empirical questions: Firstly, what is the relationship between 
the migrants and the locals (or the employers) in the field site? Secondly, how do the 
migrants perceive their situations? Thirdly, how and why the migrants react to the 
dissatisfaction? 
III. Methodology 
In order to have a deeper understanding to the above questions, it seems 
unsuitable to use the quantitative method, since it only finds out the statistical 
relation between different variables, but it does not give explanation. Alasuutari 
writes that: 
"In quantitative analysis, what is common to all observation units does not 
give any clue whatsoever about the phenomenon to be explained; it is 
automatically ruled outside the methodological possibilities." (Alasuutari 
1995:11) 
In addition, even the structural conditions are homogenous and the respondents 
have very similar behaviors, they may have differential perceptions to the same 
situation. Quantitative method can hardly cover this respect. Therefore, the 
qualitative approach is employed in this study in order to capture the hidden diversity 
and thus show insights to the phenomenon. 
According to Appelbaum and Chambliss, the strength of qualitative approach is 
that "it can provide a deep, sympathetic, extremely rich, and detailed understanding 
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of the lives of others." (1997: 42) Besides, it emphasizes the subjectivity of actors, 
and, subsequently, indicates a new way to understand the migrants by learning their 
experiences and perceptions rather than from statistical data merely. Thereby, I know 
the migrants are so active that they do not only respond flexibly to the structural 
conditions, but also construct their living strategies wisely in order to defend their 
interests. 
Undeniably, the qualitative approach also has limitations in deriving 
generalization. However, since the social situations of the township-and-village areas 
in South China are quite similar, this study, to a certain degree, can provide us with a 
general comprehension of other regions. More importantly, different from the 
quantitative method, the qualitative approach pursues theoretical causality rather than 
statistical generalization. Although this study is based on one case, its empirical 
richness and particularity are convincing enough to break the traditional perception 
on the same topic and show that rethinking the whole thing is necessary. 
This study uses the research techniques of participant observation, in-depth 
interviews and content analysis. The advantages of these techniques are to let me 
keep close to the informants, listen to them, interact with them, and understand their 
ways of living in the field site. Through the fieldwork, I can leam directly from the 
informants and the field instead of interpreting their situations arbitrarily in a 
simplistic way. 
The field site of this study is Tianshen Township^, which is one of the most 
prosperous counties in the Pearl River Delta. I stayed in Tianshen for about two 
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months, living in the house of my paternal uncle. Since Tianshen is my hometown, 
the relatives' network enabled me to contact local people of different ranks easily, 
such as the villagers' group leader，factory owner, security team leader and many 
ordinary villagers. They told me many things about Tianshen from different 
viewpoints. Moreover, during my fieldwork, I always stayed close with my relatives. 
Through observing their life styles, visiting their houses and listening to their 
conversations, I knew concretely about the economic conditions of Tianshen and the 
living conditions of the locals. Apart from the locals, I also observed the lives of the 
migrants, because there were many migrants living around. The proximity between 
the locals and the migrants showed clearly their contrasting living levels, and more 
importantly, the dynamic between the two groups. In addition，I always walked 
around in the village and visited the night market in the industrial zone. Sometimes, I 
also visited the factories in order to understand the everyday lives of the migrants as 
much as possible. These activities have definitely helped enhance my understanding 
in both the locals and the migrants. 
Participant observation is a very efficient technique for data collection, 
especially for having a concrete experience in the field site. However, the technique 
has its own weaknesses also. Firstly, the observer has to depend on opportunities in 
witnessing some important events, which do not always happen. For example, my 
auntie told me that the locals and the migrants often got in conflict, or even fighting, 
on the small road in front of her house. However, during my two-month stay, I have 
never seen once. Secondly, things like ones' feeling and impression are implicit in 
nature, and cannot be noticed easily by superficial observation. Therefore, if we 
judge situations merely by observation, we may have omitted some hidden contents 
2 Tianshen Township is a pseudo name of the field site. 
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and draw an incomprehensive or even wrong conclusion. To remedy the drawbacks 
of the participant observation, in-depth interviews were done to let the informants to 
recall some important instances they had experienced and express their own feeling 
on them. In this study, I interviewed both the locals and the migrants. Some 
interviews were formal and some were just casual dialogues, in which they shared 
various aspects of their lives with me. I would focus mainly on their impressions to 
each other and why they thought in those ways. Moreover, I paid special attention to 
how the migrants perceived their situations and whether they felt discontent to them. 
It is interesting to find that the locals and the migrants often have different or even 
contradictory viewpoints on the same instance. I think these contradictions show the 
different social positions and interests of the two groups. 
In addition to the participant observation and the in-depth interviews, the 
technique of content analysis is also employed. In this study, many magazines, 
newspapers, fictions, reportages and videos concerning migrant workers have been 
collected. Two magazines，Wailaigong <外來士〉and Xiangjudapengwan <相聚大 
鹏、are specifically designed for the migrants and thus are very popular among 
them. Books like Qingchunxuyu 青春絮語〉,Qingchunxunmeng〈青春尋夢~>’ 
Zhongguo mingongchoa < 中國民工�M> are collections of letters and stories written 
by the migrants themselves or the traveling journalists'^. These supplementary 
materials are very valuable, since they have provided data and information which I 
can hardly collect in my fieldwork, such as the relationship between the migrants and 
their employers, the working conditions in the factories, and the opinions of the 
3 The magazine Wailaigong〈夕來工> has been renamed to Dagongzu <打工臉 since 2001. 
4 Although most of the fictions and stories do not describe the migrants exactly in the field site of this 
study, some of them would also be presented, because they show the migrants' situations and 
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employers etc. Although only a very small portion of these materials have been 
presented in this study, the extensive reading of these supplementary materials helps 
me reason out what problems concern the migrants the most and what strategies they 
adopt to handle their predicaments. Furthermore, some governmental notices and 
statistical data are gathered, which are helpful in providing a clearer picture about the 
economic conditions and historical background of the field site. 
By using the techniques of participant observation, in-depth interviews and 
content analysis, I hope to achieve a profound and detailed elaboration of the main 
ideas of this study, showing clearly the perceptions and living strategies of the 
migrants in the Pearl River Delta. 
IV. Overview of this study 
In the following chapters, I will elaborate how the migrants perceive and deal 
with their predicaments, and what implications their perception and handling 
methods on the social stability of the Pearl River Delta. In Chapter 2, I will first 
review the existing literature on the topics of migration and floating population in 
China after the economic reforms. Then, by pointing out the omissions of the 
existing studies, I will pick up Scott and Popkin studies of exploitation and rcsislancc, 
Hirscliman's work of exit, voice and loyalty, and studies of Chinese familism to 
construcl a theoretical framework for this study. In Chapter 3, I \s ill depict how the 
“renting economic" is formed bccausc of the introduction of the economic reforms in 
the field site, and illustrate the unequal relationship between the migrants and the 
locals or the employers (oppressed and oppressor) under the forces of institution, 
experiences very similar to those of this srudy. 
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tradition and economy. In Chapter 4, I will elucidate the migrants' difficulties 
coming from their living，working and migration lives that give rise to the "myth of 
return" among them. In Chapter 5,1 will examine the living strategies of the migrants 
in terms of exit and family support when dealing with their predicaments. Then, I 
will argue that it is exactly this non-political reaction of the migrants that maintains 
the social stability of the Pearl River Delta. In Chapter 6, I will clarify more 
explicitly the theoretical reflections of this study by comparing this study with the 
cases of Scott and Popkin. It will reach the conclusion that under certain conditions, 
the oppressed tends to take economic retreatism rather that political resistance in 
response to the structural strain or exploitation. I will also discuss briefly how this 
study may supplement the previous studies of floating population in contemporary 
China. 
V. Terms clarification 
Before we go ahead to the following chapters, I would like to clarify the 
geographical coverage of the "Pearl River Delta" and the meaning of the "migrant 
workers (migrants)" which constitute the field site and the subject matter of this 
study respectively. 
1. Pearl River Delta 
As we know, the Pearl River Delta is a very large area. Accordingly to the 
official definition in February 1985, the Pearl River Delta economic development 
zone comprises four small cities (Foshan, Jiangmen, Zhongshan and Dongguan) and 
twelve counties (Doumen, Baoan, Zengcheng, Panyu, Nanhai, Shunde, Gaoming, 
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Heshan, Xinhui, Taishan, Kaiping and Enping). It excludes Guangzhou and therefore 
is also called the Inner Delta {xiao sanjiazhou) (Vogel 1989: 161). Since this study 
focuses on the non-urban areas, when I use the term "Pearl River Delta", I refer 
specifically to the township-and-village areas in the Pearl River Delta. It aims to 
distinguish this study from the previous urban-based studies. 
1. Migrants workers (migrants) 
Similarly, the term “migrant workers (migrants)" also points to a group of 
people whose occupations vary from general factory workers to professionals. In this 
study, "migrant workers (migrants)" refers mainly to those general workers, because 
they are the majority among the migrant workers. But it does not mean that all the 
professionals are excluded from this study. In some cases, some of the professionals 
will also be mentioned in the following chapters in order to clarify the situations of 
the general workers. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature review: understanding migrants in South China 
The traditional ruling of Mainland China is based on controlling the 
migration and employment of the population. However, this ruling 
structure has already been smashed by the market forces after the 
economic reforms... Peasants are floating silently to the costal cities in 
a huge quantity and with a fast speed... Apart from the times of dearth, 
it is the largest population floating that has not been seen in the 
Chinese history. It indicates here comes a different era, which marks 
the new page of Chinese history. 
---Yang, Danizhuan: Shijimo toushi Zhongguo 1995 
In the Mao era，population floating was strictly prohibited by the Household 
Registration System (hukou system), except in some cases, people moved in response 
to the political callings of the central government, such as participating in zhibian 
(supporting the development of hinterlands 支邊）and shangshan xiaxiang campaign 
(up to the mountains and down to the villages 上山下鄉广 However, the restriction 
on population floating was abolished by the introduction of economic reforms in 
1978. Since then, a large amount of migrants float across regions in pursuit of a 
better economic return. The central government's slackening of the population 
control aims at providing adequate labor power to fuel the economic development, 
but the proliferation of floating population, who has grown out of the institutional 
regulations, has inevitably weakened the control of the central government and 
aroused enormous social changes. Therefore, this unprecedented phenomenon has 
received extensive attention of scholars, attracting them to find out the various 
influences it brings to China. 
5 These kinds of population floating are under the directions of the central government, aiming at 
industrial development, agricultural development, intellectual development or military reasons. See 
Cheng (1991) "Internal Migration in Mainland China: The Impact of Government Policies" for the 
discussion on how the central government has regulated the population floating at different phases. 
16 
Internal population floating is a global phenomenon and the related literature is 
abundant. However, since the processes and influences of population floating are so 
diversified and complicated, there is no a concrete theory that can provide a full 
explanation to the phenomenon. In fact, synthesizing various factors to generate one 
or a few theories may lead to over-simplification of the reality. Moreover, the foreign 
experience of internal population floating is not quite similar to that of China due to 
the differential social backgrounds, and thus it is not suitable to adopt their 
explanations entirely in the case of China. Therefore, I do not intend to deal with all 
aspects of population floating in this study. What I will do is to review some related 
literature and pick up some important concepts and ideas which are useful for the 
understanding of the foci of this study. 
In this chapter, I will first refine the concept of migration^ by elaborating the 
types of migration and migrants. Then, I will summarize the main concerns of the 
existing literature on Chinese internal population floating after the economic reforms. 
After that, I will point out the inadequacy of this literature on account of the 
questions of this study. Finally, a theoretical framework will be constructed by 
borrowing the conception from Scott, Popkin and Hirschman, and the studies of 
Chinese familism. 
6 Most of the literature uses the term "migration" when discussing the phenomena of population 
movement, but in China, the officials and the public use the term "floating" {liudong 流重ij) more 
often. Owing to the Chinese hukou system, migration is classified as permanent or temporary 
depending on whether it is officially approved by the government. The term "floating" points to the 
kind of temporary migration. It indicates the migrants only move physically without a change of their 
hukou registration. Here, I will mainly review the concept of migration on the foreign literature, but I 
will point out the Chinese characteristics when it is necessary. 
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1. Migration 
1. Types of migration 
Bouvier, Macisco and Zarate (1976) have classified internal population 
migration into four types according to the migrants' origins and their destinations. 
They are listed as follows: 
Table 1: Types of internal migration streams 
Destination  
Origin Rural Urban  
Rural RR RU 
Urban 丨 UR | UU 
Source: Bouvier, Macisco and Zarate (1976: 28) R=Rural; LMJrban 
Following Richmond's (1969: 272) distinctions of the three kinds of societies: 
the traditional, industrial, and post-industrial, Bouvier, Macisco and Zarate (1976: 29) 
point out that in the traditional societies, the economic structure is mainly 
agricultural. The population migration tends to be from rural to rural. However, in 
industrial societies, the population migration is mostly from rural to urban, because 
of the attraction of better employment and more opportunities in improving their 
material conditions and achieving upward social mobility in the urban areas. Besides, 
some people may be "pushed" out of the rural areas because of the mechanization of 
agriculture and the overall decline of rural communities. In post-industrial societies, 
the population migration is neither "pushed" nor "pulled", but is two-way or even 
multi-directional. It is overwhelmingly inter-urban in character and is a part of 
exchange process between efficient deployment of labors and individuals' pursuit of 
geographical and social mobility. 
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The above classification of internal migration is very meaningful, since it shows 
that in one particular form of society, a particular kind of migration is in dominance. 
It is especially true when we see the mral-to-urban migration as a common 
experience shared by most developing countries, where the rapid industrialization of 
the urban areas have drawn many rural people to become factory workers there. In 
addition, the rural people moving to urban areas are not only because of the better 
employment and economic return, but also because they are deeply attracted by the 
new life styles in urban areas, where they can escape from the social constraints of 
the traditional societies and enjoy the diversified urban lives. As Richmond 
describes: 
The urban industrial areas to which they [migrants] migrate are 
characterized by associational forms of organization (such as labor 
unions) of the Gesellschaft type...Unlike traditional societies there are 
innumerable groups and associations which the migrants is free to join or 
ignore as he pleases. There are many religious faiths to which he may 
subscribe and outward religious observance is subject to few sanctions. 
Politically he may choose between various parties and pressure groups or 
abstain altogether from political involvement if he wishes... (1969: 275) 
Referring to the classification of Bouvier, Macisco and Zarate, China is a 
developing country on a stage of fast industrialization. Therefore, its population 
migration is mainly mral-to-urban in nature. Many surplus labors from inland rural 
areas float to urban areas in the hope of getting jobs and participating in urban life. 
However, that is only part of the story. In China, apart from the urban areas, the 
coastal rural areas?, especially those in the Pearl River and Yangtz River Deltas, also 
attract a huge number of migrants, because the blooming of TVEs there have 
7 The classification of rural and urban areas is based on the official definition. 
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provided many job opportunities for them. Here comes the difference between the 
case of China and the ideas of Bouvier, Macisco and Zarate which depict the 
destination of population migration as a place of high degree of industrialization and 
urbanization. In the rural areas of Pearl River and Yangtz River Deltas, although the 
pace of industrialization is rapid, the degree of urbanization^ lags far behind (will be 
discussed in greater detail in chapter 3). There are no labor union, religious group or 
political party, but many traditional customs such as family introversion and 
xenophobia still remain among the local people, despite the fact that the agricultural 
life has almost totally disappeared. As a result, it would be more accurate to define 
these highly industrialized rural areas as sub-urban areas rather than rural or urban, 
and thus the population migration from inland rural areas to coastal rural areas in the 
Pearl River and Yangtz River Deltas is actually mral-to-sub-urban in nature. This 
type of population migration has obviously been neglected by the classification of 
Bouvier, Macisco and Zarate. 
2. Types of migrants 
Apart from the classification of internal population migration, it is also 
necessary to distinguish two types of migrants—the permanent and the temporary 
migrants. In China，the permanent migrants are those who move along with their 
hukou. In other words, their migration is officially sanctioned and closely monitored 
by the state. This kind of migration is often arranged to serve specific national goals 
such as developing the Special Economic Zones and the less-developed hinterland, 
8 Urbanization can be discussed in the structural aspect such as the population density, infrastructure, 
and non-agricultural occupation proportion etc., and in the cultural aspect in terms of the peoples' 
behavior and belief. In this study, I would highlight the relatively low degree of urbanization in the 
cultural aspect. 
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or mobilizing military service. (Li 1997a: 1004; Cheng 1991: 48-49) However, the 
temporary migrants are those who reside in the migration destination with their 
official hukou remain unchanged. Therefore, they, compared with the permanent 
migrants, are dubious in legal status. Nevertheless, since they are relatively 
independent to the state, they can migrate according to their own will and the 
changes of social conditions with more freedom. 
Besides the difference of hukou, how to define migrants as "temporary" is still a 
problem. Solinger has mentioned the official definition, "[djespite real differences, 
in the eye of the authorities, as defined by the Fourth National Census, held in 1990, 
anyone living away from his or her place of legal residence [hukou] for less than a 
year is called 'floating'^" (Solinger 1995a: 115). Some scholars such as Goldstein 
and Goldstein (1994) define temporary migrants as those staying at their destination 
shorter than one year regardless to their hukou. However, both definitions are far 
from the fact, because some migrants who have left their legal residence and stayed 
in the destination for several years are still labeled officially as floating population 
(temporary migrants). The critical distinction between permanent migrants and 
temporary ones is whether their hokou is changed along with the their migration. If 
not, one will always be a temporary migrant no matter how long he/she has left home 
or has stayed at the destination. 
Hence, the population migration in China is unlike those in other countries. 
Firstly, migration in China is not purely a spontaneous reaction to the changes of 
social conditions. Both permanent and temporary migrations are under the 
9 "Floating" is more or less the same meaning as "temporary migration", and thus the migrants can be 
seen as the temporary migrants. 
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interference of the statis policies, especially the hukou system. Although people are 
free to float after the economic reforms, temporary migrants, who migrate without 
official approval, are expected to return to their hometowns after a certain period of 
time by the state. Their length of stay at the destination in itself is not sufficient to 
entitle them the right of permanent residence. Secondly, since one's social status is 
greatly affected by his hukou identity, the temporary migrants are officially classified 
as having lower status than the permanent ones and the local people. Their life 
chances are, therefore, limited by the institutional barriers. In other countries, where 
there are no institutional segregation policies, social integration of the new 
immigrants moving within the same country is only a minor problem because the 
social structures and cultural background of their origin and destination are similar 
(Jansen 1969: 69). However, the hukou system in China hinders the integration of 
temporary migrants to the destination. It gives rise to the social stratification between 
the permanent and the temporary residents, and thus may trigger off conflicts 
between them. 
In a word, the subject matter of this study is those temporary migrants, who 
mainly float from the inland rural areas to the sub-urban areas in the Pearl River 
Delta, where they work for the economic development, but face strong social 
exclusion from the locals and the institutional constraints from the hukou system. 
II. Floating population in China after the economic reforms 
1. Regional inequality and surplus labors 
The open-door policy implemented since 1978 was originally aimed at 
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attracting large-scale and high-tech foreign investments to help reincorporate China 
into the world economy (So and Chiu 1995: 243-248). However, the poor investment 
conditions in China failed to impress the transnational corporations. Therefore, a new 
strategy---coastal-development strategy---was formulated by the state in late 1980's 
to attract investors from Hong Kong and Taiwan. The new strategy focuses on small 
and medium-sized industries, which are mainly labor-intensive in production mode. 
Accompanying with the coastal-development strategy, the introduction of 
Household Responsibility System and the decollectivization of agriculture have 
liberated a huge amount of surplus labors from farmlands. They are free to leave 
their hometowns and participate in non-agricultural activities. In order to prevent 
those surplus labors from pouring into the cities and the other more developed areas, 
the central government has promoted rural industrialization in order to absorb the 
surplus labors locally and increase their income^^. "Leaving the farmlands but not the 
rural areas" is the slogan emphasized since then. 
Owing to the rapid rural industrialization since 1980，s, the rural economic 
sector is becoming more and more contributive to the national GDP. According to the 
statistics, the annual GDP growth rate of the rural sector from 1984 to 1993, after 
adjusting for inflation, was 27%, while the annual national GDP growth rate was 
only 9.5% in the same period. Rural enterprises contributed 13%, 27% and 32% in 
1984, 1991 and 1992 respectively to the gross output of China (Agricultural Bank of 
China 1993, quoted in Peng 1996). Besides，by mid-90's, the rural enterprises have 
already absorbed nearly one third of the rural labor forces. The rural unemployment 
See Peng (1996) "China's Rural Enterprises: Effects of Agriculture, Surplus Labour and Human 
Capital" for detailed discussion on the issues of rural industrialization and surplus labors. 
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has, therefore, been alleviated. 
However, rural industrialization does not develop evenly in all regions. The 
coastal areas, besides their geographical superiority, enjoy many preferential policies 
because of the coastal-development strategy. The preferences include entitling 
foreign investors more flexibility in enforcing labor practices, foreign currency 
policies and tariffs etc. which make the coastal areas much more attractive to foreign 
investors than the inland ones, and thus push the coastal rural industrialization to 
even higher speed. The most outstanding example is the Pearl River Delta. With its 
convenient transportation system and its proximity to Hong Kong and Taiwan, it has 
received many foreign investments and has become the production center for the 
industries of Hong Kong and Taiwan. Moreover, the fast industrialization has 
absorbed all local surplus labors quickly and thus has faced the problem of labor 
shortage. On the contrary, the level of industrialization in the inland rural areas is still 
very low and its capacity in absorbing surplus labors is too small. In short, although 
the economic reforms have benefited the coastal areas, they have also aggravated the 
spatial uneven development and affected the degree of market penetration at the 
same time (Li 1997a). 
The income difference between the coastal and the inland areas has been 
widened drastically because of the regional unevenness of the rural industrialization. 
For examples, when the average per capita net income of all rural residents was 921 
yuan in 1993; the average was 1,745 yuan in Zhejiang province; 1,674 yuan in 
Guangdong; 1,266 yuan in Jiangsu, and only 550 and 579 yuan in Gansu and 
Guizhou respectively (Davis 1995:11.8). These great regional disparities give rise to 
the mass population migration. Surplus labors from inland areas float to the coastal 
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areas in the hope of finding jobs in cities or TVEs. The pet phrases among Chinese: 
"Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern and Central China, going to Guangdong to 
earn big money"(東南西北中，發貝才到廣東）and "Peacocks are flying to Southeast 
China"(孔雀東南飛）have reflected exactly how attractive South China is to 
Chinese people, especially among the inland people. By mid-1990's, the amount of 
floating population was estimated to lie within the range of 50 million to 70 million 
(Solinger 1995a). Some estimations are even bigger^ ^  In other words, inland surplus 
labors nowadays are actually “leaving the farmlands and also the rural areas". 
2. The main concerns of the existing literature on Chinese floating population 
The proliferation of such a huge number of floating population after the 
economic reforms has become a hot topic in recent China studies. The abundant 
existing literature has almost touched on every aspect of the floating population. It 
can be roughly summarized into three categories. Undoubtedly, this summary is not 
exhaustive, but it more or less has sorted out the main concerns related to the floating 
population. The three categories consist of the reasons of floating, the characteristics 
of migrants, and the comparisons between the conditions of the migrants and those of 
the locals at the destination. 
i. On reasons of migration 
11 The estimations of the floating population vary a large range from 54 to 102 millions by 
mid-1990's because of the different definition of the migrants. The estimation of 54 millions only 
refers to the group of long-term and wage earning migration. See Scott, Li, Shen, Hughart and Giles 
(1999) "Leaving China's Farms: Survey Results of New Paths and Remaining Hurdles to Rural 
Migration." for details. 
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The classical model of migration bases on the push and pull factors—forces 
which drive people away from their place of origin and attract them to go to their 
place of destination. This push-pull model assumes that people are rational and 
intend to maximize their economic advantages, and the rationality and intention in 
turn define their migratory activity (Jackson 1986: 13-16). The typical example is 
Todaro's theory. It postulates that the migrants forecast the real income difference by 
deducting the costs of migration between the origin and the destination, and 
estimating the probability of finding a job. If they find that their gain at the 
destination is higher than that at the origin, they would choose to go (Todaro 1976, 
quoted in Scott, Li, Shen, Hughart and Giles 1999: 381). The labor market theory, 
which is even more precise than the Todaro's theory, emphasizes the supply and 
demand factors in the provision of labors. In this model, different measurements and 
motivations of migration are reduced to the wage rate. If there are wage differentials 
in different locations, people would migrate from the low-waged locations to the 
high-waged locations automatically in order to maintain a wage equilibrium (Jackson 
1986: 17-25). 
Following the classical models of migration, most scholars have pointed out that 
the population migration in China since 1978 is due to the regional income 
inequality 12. The lack of job opportunities and the low income in inland rural areas 
push people out，while the great demand of factory workers and the relatively higher 
income pull them to coastal areas. Therefore, the inland people leave their backward 
12 See Song (1995) "'Mingongchao' de xingcheng, qushi yu duice"; Knight, Song and Jia (1999) 
"Chinese Rural Migrants in Urban Enterprises: Three Perspectives"; "Wailai nong min gong" ketizu 
(1995) "Zhujiang sanjiaoshou wailai nong min gong zhuangkuang"; Li (1997) "Population Migration, 
Regional Economic Growth and Income Determination: A Comparative Study of Dongguan and 
Meizhou, China"; Barnard and Shenkar (1997) "The Return of 'The Red Eye Disease': Wage 
Inequality in the People's Republic of China." 
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hometowns and head for the prosperous coastal areas in order to pursue a better 
prospect. Needless to say, going for "gold-dripping" at coastal areas is the common 
aspiration of many inland rural people. 
The push-pull model has explained the objective and materialistic motivations, 
but neglected the subjective and spiritual reasons of population floating. Apart from 
the economic considerations, Lee (1998), in a research of female migrant workers, 
has noted that some young girls who work in the coastal areas aim not only at 
making more money, but also for the experience of modernity and the escape from 
the familistic constraints at homes. Some migrants also see working in the coastal 
areas as a chance of learning new knowledge and widening their horizons. A 
reportage describing the migrant workers in Pearl River Delta relates that: 
“If we think that the tens of thousand migrant workers only aim to earn 
two to three hundreds RMB each month, it deviates from the reality. 
Those clever boys and girls name here 'The Pearl River Economic 
College'. They said that: you have to pay the tuition fee if you go to 
universities, but we in ‘The Pearl River Economic College' need not to 
pay. Besides, we have salary and masters who teach us about modem 
industrial production techniques. We don't have any reason to reject, do 
we?" {Haitian chubanshe wenyibu 1992: 147) 
Some migrants also further their study by participating in various 
correspondence courses, part-time education programs and evening classes. They try 
to improve their knowledge in order to seek a better job, and see it as a compensation 
for their lack of education while they were at homes. 
In addition to the above, we should not neglect the "statist influence" if we have 
to account for the reasons of population floating. The restrictions on population 
floating were so strict before the economic reforms that it would not have appeared if 
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the central government had not released those restrictions. As Goldstein and 
Goldstein (1994: 98) argue, the internal population floating in China is not 
completely a response to the economic development, but also an effect of the 
government policies. In order to meet the great labor demand for the fast 
industrialization at the coastal areas and to settle down the huge amount of surplus 
labors in the inland areas, the central government has allowed the inland surplus 
labors to work in the coastal areas so as to solve both problems at the same time. 
Migrants are usually labeled as mangliu (blind wanderers 肓流尸 by the 
public and the government. However, as the discussions above indicated, very few 
migrants really wander without a specific aim and direction. In fact, most migrants 
float for economic improvement or personal pursuit, and they head to the coastal 
areas specifically, where they believe they can realize their dreams. 
ii. On characteristics of migrants 
According to a report conducted in the Pearl River Delta, the migrant workers 
come mainly from the inland rural areas. Those coming from Guangdong hinterlands, 
Guangsi, Hunan and Sichuan account for 19%, 16.8%, 23.4% and 23.1% of all 
migrants respectively. In addition, most migrants are youngsters with an average age 
of 22, and 84.8% of them are single (Wailaigong ketizu 1995). They are, therefore, 
nicknamed as “a floating tribe of youngsters"(流動的青春音落）(Tan 1998:65). The 
gender ratio among the migrants is extremely unbalanced. Females disproportionally 
consist of 74.7% of the whole sample. Besides, migrants' quality is not as poor as the 
1�Mangliu are vagrants who wander blindly without a specific direction and an aim. Sometimes, they 
are also known as "three withouts": those without the legal certificates, the proper professions and the 
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public label. Most migrants have an education level higher than primary school. 
Around 14.4% and 66.1% of them are graduates of junior middle school and senior 
middle school respectively. As to their jobs, 66.3% of the migrants are temporary 
workers and 84.6% of them engage in the works on production lines in various kinds 
of industries. Since the sample data was not collected under random sampling, we are 
unable to generalize the result to the whole population. However, the data is still 
valuable，because it provides us with a general impression on the characteristics of 
the migrants in the Pearl River Delta. In fact, the characteristics of migrants 
presented in this report are quite consistent with those in other literature concerning 
the migrants of the same district^" .^ 
Mallee (2000) shows that the rural-urban population floating mainly takes place 
in the form of chain migration rather than blind wandering. Earlier migrants provide 
information and assistance to the later migrants from their own villages, helping 
them to find job and accommodations. It results in the linkage between specific 
origins with specific destinations. Scott, Li, Shen, Hughart and Giles (1999) also 
point out that chain migration lowers the risk and the costs of transportation and 
job-searching. A study by Guowuyuan fazhan yanjiu zhongxin nongcunbu (State 
Council's Rural Development Research Center) (1996) reports that 75.6% of the 
first-time migrants found their jobs through their personal networks, which are their 
fixed living places. See Solinger (1999) Contesting Citizenship in Urban China: 63. 
14 The figures presented refer only to the migrant workers in the Pearl River Delta. Due to the 
variations of the economic modes in different regions, the characteristics of the migrant workers are 
quite different. For example, in another report of migrant workers in Sunan districts and Shanghai city 
(Yangtz River Delta), the migrant workers come mainly from Jiangsu (36.7%) and Anhui (32.2%). In 
addition, majority of the migrants are male (67.1%) and have married (51.6%). One of the reasons for 
the differences is that the economy of the Pearl River Delta is dominated by foreign-invested 
enterprises, which prefer young and single females for the production-line works. But the economy of 
the Yangtz River Delta are primarily occupied by the state-owned, collective and private enterprises. 
They see the age and gender of the workers as relatively unimportant. See Guowuyuan fazhan yanjiu 
zhongxin nongcunbu (1996) Nongmin liudong de jizhiyu zuzhi (yanjiu baogao) for comparisons. 
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relatives, friends and floating companions. Therefore, the localistic network forms an 
informal mutual support among the migrants, and consequently encourage 
similarities in occupation, residence and high frequency of interaction among its 
members^ 
iii. On comparisons between migrants and locals at the destination 
Hukou, occupation, income, welfare and living conditions are often mentioned 
when comparing the migrants with the locals. The migrants without a hukou in the 
destination are treated as outsiders by the local governments and people. In urban 
areas, while the urbanites are eligible to enjoy various welfare benefits such as 
medical and education allowance provided by the state, the migrants have to manage 
their livings by themselves. 
Solinger (1995a: 114) considers that the state, by refusing to grant these 
migrants a hukou in the destination, forces them to remain in the subordinate class. 
The migrants are, therefore, deprived of the right of leading a normal life. Besides, 
the temporary identity also exploits the migrants' prospects in some fields of jobs. 
For example, in the state-owned enterprises, hukou is a basic requirement for the 
recruitment of permanent staff. The migrants are then forced to become temporary 
staff, receiving lower salary and fewer fringe benefits, and having less chance for 
promotion. Therefore, social inequality between the locals and the migrants is 
generated. 
See also Lee (1998) Gender and The South China Miracle: Two Worlds of Factory Women for 
detailed description on the self-help activities among female migrants from the same hometown in 
factories. 
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Normally, the migrants can only be recruited in the secondary sector in the 
"dual labor market’，，taking up duties which are manual, filthy, arduous and 
burdensome (Solinger 1991). These jobs are low-skilled, informal and low-paid. But 
for the locals, they always get preferential treatment, and would always be employed 
to fill those civil posts with relatively higher payment and prestige. Knight, Song and 
Jia (1999: 87) also point out that the urban labor market is segmented between the 
migrants and the locals. There are “job discrimination" and "wage discrimination" to 
the migrants. Equally productive people do not have equal opportunity to access to 
the good jobs and are paid differently for similar jobs. Moreover, the wages of the 
urban workers are protected by the institution, while those of the migrants are 
market-determined. As a result, there is little competition between the urban workers 
and the migrants. The average income return of the migrants is much lower than that 
of the locals, even though the migrants may have put in much more effort. 
As to the living conditions, Mallee (2000) reports that the living conditions of 
the migrants are very poor. Construction workers usually live in the work sites，while 
industrial workers live in the dormitories provided by the factories. Similarly, people 
working in shops, restaurants，and service workshops simply spread their mattresses 
on the floor of their workplaces once the doors are closed at night. In some cities, the 
migrants from the same native places cluster together to form different enclaves. For 
example, in Beijing there are Zhejiang Village, Xinjiang Village, Anhui Village and 
Henan Village etc^^. They are described as "temporary colonies" by Ma and Xiang 
16 See Ma and Xiang (1998) "Native Place, Migration and the Emergence of Peasant Enclaves in 
Beijing"; Solinger (1996) "Sojourning in the Cracks and Crevices: How Peasant Migrants Live in 
Chinese Cities"; Xie (1997) "Guangzhoushi de wai sheng min gong shequn: Zhongguo minjian shehui 
de zaixian" for discussions on ethnic enclaves in cities. 
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(1998: 563). Comparing with the locals, the migrants only sojourn in the destination 
and are always forced to move, because the state will quash the ethnic enclaves 
whenever it considers the conditions of the ethnic enclaves to be out of 
administration. In addition, the migrants are always blamed by the urbanites for 
causing various social problems such as degrading the social security, increasing the 
unemployment rate, putting pressure on the infrastructure and promoting the 
pornographic business, which threaten the living environment in the cities. Therefore, 
they are unwelcome and discriminated by the urbanites. 
On the whole, Solinger describes the distinction between the privileged locals 
and the poor migrants in the cities as a new "two-class structure": 
“[0]n one hand, those for whom jobs, housing, education, cheap food, 
and medical care are an entitlement, and on the other hand, those who 
must scramble for these goods or do without.,，(1995a: 136) 
Therefore, economically speaking, it is beyond doubt that population migration 
in China, just as the push-pull model suggests, can, to a certain degree, reduce the 
income difference between the inland rural areas and the coastal developed areas. 
However, socially speaking, the segregation and stratification between the migrants 
and the locals have become more serious. Its negative effect may offset the positive 
effect on the economic side, and lead to the social conflict between the migrants and 
the locals. 
3. Omissions of the existing literature 
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Although the three categories concerning the floating population in China are 
not exhaustive, they represent the mainstreams of the academic studies on this topic. 
In the following paragraphs, I am going to point out three omissions of the literature 
and argue why they are inadequate in understanding the migrants in the 
township-and-village areas. 
i. The silence of migrants 
Most of the existing literature tries mainly to understand the population floating 
from the officials' or urbanites' viewpoints, and to describe or interpret the migrants 
through the analysis of quantitative data. The migrants seldom have the opportunity 
to articulate their perceptions towards their own situations. Undoubtedly, the macro 
descriptions of the migrants' characteristics and the structural comparisons between 
the migrants and the locals can objectively show the subordination and the 
predicaments of the migrants, but it would be too hasty to jump directly to the 
conclusion that the migrants are passive, humble and powerless, even though they 
appear in this way. It is because the macro and structural approaches cannot capture 
the inner feeling of the migrants effectively, and have ignored the fact that the 
migrants may have different interpretations of the same situation for various 
individual reasons. Therefore, it is important to listen to the migrants' subjective 
perceptions before we draw any conclusion. 
What is the migrants' experience about their migration? How do they perceive 
their predicaments and their relationships with the locals? These are all very 
important questions concerning the migrants, but they are often neglected by the 
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existing literature. The few exceptions are Jacka and Tan'?. Jacka (1998), in a 
research of female migrant workers in Hangzhou, has examined their perception to 
the prevailing urban discourses which describe them as ignorant, naive and inferior. 
Reacting to these denunciation, the migrants are "speaking bitterness" (su ku), 
complaining that they are looked down, exploited and marginalized by the Hangzhou 
people. However, Jacka has found that although the migrants feel depressed and have 
a sense of inferiority, they are by no means totally passive and cowed by the 
discrimination. On the contrary, they counter-argue the urbanites, discourses with 
Maoist concepts of equality and justice in order to vent their anger and assert their 
own worthiness as human beings. Similarity, Tan (1998) also has examined the 
subjective experiences of the female migrants, but has focused on the internal 
discourses among themselves. She has analyzed the social networks, jobs mobility, 
relationship with family, love affairs and marriage of the female migrants through the 
deduction of 109 personal letters and 9 poetry of the workers. Tan has found that 
although the experience of migration and working outside is full of pain and setback, 
it has lifelong, positive influence on the female migrants. These migrants become 
more confident and have acquired a new way of thinking. They are, on the whole, 
quite different from what they were. 
Despite their different focuses, Jacka and Tan, using the ethnographic approach, 
have both shown us the concrete experience of the migrants. One's subjective 
perceptions are so complicated and, sometimes, contradictory that we can hardly 
understand if we neglect the person involved. 
17 The other two important exceptions are Lee (1998) and Pun (1999). Both of them centrally focus 
on the experience of the female migrants working in factories, under China's transition from the 
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ii. Overlooking the township-and-village areas 
The second weakness of the existing literature on the floating population is that it 
has given undue emphasis on the cities (urban areas), but has ignored the highly 
industrialized township-and-village areas (sub-urban areas) or has mixed the two 
kinds of areas. The urban-based studies mostly attribute the migrants' problems to 
the rural-urban inequalities. For example, they underscore the rural-urban hukou 
difference, and impute the predicaments of the migrants to their being rejected to 
acquire an urban hukou. Besides, the difference in modernity between the urbanites 
and the migrants, and the urbanites' superiority complex, help explain why the 
migrants are always teased by the urbanites as "xiangxia ren “ (country bumpkin) 
(Jacka 1998: 52) or "xiangxia mei" (village girls) (Pun 1999: 4), which shows the 
urbanites' discrimination on the migrants' backwardness and lower education level. 
Undoubtedly, rural-urban inequalities are quite powerful to account for the 
migrants' situations in the urban areas. However， the case in the 
township-and-village areas is not that simple. Although the hukou system is still a 
very important factor, it is far from enough to give a full explanation to the 
difficulties faced by the migrants, because they in the township-and-village areas not 
only encounter the hukou obstacle, but also the social exclusion due to the locals' 
xenophobia. Therefore, the migrants are unable to integrate themselves into the 
destination because of institutional as well as traditional barriers. Moreover, owing to 
the agricultural background of these highly industrialized township-and-village areas, 
the education level of the locals does not surpass that of the migrants. Although the 
locals do discriminate the migrants, their superiority complex comes from their 
socialist to the capitalist economy. 
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economic well-being and the traditional localism rather than their better cultural 
quality. Therefore, in the township-and-village areas, the locals normally tease the 
migrants as laomui (female migrant workers) and laoluo^' (male migrant workers) 
instead of xiangxia ren or xiangxia mei in order to the highlight the migrants' 
migratory background and poverty (will be discussed in details in chapter 3). Last 
but not least, the explanation of the rural-urban inequalities is so static that it can 
apply to all other urban areas, because the urbanites，superiority from their urban 
hukou and higher education level relative to the migrants are more or less the same in 
all the urban areas in China. However, in the township-and-village areas, we cannot 
neglect the influence of the economic environment. Since the economic mode varies 
from "collective enterprise dominated" to "foreign-invested enterprise dominated" in 
different township-and-village districts, the relationships between the migrants and 
the locals or the employers are also not necessarily identical. As a result, we cannot 
overlook the specific influence of the particular economic mode on the migrants' 
situations at a certain district. 
In other words, the explanation of the rural-urban inequalities is, if not 
unsuitable, inadequate to explain the case of the non-urban areas. In order to shed 
light on the migrants in the township-and-village areas, we need to consider the 
traditional and the economic factors in addition to the institutional factor (hukou 
system). All these will be elaborated separately in the later chapters of this study. 
iii. Ignoring social significances 
The third weakness of the existing literature is that it usually remains on the 
individual and descriptive level when discussing the characteristics or the 
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phenomena of the floating population, but rarely indicates their social significances. 
For example, lots of the literature has mentioned the high resignation rate of the 
migrants and their strong connection with their family or localistic members. 
However, it seldom goes one more step forward to point out how these frequent 
resignation and strong familistic/localistic networks affect the migrants' reaction to 
the unfavorable conditions, and what implications they show on the maintenance of 
social stability. Moreover, their identities as "outsiders" and "passers-by" not only 
reveal the migrants' subordination to locals, but also promote their retreatism when 
facing excessive exploitation and exclusion. Political resistance to oppressors is thus 
avoided. Therefore, the mere descriptions of the migrants' characteristics are 
inadequate to help extend our vision to the larger society and provide insights to the 
concerns of this study. 
In order to grasp the social significances of the migrants' living strategies, I will 
focus on how their reactions to the structural strain help maintain the social stability 
of the Pearl River Delta. Among the various living strategies, the adoption of exit 
and family support are the most important, because they are the most explicit 
characteristics of the migrants and cover almost every aspect of their daily lives. 
Therefore, how the availability of exit and family support channel the migrants' 
reactions to the non-violent realm，and the consequent reduction of the chance of 
political action will be the main themes of this study. 
To sum up, this study tries to shed light on the migrants in township-and-village 
areas in the Pearl River Delta. Different from the previous studies on the migrants in 
urban areas, this study attempts to understand the migrants by capturing their 
subjective perceptions and learning their living strategies, especially the 
37 
employments of exit and family support. How these strategies maintain the social 
stability of the Pearl River Delta will also be discussed. I hope this study will extend 
our understanding of the floating population from the urban to township-and-village 
areas. 
III. Theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework of this study will be constructed by borrowing the 
conception of Scott, Popkin and Hirschman, and the studies of Chinese familism. In 
the following paragraphs, the discussion of exploitation (or structural strain) and 
resistance is mainly adopted from Scott's The Moral Economy of the Peasant (1976) 
and Popkin' The Rational Peasant (1978). They constitute the basic framework and 
the reference cases of this study. Besides, Hirschman's Exit, Voice and Loyalty 
(1970), which contains an in-depth investigation of actors' responses to 
dissatisfaction under different conditions, would be an important supplement to 
Scott's and Popkin's viewpoints. In addition, I have drawn the information of the 
Chinese familism from various existing literature concerning Chinese family. It 
would be very useful to help explain the migrants' self-help activities and living 
strategies, which have serious influence on their reaction to structural strain. 
1. Exploitation and resistance 
i. Marx's exploitation rate 
The classical elaboration of exploitation can be found in Marx's idea of “class’，， 
which refers to the inequality in production relationship between the proletariat and 
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the bourgeoisie. Marx points out that the capitalists (bourgeois) control the means of 
production. Therefore, they can make the workers (proletarian) produce more than 
what they need for survival, and then take away the surplus values. The ratio 
between the values necessary for the workers' survival and the surplus values being 
taken away is the "exploitation rate". The increase of “exploitation rate" would 
generate discontent and resentment among workers (Giddens 19--?: 71-88). In a 
capitalist society, capitalists, in order to maximize their profits, would intensively 
enhance their exploitation on the workers by lowering their salaries or lengthening 
their working hours. When the exploitation rate reaches a point that the proletariat 
can no longer endure, they would revolt to overthrow the bourgeoisie. 
From the viewpoint of traditional Marxist Sociology, the level of exploitation is 
proportional to the proportion of surplus values (income or products) expropriated, 
and thus can be objectively measured and compared. For instance, a worker who is 
expropriated of 20% of his income is considered to be being exploited two times of 
the one who is expropriated of 10%. Therefore, the former worker should be angrier 
to the exploiter. The Marxist tradition has provided a clear standard and definition of 
exploitation in this respect. However, its reductive approach only leads us to see the 
level of exploitation from the angle of the observer rather than the exploited. It 
"rarely provide[s] a conceptual link between a prior notion of exploitation and the 
subjective feelings of the exploited...in the absence of this conceptual bridge, any 
similarity between the level of exploitation as determined by the theory and the sense 
of exploitation among victims is largely fortuitous." (Scott 1976: 159). In addition, 
even though exploitation and discontent are the necessary conditions, as indicated by 
the Marxist tradition, to trigger a revolution (or other form of resistance), to what 
degree an exploitation will generate a sense of discontent which is strong enough to 
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initiate a revolution or resistance? Besides the objective economic account, are there 
any subjective preconceptions among the exploited that affect their perceptions of 
exploitation? The works of Scott and Popkin may provide an inspiring understanding 
to those unanswered questions of the Marxist tradition. 
ii. Scott's moral principle 
In his famous book The Moral Economy of the Peasant (1976), Scott points out 
that there are two basic characteristics of exploitation, which are commonly agreed 
by different academic traditions: First, there is a relationship between individuals, 
groups or institutions. They are composing the exploiter and the exploited. Second, 
the relationship is constituted of an unjust distribution of efforts and rewards, which 
would generate discontent and demand for equity rectification among the exploited. 
Obviously, the existence of a sense of exploitation or discontent implies that a social 
norm of justice does really exist. However, apart from these two basic agreements on 
exploitation, it is difficult to achieve consensus among different academic traditions 
on the criteria of justice (1976: 157-158). While the Marxist tradition emphasizes on 
the elimination of class exploitation, Scott claims that the social norm of justice rests 
on the principle of reciprocity and the balance of e x c h a n g e T h a t is a moral 
standard emphasizing mutual help and requiring the well-off members to share their 
resources with their poorer counterparts in the community. 
Scott, in his analysis of the Southern Asia Countries, has found that peasants 
I g 
According to Scott, the principle of reciprocity and the balance of exchange refer to the idea, "one 
should help those who help him or (its minimalist formulation) at least not injure them." This idea 
indicates a general moral principle, and its maintenance depends on the feelings of shame and 
obligation among the peasants and the landlords. See Scott (1976) The Moral Economy of the Peasant 
167-168. 
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prefer minimizing the probability of a disaster to maximizing his economic gain. In 
other words, the security of their subsistence is far more important than the amount 
of crops the landlords take away when the peasants evaluating the degree of the 
exploitation. Thus they are more likely to ask, "What is left?" than "How much is 
taken?" (1976: 7) Due to the safety-first inclination of the peasants, they take their 
subsistence being protected as their rights and think that it is the obligation of the 
landlords to guarantee their subsistence by offering help, especially when their 
livings are threatened by dearth, illness or any other accidental incidents. This moral 
principle becomes the tradition of a community. It not only affects the peasants， 
perceptions of exploitation，but also governs the behaviors of the landlords, 
preventing them from exploiting excessively and intimidating the peasants' 
subsistence. Therefore, the peasants' feeling of exploitation cannot be measured 
objectively by the exploitation rate. According to Scott, the peasants assess the level 
of exploitation on the basis of the subsistence maintenance and the moral principle. 
As he puts it: 
If the balance of exchange is deteriorating but the material situation of the 
cultivator's family is stable or even improving, discontent may be evident 
but it is unlikely to provoke massive unrest. It is when a worsening 
balance of exchange menaces crucial elements of subsistence routines, 
when it stretches existing subsistence patterns to the breaking point, that 
we may expect explosions of rage and anger. (Scott 1976: 177) 
From the peasants' point of view, the most exploitative situation is the one they 
are most often led to subsistence crises. Therefore, if the landlords conform to their 
moral obligation and secure the peasants' subsistence, especially at times of 
difficulties, they not only can relieve the peasants' feeling of being exploited, but 
also legitimize their superior status among the peasants, even though the structural 
strain or exploitation still exists between them. Hence, exploitation does not 
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necessarily result in discontent and revolution. It is an idea contrasting to that of the 
Marxist tradition. Moreover, discontent does not linearly increase with the 
"exploitation rate". It only would rocket when the peasants' living conditions 
deteriorate to an intolerable level, and only at that point, the peasants' discontent may 
be strong enough to spark a resistance off. 
The peasants usually categorize the landlords into two kinds---those who secure 
their subsistence level are “good”，while those who fail to do so are "bad". When the 
peasants' living conditions fall below the subsistence level, they would put the blame 
on the “bad” landlords, as they have violated the moral principle of the community, 
and do not respect the peasants' right of subsistence. At that time, the peasants would 
view it as morally justified to resist, either in a hidden or a collective form, in order 
to restore the moral principle and save themselves from dearth. 
Scott's moral (social) angle has replaced the Marxist tradition's economic 
viewpoint in understanding the relationship between exploitation and resistance. It 
emphasizes particularly on the subjective experience and the consciousness of human 
agency, that the reductionism of the Marxist tradition can be avoided. In his another 
famous book Weapons of the Weak: Every Forms of Peasant Resistance (1985), Scott 
argues that: 
The Marxist tradition] entails a highly reductionist leap straight from one 
or a very few economic givens to the class situation that is presumed to 
follow these givens. There are no human actors here, only mechanisms 
and puppets...Only by capturing that experience in something like its 
fullness will we be able to say something meaningful about how a given 
economic system influences those who constitute it and maintain it or 
supersede it. (1985: 42) 
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In Scott's eyes, peasants are active and sensitive, and have their own 
interpretation of the world. They evaluate the nature and the degree of exploitation 
through their own experience and situations, and by which they adjust their behavior. 
Therefore, if we do not understand the peasants' perceptions, we can hardly explain 
why they don't take up resistance or even don't feel discontent when they encounter 
the “intolerable” exploitation deemed by the Marxist tradition. Furthermore, by 
shedding light on the perceptions of the peasants, Scott's approach points out the 
their criterion of justice more concretely. It rests on the moral principle of reciprocity 
and the right of subsistence, instead of the idealistic and unrealistic class 
equalitarianism of the Marxist tradition. Only when the exploitation of the landlords 
violates the moral principle and threatens the subsistence of the peasants, the 
peasants would initiate resistance or revolution. 
iii. Popkin's individual rationality 
The social background of Scott's moral economy sets in an corporate village, 
which is a closed system with clear boundaries dividing it from the outside world, 
clear restrictions on landownership and a well-defined concept of village citizenship 
(Popkin 1978:2). Besides, the villagers' systematic participation in the communal 
political and religious affairs promotes a shared collectivity and a strong village 
identity, that in turn promotes consensual decision-making, controls internal conflict, 
and prevents the individualistic opportunism among the villagers. (Popkin 1978: 11). 
It is exactly this closed and communal environment that cultivates the moral 
reciprocity between the peasants and the landlords, and facilitates their patron-client 
relationships. The peasants，under the parental care of the landlords, are reluctant to 
take risk to improve their living standard or withdraw their filial loyalty from the 
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landlords lest they would damage their subsistence guarantee. Therefore, the 
peasants are conservative and are satisfied with basic living on the subsistence level. 
Holding a viewpoint different from that of Scott, Popkin (1978) argues that it is 
too romantic to see the peasants and the landlords as moralists. By focusing on the 
individual rationality, Popkin points out that reciprocity in the village is greatly 
restrictive and mostly limited among relative equals. The landlords will help less 
fortunate peasants only if it does not affect their own long-run welfare and the main 
motivation of helping them is not for social prestige, but for economic gain. 
Moreover, the landlords spend money on feasts, sponsoring festivals or relieving the 
peasants from dearth not only to secure their subsistence, but also to attain high 
office and to maintain their own statuses. Thus the peasants are prevented from 
assuming any important roles in village leadership or decision-making. Therefore, 
the patron-client relation actually does very little to level the inequality between the 
landlords and the peasants. On the contrary, it puts the stratification of the village 
into deadlock and blocks the upward social mobility of the peasants. 
Similarly, the peasants are not as conservative as Scott suggests. Popkin, by 
distinguishing the short-run subsistence from the long-run one, points out that the 
peasants are risk abhorrent only when they are close to the margin, and a small loss 
would be disastrous (short-run subsistence crisis). However, when the peasants have 
some surplus and a small loss would not threaten their living security, they would be 
more willing to take risky investments in the hope of a chance of advancement 
(long-run subsistence). Therefore, the peasants' insistence on the subsistence ethic 
under the short-term subsistence crisis doesn't imply their conservation. It is only a 
living strategy of demanding a safety net from the landlords and lowering the cost of 
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making risky investments at the good time. Popkin criticizes the moral economists 
that they treat all subsistence crises as of the same form of short-run crisis and thus 
have neglected the different living strategies on different subsistence levels (1978: 
17-22). From his perspective of political economy, the peasants are not conservative 
and dependent, but individually rational and aggressive to improve their self-interest 
rather than that of the entire village or collective: 
"[PJeasants are continuously striving not merely to protect but to raise 
their subsistence level through long- and short-term investments, both 
public [e.g. collective insurance] and private [e.g. risky gambling, savings 
and raising children etc.]" (1978: 4)..."[But] peasants will favor personal 
investment in future welfare.. .rather than automatically investing in, and 
relying on, future reciprocity and insurance from the village." (Popkin 
1978: 22) 
"Whatever his broad values and objectives, when the peasant takes into 
account the likelihood of receiving the preferred outcomes on the basis of 
individual actions, he usually will act in a self-interested manner." 
(Popkin 1978: 31) 
The individual rationality is more explicit when the villagers are associating 
with outsiders. Although the moral economists consider all villagers equal, the 
emphasis on "full citizenship" in a corporate village excludes the participation of the 
floaters. Popkin points out that even in the precapitalist society, the distinction 
between insiders and outsiders was very clear. The “insiders’，are those who have full 
citizenship within the village, whereas the "outsiders" are those residing in the 
geographic confines of the village, but have fewer (or even no) rights and benefits 
(1978: 43). The restriction on the floaters' full access to the village is due to the 
limitation of resources and the guarantee of the continued control the local villagers 
have on the resources. Popkin deems that this restriction does not conform to the risk 
minimizing safety-first principle, but reveals the rationality of the well-off local 
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villagers, who intend to maximize their benefits by depriving the outsiders' right and 
making them a source of cheap labors. 
From the discussion above, we can see that while the moral economists praise 
the social harmony of a corporate society，the political economists show us the 
prevalence of individual rationality and the power conflicts among the villagers. 
Popkin argues that the subsistence level is not fixed and culturally determined, but is 
variable according to the situations of the economic system (1978: 73). When the 
terms of exchange is in favor of the peasants, their subsistence level would rise 
because of their increased bargaining power. Although Popkin has not mentioned 
directly the relationship between exploitation and resistance, we can still reason out 
from his viewpoints that peasants are all rational and politically conscious, and thus 
no exploitation or moral violation is necessary to trigger off a collective action. In 
fact, the peasants are always ready to revolt if they have enough external supports^^ 
and foresee that their actions will give them more individual profit than the cost. As 
Popkin writes that: 
“[T]here is no need for dramatic subsistence crisis before peasants in 
"feudal" or subsistence areas will support revolutionaries. Peasants in 
subsistence areas may be less likely to generate new organization 
themselves, but when outside allies are available to provide the initial 
impetus they can be as revolutionary, indeed more so, than peasants in 
commercial centers.，'(1978: 28) 
"Whether a self-interested peasant will or will not contribute a collective 
action depends on individual—not group—benefits.. .the individual 
member of the group or class expects individual participation in collective 
action to be of ultimate individual benefits." (1978: 251-252) 
19 Such as organization, selective incentive benefits and leaders etc. See Popkin (1978) The Rational 
Peasants, chapter 6. 
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Scott and Popkin emphasize the morality (social viewpoint) and rationality 
(economic viewpoint) of the peasants respectively. Their contrasting viewpoints 
show that the peasants may have different interpretations of their situations, different 
relationships with the landlords, and different strategies to respond to exploitation. 
Their elaborations on the peasants would be the reference cases for this study of the 
migrants. 
Implications to my study 
In the cases of Scott and Popkin, the social background is rural village, where 
both the peasants and the landlords are local people and their geographic mobility is 
extremely low. Therefore, they can maintain a stable relationship and cultivate a 
patron-client tie between them. However, if we focus on the migrants, who are free 
to float, in township-and-village areas of the Pearl River Delta, can they still 
maintain a stable patron-client tie with the locals? How is their relationship different 
to that between the peasants and the landlords? As Popkin has indicated in his case 
that the floaters are exploited by the locals and are excluded to share local benefits^^, 
do these happen in the Pearl River Delta? Moreover, both Scott and Popkin mainly 
limit their discussions inside the village and seldom mention the outside influences. 
However, in the Pearl River Delta, both the locals and the migrants are subject to the 
constraints of the hukou system and market economy. Their situations and 
relationships must be more complicated than those in the closed village areas. 
In addition, although Scott and Popkin hold different viewpoints regarding the 
20 Popkin only intends to show the villagers' rationality, so that he has not further elaborated the 
situations of the floaters. 
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peasants' resistance to the landlords, they both do not go beyond the Marxist 
paradigm, which regards political resistance as the only mean of the oppressed to 
respond to the oppressor, either for defending the moral principle (Scott's case) or 
improving the economic gain (Popkin's case). It is because in a closed village, 
peasants are attached to the soil and lack other alternatives to secure their subsistence 
level or to improve their living standard. They only have two choices—either to 
submit or resist to the landlords, who are the only source of dependence and income. 
However, in the Pearl River Delta, the locals cannot monopolize the whole economy, 
and the migrants are free to leave if they find the situation in the destination too 
adverse to stand with or if they can grasp a better alternative elsewhere. Then, is 
resistance the only and the necessary response of the migrants to the oppressor? How 
the migrants react to the exploitation or the structural strain will hint something 
important to the social stability of the Pearl River Delta. 
Due to the differences in social settings between this study and the cases of 
Scott and Popkin, it is not suitable to argue directly with them. But I would like to 
compare this study with their cases, seeing what are the relationships between the 
locals and the migrants under different conditions? How do the migrants perceive 
their situations, by moral principle or by individual rationality? And what are their 
strategies in reacting to the dissatisfaction? 
2. Exit, Voice and Loyalty 
Hirschman's work Exit, Voice and Loyalty (1970) has an in-depth elaboration of 
the ways of discontent expression under different conditions. In his discussions on 
the recuperation of the deteriorating performance of a firm, Hirschman points out 
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that if customers are unsatisfied with the deterioration of quality of the product or 
service provided, they can express their dissatisfaction via two routes: First, they can 
stop buying the products of the firm. As the revenue drops, management of the firm 
is impelled to correct the faults and search for ways to regain its customers (The exit 
option). Second, they can complain directly to management or address their protest 
to anyone who cares to listen and would like to carry out possible cures (The voice 
option) (1970: 4). 
Although both options may be useful for the recuperation of a deteriorating firm, 
they prevail and are mostly effective in different conditions. According to Hirschman, 
the exit option belongs to the economic realm. In market economy, there are many 
firms competing with one another and no one can monopolize the whole market. 
Therefore, the customers have choices and they don't need to stick to one firm if they 
are unsatisfied with the quality of the service or the product provided. Instead, they 
can just exit to other firms, which provides service or products of better quality, in 
order to protect their own benefits. As Hirschman puts it: 
“The customers who, dissatisfied with the product of one firm, shifts to 
that of another, uses the market to defend his welfare or to improve his 
position; and he also sets in motion market forces which may induce 
recovery on the part of the firm that has declined in comparative 
performance." (Hirschman 1970: 15) 
Therefore, the freedom and the right of switching entitled by the market enable 
the customers to avoid the excessive exploitation by a firm. Moreover, the switching 
in itself is a powerful checking force to the performance of the firm, since it would 
penalize the firm by decreasing its revenues or membership for its deteriorating 
quality. 
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The social setting of the voice option is very different from that of the exit 
option. Voice often occurs in conditions which the exit option is unavailable such as 
in the family, the state, the church or the pure monopoly in the economic sphere. 
While the primary concern of the exit option is to defend one's self-interest, and 
recuperating the failing firm is only its latent function, the voice option aims at 
improving the delinquent management rather than just for selfish purpose. 
Hirschman points out that: 
“To resort to voice, rather than exit, is for the customer to member to 
make an attempt at changing the practices, polices, and outputs of the 
firm...Voice is here defined as any attempt at all to change, rather than to 
escape from, as objectionable state of affairs, whether through individual 
or collective petition to the management directly in charge, through 
appeal to a higher authority with the intention of forcing a change in 
management, or through various types of actions and protests, including 
those that are meant to mobilize public opinion." (Hirschman 1970: 30) 
In other words, the voice option belongs to the political realm. Contrasting to 
the peaceful and escapist nature of the exit option, the voice option is aggressive and 
sometimes even involves conflicts. Although voice is non-violent at the beginning, it 
may convert into a collective, vehement movement if the voice is continuously 
ignored by the management, and thus it can put political pressure on the privileged. 
Comparing the two options of discontent expression, the voice option is more 
effective to recuperate a deteriorating firm. However, under certain conditions, such 
as in the market economy, the exit option is always the dominant reaction to 
deterioration, because the customers (or members), who are most alert to the 
deterioration of the product or service quality, are most likely to exit first. Moreover, 
the cost of carrying out the voice option is much higher than that of the exit, as 
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customers must spend time and money on attempting to express their opinions and 
on having the policies and practices of the firm changed. Therefore, the exit 
alternative, which is lower in cost and handier, tends to atrophy the choice of voice. 
However, according to Hirschman, the probability of exit adoption can be 
reduced sharply if loyalty exists among the customers of the firm. Loyalty is a 
"special attachment to an organization” (Hirschman 1970: 77). It can make 
individuals less rational and can neutralize, in certain limits, the quality-conscious 
，1 
customers' tendency to exit . Moreover, the sense of belonging would initiate the 
customers' aspiration to reform the falling firm, rather than simply leave. If the most 
influential customers stay longer than they would be, the probability to achieve an 
improvement through their voices and effort would be greater. Therefore, the higher 
the degree of loyalty, the greater the probability of voice being chosen. But, at the 
same time, it also increases the risk of political conflicts between the customers and 
the management. 
Implications to my study 
Hirschman's work is an excellent supplement to those of Scott and Popkin. 
While Scott and Popkin remain in the Marxist paradigm, which emphasizes the 
necessity of resistance in response to dissatisfaction, Hirschman extends our horizon 
from the political realm to the economic one, indicating that the discontented people 
do not necessarily take up political mean (voice) to recuperate the adverse situations. 
It is a paradox that loyalty is at its most functional when it looks most irrational, such as one's 
loyalty to his country or to a political party. The origin of such an irrational loyalty is difficult to be 
clarified. It may be inborn or achieved through the long-term cultivation. But it is certain that the 
stubborn attachment cannot be established or changed easily or suddenly. See Hirschman (1970) Exit, 
Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States: 79-82. ’ 
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Instead, they may just employ economic mean (exit) to protect themselves from 
excessive exploitation. Obviously, the freedom of exit is absent in the cases of Scott 
and Popkin. However, in the Pearl River Delta, migrants can make use of their 
floating nature and the fluidity of the labor market to switch whenever and wherever 
they want. In addition, the migrants, as outsiders in the destination, do not have any 
loyalty to the locals, the employers and the local community. Then, how do the 
migrants express their dissatisfaction? Exit or Voice? Will they tend to employ exit 
rather than voice in response to the exploitation and exclusion from the locals and the 
employers? Hirschman's conception of exit, voice and loyalty has provided valuable 
insights for the examination of the migrants' reaction to the structural strain and the 
explanation of the social stability of the Pearl River Delta. 
3. The Chinese Familism 
In Chinese society, family always plays a key role in every aspect of social and 
individual lives. Therefore, it cannot be neglected even if we are focusing on the 
most economically developed areas of China. Lau emphasizes: 
“[A]s the ethos of familism constitutes a major component of the 
cultural codes of a society which underlies the operation of its social 
institutions and the patterning of human behavior, the general absence 
of attention to this area is deplomble.,,( 1978b: 2) 
Fei also deems that: 
“To stress the equal importance of the traditional and the new forces is 
necessary because the real process of change of Chinese economic life 
is neither a direct transference of social institutions from the West nor a 
mere disturbance of a traditional equilibrium. The problems arising 
from the present situation are results of the interaction of these two 
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forces. ”(1939: 1-2) 
In this study, the family and the kinship networks are also very critical in the 
daily lives of the migrants, ranging from finding jobs to emotional support. Therefore, 
it is essential to explore also the influences and the functions of the family and 
kinship networks in order to understand the behaviors and living strategies of the 
migrants. 
Traditionally，family has been the most important and basic social institution 
that constitutes the society. Chinese family is an extended structure, which includes 
the family members within a house as well as ‘‘children even when they have grown 
up and married. Sometimes it also includes some relatively remote patrilineal 
kinsmen." (Fei 1939: 27) Since the Chinese family institution is so restrictive, it 
suppresses the emergence of individualism and generates a strong sense of familism 
among Chinese (Jin 1980: 70-71). Therefore, most Chinese lack a public spirit and 
distinguish their family and kinship members from outsiders clearly. This family 
introversion has undoubtedly enhanced Chinese tendency to exclude outsiders, but 
simultaneously, it has also strengthened the interdependence and the solidarity within 
a extended family. One of the most important principles of a family is the sharing of 
happiness and suffering (同甘共苦）among family members, which helps ensure the 
social continuity and harmony of an extended family. 
After 1949, the Chinese communist revolution has destroyed the traditional 
family structure in China. Many functions of the traditional family have been 
replaced by state organizations. However, the gradual retreat of the state as the 
generous welfare provider since the introduction of economic reforms in 1978 has 
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reactivated the extended family structure as the social supporting network for it 
members. Chan and Qiu (1999), in a survey of “off-duty workers", have discovered 
that the "off-duty workers" rely on their social capital, accumulated through 
connections with friends, neighbors and especially kinship ties, increasingly in 
acquiring the most important material aid and guidance in job search. These social 
supporting networks reduce the workers' dependence on the state and revitalize 
many traditional values of Chinese family. Lau (1978b), in a research of Chinese new 
immigrants, holds the similar viewpoint that when formal social institutions are 
inadequate, the new immigrants tend to return to their family for support. Lau's 
conception of utilitarianistic familism describes the adverse situation of institutional 
vacuum in Hong Kong, in which new immigrants cannot seek any living protection 
from the government and society. Therefore, they rely on mutual support, 
particularly the economic assistance, among family members to cope with the hostile 
and highly unpredictable environment. Apart from the function of subsistence 
security, the family network also serves as a mean for the new immigrants to achieve 
an upward social mobility by providing the initial capital for starting business. As 
Lau says: 
“[F]amilistic ties are the most handy organizational principles to form 
groups with larger resource bases in order to protect or promote one's 
interests in society." (Lau 1978b: 34) 
“[F]or most of the Chinese capitalists, the capital which is necessary for 
the launching of any economic enterprise has to come from one's family 
and relatives...Sociologically speaking, the importance of the family in 
the economic sector reinforces its importance in the social sector." (Lau 
1978a: 37) 
Although the ultilitarianistic familism focuses only on the function of a family 
in the utilitarian (or materialistic) purposes rather than the multi-purpose nature of 
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the traditional familism , the idealistic conception of interdependence and solidarity 
among extended family members still persist. It is especially so in the time of 
difficulty, when the family serving as one's strongest supporting network and the last 
resort is more than obvious. 
Similarly, Lee (1998) depicts the importance of localistic networks among 
migrant workers. The networks help the migrants to make the initial trip to Shenzhen, 
to find jobs, to acquire skills, to survive in the time of unemployment, and to change 
to a better factory etc. Laoxiang (acquaintances of the same hometown) is the main 
source of support of the migrants while they are far away from homes and need help 
to solve the various problems they encounter. The migrants' dependence on laoxiang 
is also because they have been offered no social protection in the destination. As Lee 
has mentioned: 
"Because neither the state nor the employer provided insurance or 
subsidies to cover workers medical needs, workers had no alternative but 
to count on locals [here refer to laoxiang] for emotional, economic, and 
practical support." (Lee 1998: 88) 
The term “Laoxiang” emphasizes the localistic relationship among migrants. 
Comparing with the term “family and kinship network，，，the boundary of laoxiang is 
more elastic, and can vary from having come from the same village to from the same 
province. In fact, the two terms, “family and kinship network" and “laoxiang”, are 
overlapping. People of the same family and kinship network are also laoxiang, but 
not vice versa. In a highly unstable and unpredictable situation, those laoxiang, who 
are most willing to give help in the time of long-term unemployment and suffering 
22 See Lau (1978b) From Traditional Familism to Utilitarianistic Familism: The Metamorphosis of 
Familial Ethos among the Hong Kong Chinese for discussions on the differences between the 
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from a serious illness, are actually the family and kinship members. For those 
laoxiang without family and kinship relationship, they are mostly casual friends in 
daily lives. Therefore, if we focus on the adverse situations, we would find that the 
family and kinship network rather than laoxiang has become the supporting network 
of the migrants (will be further elaborated in Chapter 5). Then it brings us back to the 
discussions of Chinese family. 
Although the migrants are far away from homes, they are not totally withdrawn 
from their extended families, which provide them with safety network and mutual 
support for survival in the adverse conditions without any institutional protections. 
Implications to my study 
Needless to say, the migrants in the Pearl River Delta are living a hard life since 
they have to face the xenophobia from the locals and the serious exploitation from 
the employers. In addition，they are not eligible to enjoy any institutional benefits 
and protection from the local governments. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that 
the migrants rely heavily on their extended family for support. 
Since most of the migrants have family and kinship members working in 
different factories or at different places, they can share job information and 
accommodation. This existing family and kinship network has undoubtedly 
facilitated the migrants' exit. Referring to Hirschman's conception, will the migrants 
thereby tend to employ exit rather than voice as a response to the unsatisfactory 
environment? Moreover, the importance and functions of the migrants' remote 
traditional familism and the utilitarianistic familism. 
56 
homes have been neglected by most of the previous studies concerning the migrants 
working in the destination. However, the extremely adverse situations of the 
destination force migrants to rely on not only their family and kinship members 
nearby, but also their remote homes. In this study, I would like to examine how the 
migrants' remote homes can also support their living by serving as the last safety net 
or the last resort of exit. 
As for the maintenance of social stability, it is paradoxical that familism, on one 
hand, may enlarge the cleavage and even trigger off conflicts between the locals and 
the migrants. On the other hand, however, it may resolve the political discontent of 
the migrants "through the process of ‘familization’ of politics within the familial 
groups" (Lau 1978a: 32). In other words, if the migrants can handle their living 
problems by making use of their family and kinship network, their need of 
institutional protection from the local governments and people will be smaller, and 
thus the potential conflicts between them can be reduced. Then, what are the effects 
of familism to the social stability of the Pearl River Delta? Does it resolve the 
migrants' political discontent or worsen their conflicts with the locals? 
4. A synthesizing theoretical framework 
In this study, in order to understand how the migrants perceive and respond to 
the exclusion and exploitation, I make use of the conception from Scott, Popkin, 
Hirschman and the studies of Chinese familism. I would like to have a dialogue with 
Scott and Popkin, so as to make the situation of the migrants and the theoretical 
reflections of this case more explicit. In addition, referring to the specialties of this 
case，I borrow the concepts of exit，voice and loyalty from Hirschman and the studies 
57 
of Chinese familism to highlight the availability of exit and family support of the 
migrants, which Scott and Popkin have not covered adequately in their studies. I 
hope that the synthesis of these concepts would enable me to have a clearer and more 
comprehensive interpretation of the migrants' perceptions and living strategies, as 
well as their political implications. 
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Chapter 3 
A dichotomous community: the construction of oppressed and oppressor 
in Tianshen Township 
Apart from laws, even from the angle of humanism, urbanites and 
officials should think in the position of those migrant workers, who 
cannot eat full at homes by farming and are discriminated in cities, 
how can they make a living? They are by no means privileged enough 
to pursue their happiness, but only strive for survive. Why don't we 
give them such a chance? Are we too poor in humanistic spirit? 
Human equality should not be an abstract pet phrase for cheating 
people. Migrant workers are our brothers and sisters. Only they were 
unluckily born in rural areas that make their lives much bumpier than 
ours. We don ’t have any reason to look down on migrants and neither 
does the government to set up occupational barriers to them. 
---Beijing laoshi 2000 
The field site of this study, Tianshen Township, is a rural area in the Pearl River 
Delta. It has a high level of industrialization, but a relatively lower level of 
urbanization, and its economy mainly depends on rent collection from foreign 
investors (renting economy). Therefore, the migrants working there face not only the 
hukou barrier, but also the serious xenophobia from locals and the adverse 
exploitation from employers, who try to ensure their own benefits by taking 
advantages of the migrants. In this chapter, I am going to elaborate in detail the 
background of the field site, examining how the economic reforms has led to rapid 
industrialization and a special model of renting economy in Tianshen. In addition, I 
would like to clarify the unequal relationships between the migrants and the locals or 
the employers (the oppressed and the oppressor) from six different aspects, showing 
how the subordinate position of the migrants are constructed by the influences of 
institutional (hukou), traditional (xenophobia) and economic (renting economy) 
factors, which have split the community. 
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I. Going down to the field site 
1. Guangdong: one step ahead in China^^ 
In 1978, Maoist equalitarianism was replaced by Deng's uneven development 
model. After the turmoil of Cultural Revolution, Deng introduced market economy to 
rebuild the bankrupt economy of China, aiming at improving the poor living 
conditions of people and regaining the legitimacy for the Chinese Communist Party. 
In order to activate economic development, Deng announced that some people and 
regions should get rich first, so that they could act as a demonstration to other people 
and regions (Deng 1983). This idea marked the beginning of uneven regional 
development in China after the economic reforms. 
From the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1981-85), the central government has 
designated specific economic roles of the “three economic belts" {sanda jingji didai) 
to the eastern, central and western China according to their endowments. There are 
export-oriented industrialization and foreign trade in the eastern region; agriculture 
and energy development in the central region; and animal husbandry and mineral 
exploitation in the western region (Fan 1997: 623). The central government's 
purpose is to promote regional division of labor. The policy stresses primarily the 
development of the eastern region, and the central and the western regions only play 
the supporting roles by providing natural resources and labor power to fliel the 
eastern economic take-off. The implementation of "coastal development strategy" in 
This term is used by Vogel (1989) in One Step Ahead in China: Guangdong Under Reform to 
describe the outstanding performance of Guangdong in China's economic reforms. 
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late 1980's has further pushed up the export-led industry in the eastern region by 
setting up open zones along the coastal areas and implementing preferential policies 
{qiangxie zhengcef"^ to attract foreign investment. 
Guangdong is the province benefited most from those new development 
strategies. Before the reforms, Guangdong was an agricultural province with most of 
her population being peasants. However, the creation of Shenzhen, Zhuhai and 
Shantou special economic zones (SEZs), and also the open economic zone of the 
Pearl River Delta after reforms have turned Guangdong dramatically into a foreign 
investment center. In addition to preferential policies implemented by the central 
government, Guangdong's proximity to Hong Kong and strong relationships with the 
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outside world have also enabled her to become an opportunity window, not only 
for her own development, but also for the industry transplantation of Hong Kong. 
Hong Kong has been famous for her light industries, especially cloth-making, 
electronics, textile, toy and clock productions. All these are labor-intensive 
production. From 50's to 70,s, their huge demand of labors was fulfilled by the 
tremendous amount of illegal immigrants from China. However, after 1978, the 
co-effort of Hong Kong and Guangdong governments in depressing the tide of illegal 
migration has blocked the source of labor supply. Since then, Hong Kong has faced 
the problem of labor shortage. In 1988, the unemployment rate of Hong Kong was 
below 2% (Vogel 1989: 68-69). It largely pushed up workers' wages. In 90,s, the 
24 See Fan (1997) "Uneven Development and Beyond: Regional Development Theory in Post-Mao 
China，’: 624-625 for the details on the designation of open zones and preferential policies. 
According to Vogel, 80% of the overseas Chinese have come from Guangdong. They maintain a 
feeling of goodwill toward their homeland and continue to send financial support to their relatives in 
China. Therefore, they are the potential investors of Guangdong after the economic reforms. See 
Vogel (1989) One Step Ahead in China: Guangdong Under Reform, chapter 3 for discussions on 
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average wage of Hong Kong workers was 5 times of Malaysia, 6 times of Thailand 
and 7 times of Philippine. Meanwhile, due to the limitation of space in Hong Kong, 
the land price for industry development sky-rocketed from HK$105 per square meter 
in 1959 to HK$41000 in 1992. The rate of increase was 390 times in 33 years (Li 
1997b: 11). Since the production cost of the manufacturing industries in Hong Kong 
was so high, they became less competitive in the international market. Transplanting 
the manufacturing industries to China in order to lower the production cost was the 
only way for them to maintain their competitiveness. 
Hong Kong and Guangdong both have their own comparative advantages. Hong 
Kong is a world-class information, financial and transportation center, and can 
provide capital and management skill for the economic take-off of Guangdong. What 
Guangdong possesses are abundant natural resources, preferential policies, cheap 
labors and lands, which are exactly what the Hong Kong's manufacturing industries 
go short of. Therefore, the cooperation of Hong Kong and Guangdong is “a natural 
combination for competing in international markets" (vogel 1989:446). In 1994, 70% 
of Hong Kong manufacturing industries had moved to China, mostly to Guangdong 
province, and over 4 millions workers were employed. The moving ratio of toy 
production was 90%; shoe making 80%; electronics, textile, clock and cloth 
production 70%-80% (Li 1997b: 12-13). Since 1987, Taiwanese citizens were 
allowed to visit their relatives in China, and some Taiwanese businessmen began to 
invest in China. Because Taiwan and China have no direct transportation，most 
Taiwanese are traveling back and forth China through Hong Kong. In this respect, 
Guangdong also possesses the biggest advantage to receive Taiwanese capital. 
Guangdong's superiorities in China's economic reforms. 
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With all these advantages, Guangdong has become the new investment center 
for foreign investors and has gained the leading position in the national economic 
development after the economic reforms. Because of the influx of capitals from 
Hong Kong, Taiwan and other foreign countries, Guangdong has rapidly been 
industrialized and has been incorporated into the world economic system. 
2. Dongguan: a place of borrowed capitals and borrowed labors 
Hong Kong's investment in Guangdong has a "small-city-and-town bias" (/J�城 
鎮f頃向）relative to the ‘‘big-city bias"(大城市f頃向）of other foreign countries (Yang 
1997: 208). Therefore, small cities and townships in the Pearl River Delta are the 
main receivers of Hong Kong capital. For example, Dongguan, situated in the eastern 
side of the Pearl River Delta and adjacent to Shenzhen city, is one of the hot spots of 
Hong Kong investment. According to statistics, the per capita foreign investment of 
China in 1998 was US$47，while that of Dongguan was US$11422, which was 2226 
times of the national average (Dongguan tongji nianjian 1999: 397). Yang has found 
that over 90% of the total foreign investment in Dongguan comes from Hong Kong 
(1997: 207). The influx of Hong Kong capitals has driven Dongguan's economic 
development to a high speed. In 80,s，its GDP increased at an average rate of 19%, 
which was the highest among the “four little tigers"^^ of Guangdong (Zhao and Yin 
1995: 10). Due to her outstanding economic performance, Dongguan was upgraded 
from a county to a city by the State Council in 1985 and was made become a part of 
26 The "four little tigers" of Guangdong are Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shunde and Nanhai. They situate 
in the eastern and the western sides of the Pearl River Delta. In 1981-1990, their average GDP are 
15-19%, which are much higher than the 7% of the national average and the 7-8% of the "four little 
dragons" in Asia in the same period. See Zhao and Yin (1995) "Zhongguo xiaochengzhen fazhan de 
dongli ji luxiang: yi Guangdong Dongguan wei li", table 2. 
63 
the Pearl River Delta open zone . 
Dongguan is a model of export-processing industry. Many factories have been 
set up in the forms of san lai yi bu (三來一補）and sanzi qiye (三資企業)28, which 
receive materials from Hong Kong and transport the finished products back to Hong 
Kong for export directly. In 1998, there were 38,323 TVEs in Dongguan^^ 
{Dongguan tongji nianjian 1999: 179). The rapid industrialization of Dongguan and 
the great demand of labors of those labor-intensive manufacturing industries 
exhausted the local labor supply quickly in the early 1980's. Migrant workers were 
then recruited from elsewhere to meet the need for further industry expansion (Vogel 
1989: 179). In fact, most counties or cities in the Pearl River Delta faced the similar 
problem of labor shortage and used the similar solution to fuel their economy by 
attracting a large amount of migrant workers from all over China since then. 
“Millions of migrant workers going down to the Pearl River Delta"(百萬民工下珠 
、江)is a common saying among Chinese to describe the proliferation of migrant 
workers rushing for jobs in the Pearl River Delta. According to the estimation of 
Public Security Bureau, the migrant workers in the Pearl River Delta amount 
approximately to 8-9 millions from 1993 onwards (Yang 1997: 209). Therefore, 
Hong Kong investors who transplant their factories in the Pearl River Delta can 
enjoy the most abundant labor supply in the world, and thus can reduce their 
27 Despite the official definition, Dongguan city is still mainly composed of township-and-village 
areas, where accommodate most of her population. 
28 
San laiyi bu is a form of enterprise cooperation between the Chinese and the foreign partners. The 
foreign investors provide the materials, the models of products and the equipment, while the Chinese 
side provides the building, electricity, other local utilities and the labors. See Vogel (1989) One Step 
Ahead in China: Guangdong Under Reform: 176-177. Sanzi qiye refers to the three types of 
enterprises receiving foreign funds: equity joint ventures, co-operative joint ventures and wholly 
foreign-owned companies. 
29 Although TVEs are defined as collective enterprises officially, those in Dongguan are mostly 
cooperated with or wholly invested by the foreign investors. 
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production cost. By mid 80,s, when other Asian countries such as Singapore, were 
suffering from serious economic recession, Hong Kong still managed to maintain her 
economic booming. It was because she has set up a new link with China, especially 
with Guangdong (Vogel 1989: 445). 
The number of temporary migrants in Dongguan had been increasing speedily 
in 90’s. From 1994 to 1997, the migrants were more or less the same amount as the 
local people. In 1998, the number of migrants had even exceeded that of the locals by 
about 500 thousands (see Table 2). Most of the migrants were job seekers who 
floated from inland rural areas to find job in factories in the Pearl River Delta. 
Table 2: Population of locals and migrants in Dongguan City (in 10,000) 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Locals with household 141.40 143.65 145.25 147.12 148.77 
registration  
Temporary migrants 139.09 142.18 143.32 144.68 199.11 
Source: Dongguan tongji nianjian 1999, made up from Pp. 74 and 76. 
With sufficient lands and labor power, Dongguan is very attractive to foreign 
investors. As Mr. Tarn, a Hong Kong manager of a cloth-making factory in 
Dongguan, said: 
"[Here], the rent of buildings is cheap and the workers are available as 
much as you want. In addition, the workers are compliant. If they work 
for a certain period of time, they will become skilled workers also, 
producing more or less the same quality as Hong Kong workers...Their 
wages are relatively low, about one tenth of that of their Hong Kong 
counterpart." (Interview in Hong Kong Connection 5/1/92) 
Apart from the low prices of lands and workers, another attraction of Dongguan 
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is her loose labor regulations. It enables the investors to control their workers more 
easily and to run their factories without much governmental interference. A Hong 
Kong director of a cloth-making factory in Dongguan indicated: 
"There is no a department here similar to the Hong Kong Labor 
Department, so that we can require the workers to work over time 
whenever we want. We need not to apply. We can have them to work until 
ten or twelve o'clock at night, no problem; to work on Sunday, no 
problem; to work for thirty days a month, also no problem." (Interview in 
Hong Kong Connection 5/1/92) 
Dongguan is a paradise for the foreign investors as well as a golden mine for the 
migrant workers. The influx of the foreign capitals and the migrant workers fuel the 
Dongguan's rapid industrialization, and Dongguan in itself enjoys the fruitful 
economic results for its role as a capital-labor platform. More specifically, Dongguan 
is actually a place of borrowed capitals and borrowed labors, and from which 
Dongguan gains a great deal of rent every year by leasing factory buildings and 
dormitories. In some townships of Dongguan, rent collected from property leasing 
comprises almost all of their total income. The local governments and people are 
acting as a property landlord rather than an industrial entrepreneur. Therefore, 
contrasting to the common recognition that sees Dongguan as a representative model 
of export-processing industry, it is better to view it as a model of “renting economy". 
3. Tianshen Township: the interweaving of modem and traditional elements 
i. The typical case of renting economy 
Although the numbers of temporary migrants in Dongguan listed in Table 2 are 
phenomenal, the city averages cannot show the reality of some local districts. One 
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district that largely outnumbers the city average is Tianshen Township, which is one 
of the 33 townships (districts) of Dongguan. 
Tianshen, the field site of this study, situated in South East of Dongguan, is near 
Shenzhen Huangtian Airport and Guangzhou (See Appendix D). The Guangshen 
(Guangzhou to Shenzhen) expressway and No. 107 interstate highway run through it. 
The convenient transportation and the efficient service system of Tianshen make it 
become the "investment paradise" for foreign investors. In recent years, Tianshen has 
been given more than ten honorary titles such as "The Star of China Townships"(中 
國鄕鎭之星)，"The Advanced Township of China"(全國村鎭建設先進鎭)，“100 
Best Townships in Investment Environment"(中國鄉鎭投資環境 100 強）etc. By 
1998, 1357 TVEs had been set up in Tianshen and 350,754 temporary migrants had 
moved there, while the local population of Tianshen was only 32,655 {Dongguan 
tongji nianjian 1999). In table 3, we can see the ratio of migrants to locals in the 13 
villages of Tianshen. 
Table 3: Population of locals and migrants in the 13 villages of Tianshen in 1998 
Locals Migrants Ratio of migrants to locals 
Tianshen Township — 32,655 350,754 10.74 
VI 1,584 - 13,100 8.27 
V2 _ 3,025 一 39,525 “ 13.07 
V3 _ 1,044 一 14,952 “ 14.32 ~ 
V4 _ 3,452 - 33,620 “ 9.74 ~ 
V5 一 2,887 18,540 — 6.42 
V6 — 3,339 - 47,500 “ 14.23 一 
V7 — 798 8,250 — 10.34 
V8 — 5,279 一 47,747 • 9.04 — 
V9 一 2,209 41,000 — 18.56 
VIO — 2,890 - 36,130 • 12.50 一 
Vll 2,254 - 20,000 • 8.87 
V12 — 1,086 18,500 17.03 
V13 2,808 11,890 4.23 
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Source: Dongguan tongji nianjian 1999: Pp. 358; V= Village 
In all villages of Tianshen, the numbers of migrants are normally several to 
twenty times of locals. However, again, the official figures show only part of the 
reality, since they only record those migrants who have registered as temporary 
residents with the local Public Security Bureau, while those who have not registered 
are omitted. In fact, the numbers of migrants are definitely much larger than the 
figures shown in the official records. Although the real figures are indefinite, some 
locals venture to estimate that there are more than 600 thousand migrants in Tianshen 
by 2000. In VI, for example, the number of migrants announced by the village 
government is 20 thousands in 2000, but the leader of the village security team 
assesses the number to be more than 30 thousands. 
Tianshen has been completely industrialized since the implementation of 
economic reforms. Almost all the farmlands have been claimed by the local 
governments for industrial usage. Every village has several industrial zones, where 
tens to hundreds of foreign-invested factories situate. However, factory works are 
undesirable to the locals, especially the manual works, which are despised as 
servitude. Even the office works in factories are only the last choices of the locals. 
Some youngsters in Tianshen reject to work in factories, even though they have no 
job, and are just playing around, gambling or sleeping all day. Generally, the locals 
would like to set up their own businesses or work in the governmental departments, 
because these jobs are more comfortable and highly paid, and more importantly, they 
would have dividend sharing there, which can amount to tens of thousand yuan or 
more at the end of the year. Therefore, almost all factory works are taken up by the 
migrant workers. Most of them work on production lines in manufacturing factories 
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producing various products for oversea exportation. They live in dormitories 
provided by their employers with normally ten to twenty colleagues in a room, and 
have their meals in factory canteens which serve coarse and rough dishes. However, 
they can only get about 300-500 yuan a month in return for their tough lives. The 
locals and the migrants are two contrasting groups with totally different job nature 
and living standards as if they are living in two different worlds. The sharp inequality 
between them gives rise to a strong uneasy feeling, at least to an outside observer as 
me. 
The influx of foreign investors and migrant workers enables the local 
governments and people to receive a large amount of rent and fees from them. From 
Table 4, the monetary income of village 1 government in 2000, we can see that its 
income comes mainly from property renting and contracting, which constitutes about 
70% of the total income. Moreover, the government does not run any business 
directly and has made just one investment on a petrol station, which accounts for 
only 12% of the total income. Clearly, the village government is actually a big 
landlord. As a local indicates, nowadays they "reaps without sowing"(不勞而獲)， 
since they just sit and enjoy the fruits of economic growth contributed by the foreign 
investors and the migrant workers��. 
…Village 1 is composed of four villagers' groups, which are the former production teams. If we 
examine the monetary income of the villagers' groups, we may be more surprised about the sources of 
their income. For example, the following table shows the monetary income of the villagers' group 
in June of 2000. We can see that the villagers' group has not run any business or factory by itself. 
100% of its income has come from property renting and contracting. More specifically, the income 
from renting factory buildings, dormitories and shop fronts has accounted for over 90% of the total 
income. 
Monetary income of the villagers，group, village 1 (June/2000)  
Items Amount (yuan) % of total income  
I. Renting and contract income 377,891 foo 
1. Factory building rent 210,073 5 5 . 6 0 ~ 
2. Dormitory and shop front rent 139,173 36.83 
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Table 4: Monetary income of village 1 government in 2000 
Items Amount (yuan) % of total income 
I. Renting and contracting income 17,917,399 86.23 — 
1. Factory building rent 14,007,372 “ 67.41 
2. Shop front rent 0 0 
3. Land rent — 4,480 — 0.02 
4. Agricultural contract fee 17,000 0.08 一 
5. Other contract fee 112,662 0.54 — 
6. Management fee — 3,531,739 17.00 
7. Remittance income 244,145 
IL Direct operation business income 0 0.00 
III. Other business income 350,475 1.69 
1. Interest income 18,394 0.09 
2. Fine from contract breaking 0 0 
3. Management business income 0 0 
4. Other _ 332,081 一 1.60 一 
IX. Investment profit 2,510,000 12.08 
I. Petrol station 2,510,000 “ 12.08 
Total income 20,777,874 100 
Source: notice of village 1 government 
Although the case of village 1 seems incredible, it is very common in Tianshen. 
Since the economic level of village 1 in Tianshen is about average among the 13 
villages, its case can roughly reflects the general situations in Tianshen. The huge 
sum of rent collected by the local governments supports the public services of the 
local community and generates satisfactory welfare and dividend for the locals. Out 
of self-interest, the localistic protectionism is very strong among the locals in 
Tianshen. Outsiders are excluded from sharing local economic profits, and this 
3. Land rent 28,645 7.58 
4. Agricultural contract fee Q o 
5. Other contract fee 0 o 
6. Management fee 0 o 
II. Direct operation income 0 0 
III. Other business income 0 0 
Total income 377,891 100 一 
Source: notice of the villagers' group, village 1 
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makes legal immigration more difficult (this point will be discussed in detail later), 
ii. The persistence of traditional elements 
Compared with its advanced industrialization, the degree of urbanization in 
Tianshen is relatively low. Anderson comments, “a country with a high level of 
industrialism also possesses a high level of urbanism." (1964: 1) However, it is only 
true to the modem society which developed slowly over several centuries. The 
slowness permits a gradual accommodation to the needs of an expanding 
industrial-urban economy. But it is not the case in the township-and-village areas in 
the Pearl River Delta. As the pace of industrialization in the Pearl River Delta is so 
quick, most townships such as Tianshen have been completely industrialized in less 
than twenty years. However, the pace of urbanization still lags far behind. 
Undoubtedly, if we talk about urbanization structurally and materially in terms of 
population size, infrastructure, non-agricultural occupation proportion, and the living 
standard of people, many townships in the Pearl River Delta have already achieved 
the level of a small city. Sayings like “we have whatever the urbanites have" or “we 
live better than the urbanites" reflect the locals material well-being, which is 
comparable to that of the urbanites^ \ However, urbanization involves not only an 
evolution into a city structurally and materially, but also a shift of cultural contents in 
behavior and belief (Simic 1973: 9). Therefore, it is in the aspect, the locals have not 
been totally modernized to become urbanites. The rural legacy is still quite 
influential to the locals. 
�Z h e has described concretely about the urbanization of a village in the Pearl River Delta. It shows 
the prosperous conditions and excellent infrastructure of the local community. See Zhe (1997) 
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Zhe (1997) in a study of a fast-developed village in the Pearl River Delta has 
also found that even under the high level industrialization and structural urbanization, 
the locals still maintain their rural living styles to a certain degree, especially the 
emphasis on kinship relationship and social order. Thus, the economic activities of 
the village do not merely depend on legal and market regulations, but also on 
informal means such as recognition of identity, credit of friendship and communal 
consciousness etc. This form of society pattern is still far different from the 
industrial-urban society described by Sjoberg: 
“The industrial-urban society depends on inanimate energy sources, 
'science' is important...the class system is fluid; achievement is more 
common than ascription; social power is diffused; the conjugal family is 
the ideal norm, with kinship playing a relatively minor role in human 
relations. The modem economic system is rationalized, is characterized 
by a greater division of labor, and is highly standardized...and there is 
widespread literacy." (Sjoberg 1960: 4-12, quoted in Simic 1973: 8) 
Similar to the case of Zhe, some traditional features such as the domination of 
patriarchy, the xenophobia toward outsiders, the emphases on kinship relations and 
ascription are still prevailing in Tianshen. Those parochial spirits make the social 
integration of the migrants so difficult, and thus have indirectly exploited their 
chances of achieving upward social mobility in the local community. Therefore, 
Tianshen has been urbanized in appearance, but it still lacks the urban cultural 
contents. The coexistence of modem and traditional elements in Tianshen results in 
its social specialty, which is different from that of purely rural or purely 
industrial-urban society. By borrowing Simic's term, Tianshen is in the form of an 
"intermediate society，’，where "one finds two cultural systems [modem and 
traditional] operating simultaneously, sometimes in harmony and mutual dependence, 
Cunzhuang de zaizao: yi ge "chaoji cunzhuang" de shehui bianqian: 329-337. 
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and sometimes in oppositions, inhibiting development." (Simic 1973: 10) Besides, 
Zhe's description of the highly industrialized villages as "industrial villages" (1997: 
339) can also depict the interweaving of modem industry and traditional features in 
the Pearl River Delta. 
Tianshen, a closed rural community before the economic reforms, has suddenly 
jumped into the world economic system due to the opening of China and the inflow 
of foreign investment. Meanwhile, the influx of migrants has disturbed the simplicity 
and quietness of the small community. One of the most obvious changes is that the 
locals are now the minority (in quantity) but the privileged among the migrants. 
What are the relationships between the migrants (oppressed) and the locals or the 
employers (oppressor)? How are their relationships constructed by the macro factors 
of institution, economy and tradition? I am going to elaborate these questions from 
six aspects in the following paragraphs. 
II. Unequal relationships between the oppressed and the oppressor 
1. Household registration differences 
By 1950s, a strict policy of household registration system {hukou system) was 
implemented to affix people on their birthplaces. The policy aimed at ensuring that 
the peasants would remain on their lands and produce enough foods and resources 
for the industrialization and modernization of urban China (Solinger 1999). However, 
the latent function of the hukou system had actually led to a class distinction between 
the urbanites and the rural people. Since then, one's identity was inherited from 
his/her parents' resident statuses, which in turn determined the person's entire 
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livelihood such as social rank, job nature, wages, welfare and citizen rights. 
Although the restrictions to the population movement have been removed after the 
economic reforms, the hukou system still exists. It acts as a straitjacket in 
constraining the life chances of people, especially those rural people. 
According to the state constitution, "All persons holding the nationality of the 
People's Republic of China are citizens, equal before the law, and enjoying the rights 
while performing the duties prescribed in the constitution and the law." (Solinger 
1999: 7) However, the equality of the Chinese citizens promised by the constitution 
does not realize, because the Chinese citizenship is hooked up with the hukou system, 
and people can only be full citizens in their native places. Once they leave their 
native places, they will inevitably lose a certain part of citizen rights and become 
second-class citizens in other peoples' places. As Solinger points out: 
“[T]he Chinese hukou even served as a mean of preventing floating 
farmers from exercising the franchise in a city (for whatever it was worth 
in socialist China), no matter how long they lived there, and thus from 
being genuine members of the municipality." (1999: 5) 
Undoubtedly, the urban-rural hukou difference is the most explicit indicator of 
social stratification. The urbanites are ranked on the top of the rural people by the 
state, and can enjoy various kinds of benefits which are beyond the imagination of 
the rural people. However, this class inequality does not just exist between the rural 
migrants and the local urbanites in cities. In fact, the migrants staying in the 
township-and-village areas of the Pearl River Delta, where are officially defined as 
rural areas, are also treated as second-class citizens by the local governments and 
people. 
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In Tianshen, there are two types of hukou, township resident and peasant. 
Normally, the resident hukou is classified as urban hukou, and thus is ranked higher 
than the peasant's one, according to the official definition. However, since the rapid 
economic development of Tianshen has yielded substantial income in every village, 
the village government would redistribute the profits to its villagers (peasant hukou 
holders) in the forms of dividend , welfare and benefits, which the resident hukou 
holders are unqualified to receive . Therefore, a peasant hukou is like a credit card 
in Tianshen which makes the locals, contrasting to the common sense in China, 
praise it more than the resident hukou. Some locals, who have changed their peasant 
hukou to the resident ones before the take-off of the local economy in order to escape 
the heavy burden of farming^'^, now regain their peasant hukou to partake these 
benefits35. 
In order to safeguard their self-interest, all the local villagers are unwilling to 
grant a peasant hukou to an outsider, even though he/she has been residing in 
Tianshen for years. It is because this will deplete the apportionment of benefits 
among the original villagers. The criterion of acquiring a peasant hukou is primarily 
based on one's patriarchal relationship in the village. A person who is not a 
patriarchal member of any local clans of the village or a local who has joined another 
32 In fact, the unit for distributing dividend and welfare is the villagers' group, which is the former 
production team. 
33 Woon has also captured the similar phenomenon in Shunde County. See Woon (1999) "Labor 
Migration in the 1990s": 492. 
34 In the township-and-village areas, only the resident hukou holders were allowed to engage in 
nonagriculturaljobs before and at the early stage of the economic reforms. 
35 For example, there is a village in Tianshen, which distributes new residential lands to its villagers 
recently. It is regulated that every four peasant hukou holders of that village is eligible to share a piece 
of designated land. There is one local family, its members have transferred to be resident hukou 
holders before. They try to regain four peasant hukou in order to be qualified for the land sharing. 
Because the land price in Tianshen is very high nowadays, the family is even willing to pay 120 
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patriarchal clan outside the village is considered to be an outsider, and thus is 
unqualified to possess a local peasant hukou, no matter how long he has been in that 
village. Therefore, not only the migrants are unable to get a peasant hukou, but also 
the local females who have married outsiders will lose their original peasant hukou. 
In this respect, we can see that the hukou system in Tianshen is not purely an 
institutional administration. It is highly interfered by traditional elements, and, to a 
certain degree, is only an institutional form of the patriarchal definition of being a 
local. The more the locals intend to secure their holding of the enormous economic 
profits, the more they emphasize on the hukou differences. Thus, it revitalizes the 
function of patriarchal relationship in distinguishing between "us" and "them"^^. 
The hukou barrier for the migrants is not totally unbreakable. There will be an 
exception if the migrants are rich enough to buy a property such as a flat, in the 
township. It generally costs 200 to 300 thousand yuan, and after that they will be 
offered four resident hukou, although the hukou are not free of charge. However, to 
acquire a peasant hukou is still impossible for the migrants unless they get married 
with the locals. In Tianshen, it is regulated that a non-Dongguanese female will be 
entitled a peasant hukou five years after getting married to a local male villager�?. Yet, 
to a male migrant, he can enjoy the same "preference" only if his local bride is over 
thousand yuan (30 thousand yuan for one person) for the hukou transference. 
36 Zhe has similar observation in his study. See Zhe (1997) Cunzhuang de zaizao: yi ge "chaoji 
cunzhuang" de shehui bianqian, chapter 17. 
37 Owing to the influx of a large amount of young female migrants into Dongguan, they have greatly 
challenged the local girls in mating with local boys, because in the local boys' eyes, the female 
migrants are more beautiful and compliant than the local girls. In some villages, there is a problem of 
"big age maidens". It indicates that some local girls cannot find a local mate, and they are not willing 
to marry the male migrants. In order to ensure the local girls are preferred to the female migrants, the 
Dongguan government has regulated that only the Dongguanese girls are eligible to transfer their 
hukou to their husbands' villages immediately after they get married, whereas the non-Dongguanese 
girls have to wait for five years. This policy aims to encourage the local boys to marry the local girls, 
so that they can enjoy more benefits. 
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27 years old. This special requirement for the male migrants aims at striking a 
balance between limiting the influx of outside males from moving into the local 
community and solving the problem of daling guniang (big age maidens 大齡姑娘） 
in some villages. The presentation of a local peasant hukou to a migrant groom is 
seen as a prize for his contribution in solving the local problem. This shows the 
superiority complex of the locals and their social exclusion to the migrants, 
especially to the male ones. On the whole, migrants are not welcomed by the locals, 
and are difficult to integrate into the local community, as this will threaten the locals' 
interest. 
Apart from the small group of "lucky" guys who can obtain either a resident or 
a peasant hukou, all other migrants are sojourners in Tianshen. They can only apply 
for a zhanzhuzheng (temporary resident permit 暫住言正)，which costs about 140 yuan 
a year. If their zhanzhuzheng expire, they will be caught, accused of illegal residence, 
and fined by the security team. Therefore, the migrants, as implied by the name of 
zhanzhuzheng, are only not expected to stay long in the destination. When they 
become unsuitable to work and make contribution to the economic development of 
the destination, they will be expected to leave or will be wiped off. 
2. Job differences 
Job security has been the privilege of the urbanites for long. In the collective era, 
the central government promised full employment for workers in cities in order to 
achieve social stability and equality. But the rural people had to manage their living 
without any governmental support. However, accompanying the introduction of the 
economic reforms, the urbanites' “iron bowls" have been broken due to the 
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enterprise reform and the withdrawal of the central government as a generous benefit 
provider. On the contrary, their poor counterpart---the rural people of the Pearl River 
Delta---can now enjoy the fruitful achievement of the economic development and the 
promise of employment. Since the booming economy in the township-and-village 
areas have generated a lot of job opportunities, and the local governments have 
adopted the policy of local protectionism, some of the job vacancies have become the 
privileges of the locals. This has shielded the locals' employment from the challenge 
of the migrants. 
In some self-financed collective enterprises, local cadres are also the managing 
directors at the same time. Therefore, they have power and preference to hire the 
locals, and thus secure the locals' employment. Woon (1999)，in a research of 
migrants, finds out that the economic mode of Leliu Township in Shunde City is 
characterized by collective industries and high-quality aquaculture. Their employers 
tend to recruit locals rather than migrant workers unless there is a shortage of local 
talents. As a result, most migrant workers are only hired as unskilled workers in the 
private or foreign-owned sectors, which are shunned by the locals. Another typical 
example is Daiqiuzhuang, a village in Northeast China, where the local protectionism 
is even more explicit. The “inside workers" and the "outside workers" are treated 
very differently there. The locals normally earn three, or even more, times higher 
than the migrant workers do, and the entire local work force hold the managerial, 
administrative, and professional positions in collective corporations (Lin 1995). 
Moreover, the local corporatism of Daiqiuzhuang, interweaving with the localistic 
n o 
social network , has formed a protection net for the employment of the locals. But 
38 See also Granovetter (1985) "Economic action, social structure and embeddedness". It discusses 
the influences of social network on economic activities. 
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of course, it has set up an unfair opportunity and reward structure for the migrants. 
In Tianshen, the economic mode is different to those of Leliu and Daiqiuzhuang. 
Although the TVEs in Tianshen are officially classified as collective enterprises, they 
are actually private enterprises "wearing a red cap" . The local government only 
provides factory buildings for foreign investors and receives rent from them, but it 
does not participate in the management. Foreign investors can run their factories 
independently without much governmental intervention. Therefore, the local cadres 
of Tianshen, unlike those of Leliu and Daiqiuzhuang, cannot recruit any local people 
directly in the foreign-invested enterprises. However, the local government still 
manages to secure the job opportunity of the locals by compromising with the 
foreign investors that two to four posts in every factory office are reserved for the 
locals. The posts are the managing director (廠長)，staff dealing with customs (幸艮關)， 
financial comptroller (財政）and accountant (出納),Although in recent years, the 
posts of financial comptroller and accountant have been taken back by investors for 
the better control of their finance, the managing director and staff dealing with 
customs are still the privileges of the locals. In Tianshen, there are totally 1357 TVEs. 
In other words, at least 2714 office posts are reserved for the locals. 
Since the education system of Tianshen, or even the whole Guangdong Province, 
was quite poor before the economic take-off^\ the education level of the locals 
力 In the Pearl River Delta, many TVEs are actually invested by foreign investors, but they maintain 
the name of TVEs in order to enjoy the preferential policies granted by the government. 
40 A local cadre has told me that this policy aims to solve the unemployment of the locals, but a 
migrant manager of a Hong Kong-invested electronic factory has deemed that this arrangement shows 
the local government's intention to monitor the foreign-invested factories, such as preventing them 
from smuggling and tax avoiding. 
41 For the education development in Guangdong before the economic reforms, see Parish and Whyte 
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always lagged behind the national level. Although the situation has been improved a 
lot after the economic reforms, peoples' education level in Guangdong is still very 
imsymmetrical to their leading performance in economic development. By late 80 ’s, 
only 1% of Guangdong adults were university graduates and less than 8% were 
senior middle school graduates (Vogel 1989: 28). In 1995, among those whose 
education levels were of primary school or above in Guangdong, 85.21% were of 
primary and junior middle school level and only 2.59% were of tertiary education 
level (Zhong 1999). In some former rural areas such as Tianshen, the situation of 
education is even poorer. Most locals who are in their middle ages or above are 
illiterate or have education only to the primary school level. The local government is 
now promoting popularization of senior middle school education among youngsters, 
but the results still haven't come out. Therefore, the job reservation for the locals in 
factory offices has led to a strange phenomenon. While the locals occupy the middle 
management of the factory, they are always of the lowest education level among their 
colleagues. Hon, a migrant manager of a Hong Kong-invested electronic factory, told 
me that in his office all the staff are required to be of at least technical school level, 
but the two locals, the managing director and the staff dealing with customs, are only 
junior middle school graduates. He complained: 
"Our requirements are quite high, but it is strange that their [the two 
locals'] education level is quite low. Frankly, most locals working in 
factories are not very good in ability.. .they are mostly junior middle 
school graduates. All those clever and able locals would work outside or 
set up their own businesses... We have no choice in recruiting these two 
posts. What we can do is to help them as much as possible in order to 
avoid making mistakes. If we are really unsatisfied with them, we can 
only complain to the village government, which would replace them with 
other locals." (Interview note) 
(1978) Village and Family in Contemporary China: 78-85. 
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Besides preserving posts in factory offices, the township and village 
governments in Tianshen also reserve all their department posts for those holding 
Tianshen hukoi/� Because of the necessity to manage a large number of TVEs, the 
local governments have expanded so large that every village government has 
recruited more than a hundred staff to maintain its administration'^^. Compared with 
the salary of those office jobs in the factory, which generally varies from one to two 
thousand yuan a month, the governmental posts are much more comfortable and well 
paid (will be further elaborated in next section). Therefore, the competition of 
engaging in such posts is very keen. Normally, a person holding a local hukou is 
necessary but not sufficient to get a place unless he/she has guanxi, especially 
kinship relation, with the existing cadres. Needless to say, the governmental posts 
exclude all the migrants, because they don't have a local hukou and local guanxi. 
There would be exceptions only when some specialized jobs, such as construction 
planning or engineering, cannot be fulfilled by the locals, professional migrants will 
then be employed to handle them. Otherwise, the governmental posts are the 
forbidden areas of the migrants'^ '^ . 
Due to the protection provided by local governments, the influx of the huge 
amount of migrants does not affect the job security of the locals directly. Although 
the education level of the locals is quite low, and they are not competitive in market 
economy, they can still enjoy the more comfortable and well-paid jobs in factory 
offices or governmental departments, while the migrants can only be manual workers 
42 To village governments, their posts are generally reserved for their own villagers only. 
43 A village government comprises several villagers' groups and departments of construction, 
industry development, public security team, environment and hygiene, water and electricity supply 
etc. 
44 In addition, state-owned enterprises such as banks and telecommunication bureau do not welcome 
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in the foreign-invested factories. The paradox is that the marketization of the socialist 
economy in Tianshen does not make the locals face more challenges from the market. 
The locals, in fact, are shielded by local protectionism and live in an even more 
stable life than before. On the contrary, the migrants are thrown into a primitive 
market environment, which is full of hardship and keen competition. On the whole, 
the locals and the migrants are placed in an unequal system, in which their job 
opportunities are made to be different. 
3. Welfare and benefits 
Peasants have been out of the central government's welfare planning, which 
only provides a safety net to the urbanites. In the collective era, peasants would 
receive a certain amount of kouliang (grain ration 口糧)allocated by the production 
team. The kouliang consisted of the jib en kouliang (basic grain 基本 口糧)and the 
gongfen kouliang (work-point grain 工分口糧).The jiben kouliang was distributed to 
every member of the collective without considering his contribution, while the 
gongfen kouliang was allocated to the peasants as payment for participating in 
collective labor. Their contribution was measured by the accumulation of work 
points. However, the jiben kouliang should not be considered as a kind of welfare to 
the peasants because they had to pay or work in order to be qualified to receive it (Oi 
1989). The situation in the Pearl River Delta is completely different nowadays. 
Although the central government provides nothing for the rural people, the local 
governments are rich enough to act as a philanthropist providing various welfare and 
benefits for them. 
migrants also, because of the purposes of insurance and protection of the local employment. 
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In Tianshen, because of the rapid industrialization since mid 80,s, the local 
governments have gradually reclaimed all the farmlands from the locals for factory 
buildings and other infrastructures. Therefore, the collective farmlands, collective 
labor, work-point system and the allocation of gongfen kouliang no longer exist. 
However, the jiben kouliang (simply called kouliang by the locals) allocation still 
continues in these days. It is now decoupled from the participation in collective work, 
and serves as a kind of welfare provided by the village government to its villagers. 
Every local holding a peasant hukou can receive a certain amount of money instead 
of grain every month as kouliang. Its amount varies greatly according to the specific 
economic situation of each village. In village 1, the monthly kouliang is 200 yuan per 
villager45, while that in village 2 is 500 yuan. To the locals, kouliang is their stable 
income, but most locals show a cold shoulder to the kouling as they see that “it is not 
enough to buy food". 
Besides kouliang, there are still other welfare available for the locals. The most 
prominent one is the year-end dividend sharing. Again, the amount of dividend 
depends on the economic performance of each village. In village 1, each villager can 
share 1 thousand yuan"^ ,^ while that in village 2 is 3.5 thousands. But in village 6, the 
amount can go up to 10 thousands. In addition, female elderly of age 55 or above and 
male of 60 or above are qualified to receive pension，which mostly ranges from 100 
to 200 yuan per month. Some village governments even provide medical allowance 
for their villagers. 60 % of the medical fee can be reimbursed to the villagers. 
45 It is the figure in 2000, but from 2001 onwards, the kouliang of village 1 has been raised to 500 
yuan per person. 
46 It has been raised to 2 thousands from 2001. 
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Migrants without a local peasant hukou are not only unqualified to receive any 
welfare and benefits, but also have to pay higher price for public services. For 
example, if the migrants' children are going to study in the local schools, they have 
to pay additional charges. We can see the differences between the locals and the 
migrants in the following fee collection notice of a primary school in village 1 in 
2000: 
1. The tuition and miscellaneous fee for students holding [village 1] hukou is 
150 yuan for one term. Fee of books and information is 100 yuan. The activity fee 
for Saturday class is 48 yuan. (Total 298 yuan) 
2. The tuition and miscellaneous fee for students holding [non-village 1] hukou 
is 150 yuan for one term. Fee of borrowing a study place for 3-6 formers is 300 yuan 
and 1-2 formers is 500 yuan. Fee of books and information is 100 yuan. The activity 
fee for Saturday class is 48 yuan. Education running fee for the village government is 
1050 yuan. Total (1) 1648 yuan for 3-6 formers; (2) 1848 yuan for 1-2 formers, 
(emphasis added) 
In other words, the migrants have to pay bout 6 times as much as the locals do 
in order to get a place in a local school, because it is assumed that the public services 
run by the local governments are only for the locals, while the migrants，being 
outsiders, are not expected to enjoy them. Therefore, the migrants have to pay more 
to "borrow" a study place and to "compensate" the expenses of the local government. 
Apart from the local welfare, the rewarding structures of local governmental 
departments for the locals and the migrants are also different. As mentioned before, 
some migrants are employed by government departments to handle the specialized 
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jobs that cannot be filled by locals. Nominally, the professional migrants' wages are 
higher than that of their local colleagues. However, because the locals are eligible to 
share the department dividend at the end of each year, their total economic returns 
are much higher than that of their migrant counterpart. Fong, a local youngster of 
village 2, has been a driver in the Construction Department for two years and is now 
doing the same job in the Industry Department. His monthly salary is only 600 yuan. 
But in the last two years, he received 60 thousand and 30 thousand yuan dividend 
respectively. Therefore, in the locals' eyes, the salary per se is not so important, 
while the dividend de facto is the real attraction. Fong told me that there were two 
migrant university graduates working in the Construction Department as draftsman 
and engineer. Their wages were 1800 yuan without any dividend, which was much 
lower than the average 4-5 thousand monthly income of Fong, although he is only a 
primary school graduate. It is clear that the inequality in the reward system is 
institutionalized by the hukou system, which cannot be overcome easily by the 
outsiders despite their achievement in education. Fong said: 
"They [the two migrant professionals] can not say whether they are 
satisfied or not since they are fundamentally not eligible to share the 
dividend...It is no use to have a high education level. The hukou is 
extremely important nowadays. In other words, it is more important than 
the education certificate." (Interview note) 
The welfare and benefits are very good in Tianshen, but they are only limited to 
the locals, especially those holding peasant hukou. Tang, a migrant engineer of a 
Hong Kong-invested electronic factory, complained about the lack of social welfare 
and supports for the migrants: 
“The government does nothing for us, no welfare, no relief fund for 
unemployment, nothing at all...How can I have a sense of belonging 
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here? You don't know what will be going on tomorrow...You have 
nothing apart from the salary. When you quit the job, you have nothing. 
How can I have a sense of belonging?" (Interview note) 
A strong resentment of being excluded spreads among the migrants. Without 
any protection from the local governments, the migrants see themselves as 
passers-by in the local community, living a life full of instability and uneasiness. 
4. Renting economy: the construction of the oppressed and the oppressor 
Besides job salary and welfare benefits, rent collection is also an important 
source of income to most of the locals. Because of the large influx of foreign 
investment and migrants, the demand of factory buildings and dormitories is great. It 
enables the locals to become landlords and earn good income. Contrasting to the 
economic betterment of the locals, the renting economy is unfavorable to the 
migrants, making them the targets of exploitation. 
It is implicit that the renting economy of Tianshen relates subtly to the 
predicament of the migrants working in factories. A particular characteristic of the 
renting economy is its "all-or-none" nature. In other words, the landlord will get full 
pay if the tenant continues to rent his/her property, but he/she will get nothing if the 
tenant leaves. As the financial income of Tianshen depends heavily on the rent 
collected from the foreign investors, "scaring the foreign investors away，，47 becomes 
a taboo of all the local officials, whose office achievement is firmly hooked up with 
the local economic performance. In order to maintain their huge economic income, 
47 Solinger (1995b) has similar discussion in "The Chinese Work Unit and Transition Labor in the 
Transition from Socialism". 
86 
the local officials are reluctant to push the foreign investors too hard lo comply with 
those labor regulations mandated by the central government. Therefore, the foreign 
investors can maximize their profits by using primitive capitalist techniques such as 
lowering the migrants' wages to the lowest market level, having the migrants to work 
overtime without paying subsidies or rejecting to compensate workers for their 
industrial injuries. The foreign-invested factories in the Pearl River Delta are 
notorious for exploiting the migrant workers. However, the local officials usually 
hold the ‘‘one eye open and one eye closed" attitude to their violation of labor 
regulations. It is because the renting economy of Tianshen has, on one hand, 
strengthened the local governments' pro-investor inclination, and on the other hand, 
has consolidated the common interests of the locals and the foreign investors at the 
expense of the migrant workers. 
It would be more interesting if we examine the influences of the renting 
economy on the everyday life relationships between the locals and the migrants. 
Although most of the migrants live in the dormitories provided by the factories, there 
• 48 
are still many migrants who need to rent dormitories by themselves . Therefore, 
most of the locals can lease their old houses or part of their new buildings to the 
migrants in order to earn comfortable income. For example, Shu and his wife, an old 
local couple, own an old house and a new three-story building. They receive 2100 
yuan every month by leasing their old house to the migrants. And at the same time, 
they lease two shop fronts and two apartments of their new building, and that 
generates another 3100 yuan every month. Therefore, their monthly income from 
48 For example, some couples, self-employed migrants, unemployed migrants and some who don't 
like living in the factory dormitories may group in their relatives, friends or workmates to rent their 
dormitories from the locals. 
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rent collection amounts to 5200 yuan. The example of Shu is very common in 
Tianshen. Some well-off locals can even receive up to ten to twenty thousand yuan 
every month from property leasing"^ .^ A local said, "We are now landlords. If we 
don't have these lands, we can't have such a good living." 
The migrants contribute to the high living standard of the locals, but they do not 
receive corresponding respect from them, because there is constant influx of 
migrants to Tianshen, and it weakens their bargaining power to the locals. As a result, 
contrasting to the fear of “scaring the foreign investors away", the locals are never 
afraid of “scaring the migrants away". In addition, there lacks satisfactory legal 
protection of the rights of tenants. The lease is written by the landlords, who 
naturally protect their own interest rather than that of the tenants. For example, the 
lease commonly requires the tenants to pay a deposit, which is equivalent to one 
month's rent for every year of renting. If the tenants leave before the end of tenancy, 
the landlords can confiscate the deposit. Therefore, the tenants cannot leave 
whenever they want to or bargain with the landlords by threatening to leave, unless 
they are willing to give up the deposit. Obviously, the landlords are of the upper hand 
in the dealings, especially at the time of economic prosperity, because the landlords 
never worry about the leaving of their tenants, and can let out their properties at 
higher prices easily. 
In the locals' eyes, the migrants are only instruments to make money. Therefore, 
conflict over the matter of rent is common. Huang, an unemployed migrant from 
Sichuan, was very discontented to the unreasonable attitude of the landlord: 
49 Many middle-aged locals only depend on rent collection for a living and don't participate in any 
job. I know a local family. It receives a rent of 16 thousand yuan every month. Although its four 
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“I have argued four times with the landlord, because he refuses to return 
my 50 yuan deposit. He said that only the tenancy longer than six months 
is eligible for returning the deposit. My tenancy of two to three months is 
so short that no deposit will be returned." (Interview note) 
However, they haven't signed a lease for their tenancy actually. This shows the 
selfishness of the landlord. When I was conducting my fieldwork from June to 
August, a time of summer in Tianshen, Huang, staying in his small woodblock room, 
was unable to have a good sleep at night. He had a fan, but no electricity was 
available because the landlord sealed the socket. Huang told me that his 150 yuan 
rent included electricity and water fee, so that the landlord sealed the socket to 
prevent him from using extra electricity except turning on a light at night. Sometimes, 
Huang could not bear the hot weather and wanted to sleep on the open top floor. 
However, the door was locked. Huang said in an angry tone: 
"We asked the landlord to unlock the door. At the beginning, he 
rejected. Later, some tenants who could not bear anymore left. The 
landlord was forced to unlock the door at last." (Interview note) 
Due to the economic recession of Asia after 1997, the renting market in 
Tianshen has become quite quiet. Landlords nowadays appear to be more willing to 
make a concession than before. 
In the daily life, there is almost no interaction between the landlords and the 
tenants, although they live in the same building. They would just have a casual 
greeting at most. To some migrants, the only chance to contact the landlord is at the 
time when the landlord comes to collect rent. As Fa, a local middle-aged man, said: 
family members have no waged jobs, they can still enjoy a very comfortable living. 
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“It is better to maintain a distance with them [tenants], if you have 
cultivated a friendship with them, you don't know what to do when they 
have no rent to pay." (Interview note) 
From his words, we see that the locals are highly rational when dealing with the 
migrants. Therefore, the relationship between the locals and the migrants is totally 
utilitarian and market driven. In fact, under the renting economy, both the locals and 
the foreign investors try to take advantage of the migrants as much as possible, and 
the migrants have become the oppressed inevitably. 
5. The conflicts between security team members and migrants: robbers and victims 
A security team, comprising of several tens of team members, is formed in 
every village in Tianshen. It is different from the official Public Security Bureau, but 
they are in cooperation. The security team's responsibilities are to maintain social 
order of its village and to create a fine investment environment for the foreign 
investors. Practically, its primary duty is to supervise the migrants, because “their 
backgrounds are unknown, and they come and go without any trace". 
The migrants are generally seen as potential criminals by the local governments 
and people. Therefore, the job of the security team is to get rid of sanwurenyuan 
("three withouts" people 三無人員)…those who have no legal certificate, no proper 
job and no fixed residing place. However, in reality, the only criterion the security 
team uses to distinguish the "three withouts" is to see whether a migrant has a 
zhanzhuzheng. It is assumed that a zhanzhuzheng is an equivalent to the legal 
certificates, a proper job and a stable dwelling. Therefore, the migrants found to have 
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no zhanzhuzheng will be caught by the security team members and treated as a 
mangliu (blind wanderer 肓、流).Normally, they will be fined 100 to 200 yuan if they 
are bailed out on the same day. However, if they are bailed out on the next day, the 
fine will be raised to 400 yuan. Those having no money and no people to bail them 
will be sent to Zhangmutou Detention Center and made to do hard work until they 
can compensate the fine. Actually, the fine is not fixed, at least most of the migrants 
don't know the exact amount. Some migrants even said that security team members 
put the money in their own pockets, so if a migrant was caught without a 
zhanzhuzheng, he/she can just give the security team members 100 yuan, then he/she 
would be released. 
The migrants generally suspect the motive of the security team. When I asked 
Wah, a migrant female who has married a local recently, whether the security team is 
for maintaining public order, she replied loudly, "For money! Not public order. For 
money is the fact." The greediness of the security team is evident when its members 
check zhanzhuzheng at the entrance of the long-distance bus station. This annoys the 
migrants especially. As Tang described: 
“It is unreasonable to check zhanzhuzheng at the bus station entrance. 
They [migrants] are caught [by security team] when they just get off the 
bus.. .They may just go traveling by bus or may come to Tianshen for fun. 
Why I cannot come here for fun?...The security team is just for money, 
nothing else...They only know how to abuse their power. They have 
power, so that they can bully you or catch you whenever they want." 
(Interview note) 
Since fining the migrants without a zhanzhuzheng, whether legal or illicit, is an 
important source of income to the security team members, the arbitrary arrest of 
"three withouts" is very serious. As a newspaper has reported: 
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“...A Hubei youngster was visiting his brothers, who worked in 
Dongguan...The day when he took a walk with several laoxiang after 
dinner.. .they met the local polices. The polices asked them for identity 
cards, they replied that the cards were left in the dormitory. However, the 
polices didn't listen to their explanations, just put them on the police truck 
and sent them to the detention center as "three withouts". (Haixia 
dushibao 7/9/2000)^^ 
This similar scene repeats in Tianshen every minute. From the migrants' angle, 
checking zhanzhuzheng is irrelevant to the maintenance of the public security. The 
security team just uses the excuse of "maintaining security" to make money. Tang 
argued that: 
"Having a zhanzhuzheng doesn't mean that you are not a criminal, does 
it? In fact, those migrants who conform to all rules and regulations are the 
victims.. .They are too busy to commit any bad things, because they work 
from eight in the morning to twelve in the mid-night. After they get off 
from their duties, they are so tired that they even don't wash their clothes 
and go directly to the beds. How can they commit any bad things? They 
are the victims. It is a very bad situation.”5i (Interview note) 
There are some related reports on newspapers about the polices or the security team members who 
arrest "three withouts" arbitrarily, intending to make money: 
On 3rd August, 16 Hunan migrant workers were caught as "three withouts" in Dongguan, 
because they were unable to show complete certificates. When they were transferred from 
Zhangmutou (樟木頭）Detection Center to Shaoguan ( f p | i ) Detection Center, where they would be 
made to do hard work while waiting to be sent back to Hunan, they tried to run away. The guards were 
chasing after them and fired their guns. Those fligitives were so frighten that they jumped into the 
river, resulting in five death and two missing (Oriential Daily 5/9/2000). 
This issue has aroused great public attention. A journalist has found that some detention and 
security guards are very aggressive in arresting "three withouts", because they can receive 
commission from the upper detention center. For example, the Zhanmutou Detention Center has 
received 100-200 yuan per head when it transfers its "three withouts" to the Shaoguan Detection 
Center. This practice is ridiculed by the public as "first hand wholesale and second hand wholesale". 
The expenses of the Shaoguan Detection Center comes from the "three withouts" and their families at 
last. The journalist has interviewed a man, who has just been bailed out from the detention center by 
his family after paying 600 yuan. His receipt shows that the fine includes the fees of transportation, 
accommodation and management. In addition, his family members have paid 10 yuan for "calling" 
him out from the detention center, and another 40 yuan for unknown reasons {Haixia dushibao 
7/9/2000). 
51 Tang has explained that the migrants would not have a zhanzhuzheng immediately after they get in 
a factory, because a factory would only help the workers apply a zhanzhuzheng until they pile up 
twenty to thirty people, and mostly, the factory would manage the application once a month or a 
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The torment caused to the migrants by the security team is not only related to 
fining. Actually, most of the migrants who have a stable job in Tianshen possess a 
zhanzhuzheng, so that they will not be caught and fined. However, the checking of 
zhanzhuzheng in itself results in great resentment among the migrants because of the 
poor manner of the security team members. Zhang, a Sichuan migrant, has described 
his experience: 
“When they [the security team members] see you, [they shout] 'Stand 
there! Do you have a zhanzhuzheng! Bring it out quickly.' It seems that 
you are not human beings. Besides, they are very rude. They will beat you 
up if you argue with a single word. They bring a rod with them. They will 
use the rod to beat you. They are really rude! Just like robbers. The only 
difference is they have 'certificates'...，，(Interview note) 
A strong feeling of being insulted and oppressed makes most of the migrants 
hate the security team members. However, being outsiders, the migrants feel that 
they are powerless to desist this nuisance. What they can do is to avoid the security 
team. I met several Sichuan migrants, who were unemployed and didn't have 
zhanzhuzheng, in a leased house. During daytime, they went out to find jobs, but they 
dared not go far away from their house at night. Most of the time, they played cards 
in the house or watched TV in a shop just beside their house. They even knew the 
security team members' habit quite well, that they were especially strict on Monday, 
because some members had gambled during weekend and the losers would have to 
make money on Monday by checking zhanzhuzheng. 
On the whole, the migrants are under the constant harassment from the security 
season. Therefore, some formal factory workers are also under the threat of being caught by the 
security team members before they can get a zhanzhuzheng. 
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team members, whose aim is to exploit the migrants rather than to maintain public 
security, at least in the eyes of the migrants they do. The oppression and rudeness of 
those security term members have inevitably aroused the migrants' resentment and 
their feeling of being victims. 
6. The alienation between insiders and outsiders: defenders and suspects 
There are many symbols and discourses among the locals constructing the 
images of the migrants, and serving to distinguish insiders and outsiders. That has 
reflected the locals' avoidance to the migrants. 
In Tianshen, the migrants are called as “laomui (撈妹)，，and “/ao/w /^�)（撈佬)”. 
The locals intentionally pronounce the word “lao,, in mandarin, because they want to 
highlight the non-Cantonese identity of the migrants . A general idea shared by the 
locals is that all mandarin speakers are migrants, and vice versa. Mui (妹）means 
younger sister. "It denotes not merely gender, but also marital status. [Mw/(妹)]is 
single, unmarried and younger and thus of a lower status" 
(Pun, 1999)53. 
means adult male, which also denotes a vulgar intonation indicating his low status. 
Therefore, the image of the migrants among the locals is a group of non-Cantonese 
with low social status. 
52 According to the Chinese dictionary, lao is the mandarin pronunciation of a Cantonese word luo小 
(撈).It means "gaining by improper ways" {Xinya zhongwen zidian 新雅中文字典）and denotes a 
vulgar intonation, indicating that people are doing the jobs of low status or unrespectablility. The 
terms “laomui (撈妹)，，and “laoliic/�〉(撈倍)，’ appear in the magazine wailaigong and some working 
literature (打工文學）frequently. However, since the locals only use the terms generally, but cannot 
tell the exact meaning, I am not sure whether their meaning of “lao” coincides with that in the 
dictionary or not. 
53 See also Pun Ngai (1999) "Becoming Dagonmei (working girls): The Politics of Identity and 
Difference in Reform China". Pun uses the mandarin pronunciation “mai”, while I capture the 
Cantonese pronunciation “mui”, but they are of the same meaning. 
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The locals' impression of the migrants only depicts what migrants are partially. 
Although most of the migrants are factory workers, some of them are management 
and technology specialists. Besides, some migrants are Cantonese coming from the 
areas outside the Pearl River Delta. However, their proportion is not big enough to 
change the locals' impression. In fact, the locals do not intend to describe the 
migrants concretely and rationally. On the contrary, they just hold a very general 
view, and see “all outsiders (夕也人） a r e laomui and laoluo^''\ 
By labeling migrants as of low status, the locals can amplify themselves as 
richer, more prestigious and higher in social status. Due to their superiority complex, 
some locals disdain to interact with the migrants, because they think that the 
migrants are poor, and thus they would do nothing good, except seek help from them. 
As Tin, a local youngster, said: 
"They will not visit you unless they need help...They will firstly make 
friends and cultivate a good relationship with you. Then, whenever they 
have troubles, they will come and seek help from you. If they don't have 
any troubles, they need not to visit you, do they?" (Interview note) 
In fact, the locals avoid interacting with the migrants not only because they 
think the migrants are potential help seekers, but also because they suspect them as 
potential thieves. There is a story commonly known among the locals，which is about 
a stranger who asks a female local about direction. After she answers him, she loses 
her consciousness and gives all her money and valuable belongings to the stranger. It 
is the brief version of the story. Although every local tells the story a little bit 
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differently, most of them can tell me some cases happened to some other people they 
know. Whether the story is true or not, it has created a sense of panic among the 
locals. They are afraid that this kind of cheating will happen at anytime and 
anywhere. In addition, the cheaters and the victims are always the migrants and the 
locals respectively. Therefore, to the locals, the most effective way to prevent 
themselves from being cheated is to suspect all the migrants, especially those 
strangers. As Yueng, a middle-aged local woman, mentioned: 
"We are afraid to speak to laolou^\ especially those who are smoking. If 
they blow smoke to you, you will lose consciousness and give them all 
your money, [money in] bank account and safe, all will be given to him. 
Not long ago, a case happened to the woman living over there, she gave 
the stranger ten to twenty thousands, then cried desperately..." 
Since migrants are “dangerous，,，some locals often remind me to keep cautions 
against them: 
"If there are strangers asking you directions, don't reply them, look at 
them or even pay attention to them. Just go ahead as if you haven't 
listened anything. Nowadays, never be a sympathizer. Good heart will not 
bring good return.(好心、、沒有好幸艮)，’ Hui, a local, said.54 
Although it can hardly be denied that most of crimes happed in Tianshen, 
especially those of stealing, are committed by the migrants, the criminals actually 
have comprised only an insignificant portion of the whole floating population^^. 
54 In fact, not only the locals, but also the migrants keep precaution against strangers. To my own 
experience, I tried to interview a female migrant on a street when I was conducting my fieldwork. She 
shown her reluctance and rejected to speak anything at the beginning. After confirming my intention, 
she explained to me that she was afraid of being cheated by strangers. It was the reason why she 
rejected to reply me at first. She then told me the same cheating story and remained me not to speak to 
strangers too casually. 
55 I don't have statistics exactly concerning the crimes of the migrants in Tianshen. However, the 
research conducted by Guowuyuan fazhan yanjiu zhongxin nongcunbu (1996) shows that about 
50-60% of crimes in Beijing, Chongqing and the Pearl River Delta are committed by the migrants. 
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Therefore, they feel unfair for being suspected as potential criminals. Fan, a migrant 
from Sichuan, complained bitterly to this skepticism, “It is most unbearable to be 
treated as a thief all time". 
The locals' superiority complex and skepticism towards the migrants make 
them stay away from the migrants. As a form of retaliation, the migrants are also 
reluctant to interact with the locals in order to express their discontent and to 
maintain their dignity. "If you are nice, then I am nice also. If you are rude, then I 
won't bother to heed you."(你友善，我就友善；你不友善，我就不理你。）This 
attitude to the locals of a female migrant is a kind of migrants' living strategy to 
express their dissatisfaction. 
III. Concluding remarks 
Lin Nan, in his research of Daqiuzhuang, points out that the "localness" applies 
to both spatial and social realms. Spatially, it means a definable territory such as a 
village; socially, it means a network, primarily among kins, families and social 
connections (Lin 1995: 343). However, in Tianshen or in some other 
township-and-village areas of the Pearl River Delta, the differences in identities 
between the locals and the migrants are not only constructed by spatial and social 
factors, but also constructed by institutional and economic factors---the hukou system 
and the renting economy. These factors mold the domination of the locals and the 
subordination of the migrants, and subsequently shape their relationships. 
Besides, the migrants have committed 81.6% of bicycle stealing in Beijing and 82% of total crimes in 
Wuxi (蕪錫）in 1994. But most of the criminals are "three withouts" rather than ordinary migrants. 
See Pp. 37-39. When I was staying in the field site, I often heard the locals complaining the criminal 
behaviors of the migrants. It indicates that the locals see the migrants as the main source of crimes. 
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Weber in his discussion on social relationships writes that: 
“A social relationship...will be spoken of as ‘open’ to outsiders if and 
insofar as participation ...[is] not denied to anyone who whishes to 
participate and who is actually in a position to do so. A relationship will, 
on the other hand, be called ‘closed’ against outsiders so far 
as...participation of certain persons is excluded, limited, or subjected to 
conditions. Whether a relationship is open or closed may be determined 
traditionally, affectually, or rationally in terms of values or of 
expediency...A party to a closed social relationship will be called a 
'member'; in case his participation is regulated in such a way as to 
guarantee him appropriated advantages, a ‘privileged’ member. 
Appropriated rights which are enjoyed by individuals through inheritance 
or by hereditary groups... will be called the 'property' of the individual or 
of groups in question; and, insofar as they are alienable, ‘free’ property." 
(Weber 1947: 19-20) 
According to Weber, the social relationship between the locals and the migrants 
in Tianshen is a closed one. As we have seen before, the migrants are excluded from 
the local community by various means such as non-local hukou and exclusion from 
local patriarchal networks. The basic logic behind the social exclusion is to restrict 
the memberships of local community in order to protect the privileges or the "free 
properties" of the locals. The emphasis on the inherited localness in the local 
community and the xenophobia of the locals have built up an invisible wall, which 
rejects the social integration of outsiders. Therefore, the migrants can never be the 
equals of the locals in social status and are not eligible to share the fruits of the local 
economy take-off. 
Similar to the case of Tianshen, migrant workers in Daqiuzhuang are also 
treated unequally by the locals in terms of opportunity and reward structure. 
However, the locals' attitude and the degree of social exclusion towards the migrants 
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in Daqiuzhuang are not as bad as those in Tianshen. In Daqiuzhuang, outside 
professionals and technicians are acknowledged as the dacaishen (big fortune 
angels 大財神)，since their specific techniques are essential to the production and 
development of local industry. Therefore, those professionals and technicians are 
treated as insiders enjoying "high salaries and bonuses, good housing, privileges of 
bringing their families with them, and full services." (Lin 1995: 327-328) Although 
the ordinary outside workers enjoy lower compensations than their professional 
counterpart, they can also access basic housing and public services, because their 
cheap labor power are strongly demanded by the companies. Compared with the 
migrants in Daqiuzhuang, those in Tianshen are not that lucky. They are depicted as 
“coming for begging"(來討飯吃）by the locals, meaning that the migrants depend 
on the locals for a living, but not the reverse. Therefore, they are inferior in status 
and unrespectable, at least in the locals' eyes they are. 
The sharp contrast between the experience of the migrants in Daiqiuzhuang and 
that in Tianshen is primarily due to the different economic modes in the two places. 
In Daqiuzhuang, the local economy is prevailed by collective enterprises and the 
local people are the collective owners. Since the locals realize directly the migrants' 
contribution to the local economic development, they appreciate the migrants to a 
certain degree and thus are willing to share their economic results with them, 
although the sharing is unequal. However, the economy in Tianshen is dominated by 
foreign-invested enterprises. Most of the migrants work for these factories rather 
than the locals, and the locals' income comes mainly from the rent paid by the 
foreign investors. As a result, although the migrants have contributed much to the 
economic take-off of Tianshen, their indirect boss-and-staff relationship with the 
locals pales the locals' recognition to their contribution. From the viewpoint of the 
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locals in Tianshen, their "big fortune angels" are the foreign investors, while the 
migrants are only their dependents coming to take advantage of the local economy. 
Furthermore, the collective economy of Daqiuzhuang has more or less preserved the 
legacy of socialism, that sees exploiting workers as a taboo. However, workers in 
Tianshen are completely exposed to a pure market situation, in which exploiting 
workers is seen as normal for investors to maximize their profits. As Solinger (1995b) 
has pointed out that no matter how collective or state-owned enterprises cut down 
their welfare for workers and how unfairly they treat the migrant workers, the 
situations of the migrants working there are still much better than those in private or 
foreign-invested enterprises. Hence, it is not surprising that the situation of the 
migrants in Tianshen is poorer than their counterpart in Daqiuzhuang. 
The economic development and industrialization are progressing rapidly in 
township-and-village areas (intermediate society) in the Pearl River Delta. However, 
they haven't turned the township-and-village areas into a mature market open to all 
people. On the contrary, the locals become more introverted in shielding themselves 
from the outside world in order to secure their economic benefits. In the case of 
Tianshen, we can see that the migrants are being excluded as second-class citizens, 
having no job security and welfare benefits, bullied by the security team members 
and discriminated by the locals. On the whole, the locals and the migrants are 
residing in two different worlds within the same space, with different languages, 
occupations, social networks, social mobility and living standards. 
Due to the extensive discrimination and suspicion from the locals, there is 
general discontent among the migrants. According to Weber, the social relationship 
between the locals and the migrants is in "conflict", because the interests of the 
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locals and the migrants are incompatible and the locals take advantages of the 
migrants intentionally. However, since the physical violence does not actually exist 
between them, their relationship should be seen as “peaceful conflict" (Weber 1971: 
84). Although the tense relationship between the locals and the migrants is not bad 
enough to trigger off social struggle, it does stratify the society and destroy the social 
harmony�It is as if a bomb of social conflict which may explode anytime if some 
dramatic events ignite the fire. 
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Chapter 4 
The voice from migrants: "The outside world is splendid, but also ruthless." 
(外面的世界很精彩，外面的世界很無奈） 
...We, millions of young migrants... do not repeat the old history oj 
"never leave the hometown for the whole life". Wherever the income is 
high and the living is good, we want to stay there and seed out our 
roots. However, most of us are only a flock of migratory birds. We have 
to return to our hometowns sooner or later. 
---Anzi, Qingchun xuyu: dagongzai dagongmei qingjian 1993 
Migrants float from inland areas to the Pearl River Delta because of "the 
attraction of industrial culture to agricultural culture, urban areas to rural areas, 
modernity to tradition, and openness to closeness. This attraction is so great that it 
cannot be resisted." (Yang 1991: 100) However, only very few migrants can realize 
their dreams of getting rich and becoming permanent residents in the Pearl River 
Delta. Most of them just stay there temporarily for a certain period of time. After 
devoting their most valuable years to the local economic development, they return to 
their hometowns, where they are originally reluctant to stay, without much 
achievement and money. As some migrants have mentioned, the leaving of the elder 
migrants and the coming of the younger ones is an ever-repeating scene at the 
long-distance bus station. This is like a metabolism that keeps the migrant population 
young forever. In fact, coming and leaving are the fate of most of the migrants who 
don't have any better alternative. 
The hostile discrimination from the locals, the adverse exploitation from the 
employers, the dim future for career development and the unsteadiness of life lead to 
the migrants' exclamation that "here is not a good place for staying long，，（止匕地不宜 
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久留).Therefore, to most of the migrants, returning home is their last way out, when 
they are unable to survive in the outside world, and when the situations have become 
too adverse to be tolerated. In this chapter, I would like to depict the experience of 
the migrants on their living, working and migration in the Pearl River Delta. In 
addition, I would like to see how the migrants view their fated return, and what their 
hometowns mean to them. By listening to the migrants, I hope to tap the feeling and 
attitude of the migrants concretely, which will show the basic logics of their reactions 
to the situations they are encountering. 
I. Living experience 
1. Migrants' silent anti-discrimination 
In the daily life, the migrants have to face hostile discrimination from the locals, 
who despise them as "coming for bagging" and dependents of the local community. 
However, even though the migrants seldom argue explicitly with the locals, they, 
during the interviews, emphasize their contribution to local economic development 
and ridicule the low quality of the locals frequently. They show their discontent to 
the locals' discrimination as well as their confirmation of their own values. 
In the migrants' eyes, the prosperity of the local economy is admirable, but it is 
their contribution rather than the locals'. The locals are superior to them only 
because they have occupied the favorable geographic location. As Hon, a migrant 
manager, mentioned: 
"If there are no migrants, the locals cannot achieve such a good economic 
outcome. There are so many foreign-invested factories in here, but the 
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population of locals is very small. Moreover, their quality is quite low that 
you cannot employ enough high-quality persons from them. In fact, 80% 
of the local economy is contributed by the migrants, while the locals only 
occupy the favorable geographic location...The migrants are actually the 
benefactors of the locals. Therefore, they should treat the migrants better." 
(Interview note) 
Not only the manger, but also the ordinary workers hold the similar viewpoints. 
Cheng, a Sichuan unemployed migrant, said: 
"Here the policies are good and the economic reforms provide them 
[locals] with opportunities [to make a better living]. They have lands to 
lease to foreign investors, and the floating population comes here to work. 
Those migrants consume here and rent houses from the locals that in turn 
provide more opportunities to them to earn more. In fact, their quality is 
not high, but they are very flexible and know how to make money..." 
(Interview note) 
Even though the migrants see themselves as the real contributors of the local 
economy, they are in fact of a subordinate class in the local community. In the daily 
life, the migrants are often repelled and insulted by the locals. That makes the 
migrants feel so angry, but they don't know what course to take. Feng, a Guangxi 
migrant, complained: 
“Some locals' quality is really poor. They will scold you in Cantonese 
foul language ‘XXXX!’ only when you bump into them...They will scold 
you no matter there is a reason or not. Maybe they just think that your 
look is annoying in their eyes...They are locals, so that they see 
themselves as better than you, as if they are in a higher position... Locals 
like to show their power, aiming to indicate that: 'Although we have just 
come up from the farmlands, at least we are richer than you. Now our 
economy is so good that you just come to here for bagging.'" (Interview 
note) 
Responding to the discrimination from the locals, the migrants would highlight 
the poor quality of the locals. To them, the locals are only a group of uncultivated 
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guys who reap without having sowed. On the contrary, despite poorer in materials, 
the migrants see themselves as being more capable to make a living on their own 
ability. This kind of retort is widespread among the migrants. Although it is seldom 
articulated in public and cannot do anything concrete to ameliorate the poor 
situations of the migrants, this hidden retort can still reconfirm the migrants' own 
values, and counteract the discrimination from the locals psychologically. 
2. Identification of "responsible" 
Clearly, the migrants are inferior in terms of economic conditions and social 
status, compared with the locals. However, it is tricky that the migrants attribute their 
harsh encountering mainly to some fated or geographic factors, but not the 
institutional unfairness or the xenophobia of the locals. More specifically, the 
migrants see the inequalities in institution and statues as normal, where their tough 
lives are resulted from being unluckily predestinated by the supernatural force, and 
being bom in poor places. Therefore, experiencing hardships of working outside is a 
part of their unlucky lives. As Tang said: 
"There must be differences [between locals and migrants]. You have no 
way out. The institution and the statuses have already been unequal. You 
should wisely choose your birthplace when you were bom." (Interview 
note) 
The migrants not only neglect the institution or the locals as the origin of their 
hardships, but also show their admiration to the locals' luckiness of being bom in a 
good place where they can enjoy the preferential policies of the economic reforms. 
As Zhang, a general clerk in a hotel, said: 
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“It is not the ability of locals in pushing on the economic development, 
but the geographic location of this district. Apart from this factor, I think 
the locals are absolutely poorer if compared with the migrants... 
Whatever you do, you need a good timing, a favorable place and the 
cooperation of people (天時,地幸�J,人和).They have all of them. If our 
hometown has these conditions, we can do as well as them." (Interview 
note) 
Apart from the imputation to their bad fate, the migrants generally accept the 
superiority of the locals, especially when the indigenous identity of the locals is 
considered. Due to the traditional spirit of localism in China, the word “indigenous’’ 
indicates not only one's birthplace, but also his social status. An indigenous person is 
eligible to enjoy more privileges and power in his/her hometown than the outsiders, 
regardless to his/her ability. It is seen as a protection as well as a respect to the local 
people. Although the migrants are excluded in the destination, they enjoy the same 
privileges in their own hometowns. Therefore, the inequality between the insiders 
and the outsiders seldom arouses much discontent among the migrants. As Feng 
mentioned: 
"You are originally not the locals. You just move to here. It is impossible 
for you to have the same treatment as the locals. Absolutely impossible! 
For example, when I am in my hometown [Guanxi 廣西],I have many 
privileges that the outsiders don't have. If I go to urban district [Guilin 桂 
林]for traveling, I have to pay only one yuan to buy ticket. However, 
those Cantonese or outsiders have to pay ten times, twenty times or even 
thirty times more. It is very natural! You can't compare with the locals. 
They have been residing here from the ancient time, so that they are 
different from those who move in later. If all people are the same and all 
people move to here, then the locals will be confused and here will be in 
disorder." (Interview note) 
We can see that although the migrants criticize the poor manner and rudeness of 
the locals, they generally recognize the normality of outsiders being the subordinate 
class. In fact, it is the Chinese tradition to see that "people leaving their hometowns 
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are despicable”（人離鄉賤)• Only in their own hometowns, people can have their fulJ 
respectability, because of the recognition from local people and the support from 
their kinship networks. Therefore, the locals, even weaker in ability, are superior to 
the outsiders due to their solid background. 
On the same token, outsiders, after leaving their hometowns and losing the 
support from their kinship networks, are too weak to dispute with the locals. They all 
agree to the adage, "fierce tigers are weaker than indigenous worms"(猛虎不及地頭 
蟲)，so they would like to tolerate or. avoid the locals rather than to dispute with them, 
even if they are discriminated or bullied by them. Zhang mentioned his experience in 
avoiding the interference from security team members: 
“Our lives in here are absolutely unstable, but what ways can we take? I 
can only stay in the dormitory at night and don't come out. I sleep in the 
dormitory, and then they [the security team members] cannot do anything 
to me...It is retreat [逃避].I am only an outsider in here. Compared with 
those local people, I am too powerless to get in conflicts with them. 
Therefore, I had better not to create any trouble and just avoid them." 
(Interview note) 
Huang also has the similar experience. He once argued with the landlord about 
getting back the rental deposit, but was rejected. The only thing he could do is to 
tolerate: 
“How can we dispute with them? They are locals, so that they have right 
to speak; we are not locals, so that we don't have right to speak. Here, the 
security team tends to look after the locals. If we dispute with them and 
draw the security team to come, there will be nothing good to us...We do 
the same in our hometowns. We also have more privileges than the 
outsiders." (Interview note) 
The persistence of localism among Chinese has dual effects. On one hand, it 
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intensifies the locals' exclusion and bullying to the migrants. On the other hand, it 
lessens the migrants' motivation to resist, because they accept the locals' privileges, 
or even their rudeness. This kind of traditional spirit has been enforced further by the 
hukou system, which institutionalizes the localistic spirit by hooking people to their 
birthplaces and granting some privileges exclusively to the locals. The combination 
of the traditional localism and the hukou system makes the migrants internalize the 
inequality between them and the locals. As a result, they tend to attribute their harsh 
lives to the impersonal factors such as their unlucky fates and the poor geographic 
locations of their hometowns, thus release the institution and the locals from the 
responsibility of social inequality. 
3. The consciousness of the migrants 
It is important to emphasize that what the migrants see as normal rationally 
doesn't mean they are totally acceptable consciously. In other words, even though the 
migrants see the unequal institution and the locals' superiority as natural social 
phenomena, they would still find the discrimination and bullying from the locals 
unsatisfactory. Gramsci's concept of hegemony denotes that the ruling class 
dominates the cultural sectors such as religion, tastes, morality and the media, and to 
promote those values which would benefit to its own position, while the subordinate 
class, accepting those values, would be confused by a false consciousness, and think 
that their situation is not as poor as the reality (Femia 1975). However, as Scott 
(1985) points out, complete ideological domination is not possible, since the 
subordinate class is actually very conscious about their unfavorable situations and 
would carry out symbolic resistance to the exploitation. In the case of the migrants, 
although they seldom try to seek an institutional improvement to their unfavorable 
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conditions, they do not submitted totally to the domination of the locals. In fad, the 
migrants are always discontented to the locals' discrimination and feel very angry 
about "being treated not as human beings", but they mostly keep their anger in 
silence. Only in some very exceptional cases, the migrants would quarrel with the 
locals. Wah, a former factory worker, was still very annoyed when she recalled her 
unpleasant experience of getting alone with the locals in Nanhai City: 
"You think those locals like you? Never have such an irrational thinking! 
They call you shanji [pheasant 山奚隹].Shanjil Dead shanjil It indicates 
that they despise workers. There was a time they called me shanji, that 
made me really angry. I shouted back to them, 'Shuiwugui [water tortoise 
tK島龜]! Laihama [toad 癩蛤蟆]!..., Nanhai peoples are very poor in 
sympathy [人t青薄過糸氏].They call all migrants shanji, that means you 
come from the mountain districts. How embarrassing of the word 
'shanjV\...0h.\ They are so rude, treating factory workers as if they are 
dead!... Here, the locals call the migrants 'Dead laomui�., 'Dead 
laoluo^' ！, ..." (Interviewnote) 
In most occasions, the migrants will try to avoid getting in any trouble if they 
find they cannot get along with the locals. For example, Zhang, who was frustrated 
by being despised by his local colleagues, tried to keep a distance from them: 
"There are several locals working in my office. When they speak to you, 
whatever the matter or only for a single word, they behave as if they want 
to bully you...Their tone of speaking is not kind...Their manner is like 
giving you a tongue-lashing.. .Maybe we both don't want to interact with 
each other. They are so repugnant that I don't give them any chance to 
contact me. Similarly, they don't like to be in contact with us...’， 
(Interview note) 
Undoubtedly, the migrants are very powerless in response to the exclusion and 
discrimination from the locals, so almost no resistance is taken up by the migrants. 
However, due to their marginal position in the destination, avoiding any dramatic 
confrontation is a clever tactic to minimize the risk of losing more. It is more a 
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rational choice of self-protection than a complete submission to the domination. In 
fact, on the hidden level, the migrants actively retort the locals by scolding them 
verbally, "unsympathetic"(沒有體貼性)，“impersonal,，（無人情味)，"high-handed" 
(霸道)and "arrogant"(自高自大).In Scott's case, peasants intentionally generate 
some critical discourses in order to constrain the behavior of landlords (Scott 1985). 
Here, again, this scolding only spreads among the migrants, but is not intended to be 
heard by the locals. Therefore, I cannot conclude that the migrants are trying to 
perform any symbolic resistance. However, even though the migrants have no 
intention to overturn the established social order, this scolding, at least, shows that 
they are not trapped in the false consciousness. On the contrary, they are very clear 
about their own unfavorable situations and don't take any risk that is beyond their 
capability. 
The migrants' safety-first principle makes them very careful when dealing with 
the locals. As Hon indicated: 
“It cannot say there is any relationship between the migrants and the 
locals. The well water never disturbs the river water [、河水不各E井水:• 
Unless it is absolutely necessary, we are seldom in conflict or in contact." 
(Interview note) 
II. Working experience 
Most of the migrants work as general workers (普通工人）in foreign-invested 
factories. Those factories are notorious for their violation of labor rights, but they are 
partially safeguarded by the local governments under the renting economy. 
According to the labor laws, workers should work five days a week and eight hours 
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per day. Moreover, the subsidy of overtime working is 1.5 times of the normal wage 
on working days, and 2 times on Saturday and Sunday. However, these labor laws are 
just castles in the air, too remote from the actual lives of the migrants. In fact, most 
of the migrants cannot enjoy the minimum wage, fixed working hours, public 
holidays and labor right protections. They are just cheap labor power subjected to 
strict control of their employers, and are frustrated by the fact that their hard working 
in the Pearl River Delta does not promise them a better future. 
1. The burden of work 
Generally, the working hours of the migrants are so long that 12 hours per day 
are considered to be "normal". A Hunan female migrant mentioned her working life: 
"We get up at six in the morning and then go to work from seven to 
twelve. At noon, we take a rest for an hour. At one o'clock, we are on 
duty again until six. We repeat this working schedule everyday. If the 
factory is going to finish an urgent order，we need to work overtime from 
seven to ten at night." (Interview in Hong Kong Connection 5/1/92) 
Although the working hours are long, general workers can usually earn 300 to 
500 yuan a month. Owing to the extremely low salary, most of them are still willing 
to work overtime in order to earn more subsidies^^. Some general workers said: 
"We don't have much money if we don't work overtime. We will be 
richer if we can work on Saturday and Sunday. ..Provided that the work is 
light, it doesn't matter to work overtime for 3 to 4 hours." (Interview note 
of Ling) 
56 The subsidy for overtime work is always paid lower than the rate regulated by the labor laws. 
According to a local cadre, in some factories, the subsidy is only 1.2 times of the normal wage, while 
in some other factories, it may be just the same as the normal wage. However, the workers mostly 
accept the unfair payment provided that they can earn more by working for longer time and the 
workload does not exceed their physical capacity. 
I l l 
“If you want to make more money, you have to work overtime. How can 
you earn more money if you don't work hard?" (Interview of a couple in 
Hong Kong Connection 5/1/92) 
Undoubtedly, earning more money is the primary aim of the migrant workers 
and they are willing to work harder. However, the workers actually have no power in 
deciding whether to work or not. The employers would order the workers to work 
according to the actual demand of labor power in their factories. If there comes an 
urgent order, the workers cannot reject the employers' request to work overtime, 
even if they are too tired or too sick to handle the excessive workloads. Otherwise, 
their wages will be deducted as a penalty: 
"Workers cannot reject to work overtime. No way! You have to work 
anyway. They [employers] will not let you choose to work or not. No 
way! If we ask for a leave, they will not approve our request either. It is 
not easy to have a leave!" (Interview of a female general worker in Hong 
Kong Connection 5/1/92) 
Zhang's experience was even more distressing. He had to go to work with his 
serious sickness: 
"Last year I had a cold and got a fever. I didn't know how high my 
temperature was. I only felt so dizzy that I couldn't raise my head. 
However, I had to go to work...In fact, we, migrant workers, are most 
afraid of getting sick. If you get sick, no people will care you and you 
need to go working no matter how uncomfortable you are. Otherwise, you 
will be subjected to a fine of 30 yuan for one day absence." (Interview 
note) 
The prolonged working hours, in fact, are restrictive to the basic freedom of 
people. While youngsters are assumed to be the most active and creative group, they 
are trapped in the factory, repeating monotonous work day after day. This is 
contradictory to the nature of youngsters and makes them feel most unbearable. 
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Therefore, some young workers consider working in a factory a waste of their 
youthfulness. Money earned can hardly compensate the loss: 
‘‘At ages 18 and 19 like us should be the time of playing outside, but we 
need to stay in the workshop everyday. Those kinds of works are very 
tedious and annoying. If you want to enrich your living experience, you 
will not see it wasteful of time. However, if you are annoyed, you will be 
sure to find it wasting your time." (Interview of a female worker Ah Fang 
in Hong Kong Connection 20/3/94) 
“This [Working in factory] can earn more money, but...life is most 
valuable. You can earn money, but you cannot earn your life back." 
(Interview of a female worker Sin Ying in Hong Kong connection 
20/3/94) 
In addition to the psychological stress, some workers have really been burnt out 
physically by the prolonged and burdensome work, which turns them into robots and 
wears out their sensitivity to life. A worker complained in a letter: 
"During the two years in Shenzhen, I haven't enjoyed for a single day. 
Life is like an ever-rotating machine, performing a regularly three-step 
rhythm: working, eating and sleeping. From getting up with eyes not fully 
open to going back to the dormitory with heavy foot steps; from the 
morning to the evening, I dare not go slow for a second. When I am 
working desperately, I forget the tiredness. However when I get off from 
the work, I feel like my skeleton having collapsed and I almost fall down 
on the ground." (A letter from a female worker Zhang mei qian in Anzi 
1993:7) 
Another worker described her working life more concretely in her letter. She 
said what the workers were doing was only exchanging their youthfulness for money. 
However, she was still afraid of losing her job no matter how unbearable her job was: 
"We work for more than ten hours everyday. When those Hong Kong 
clients see us, they also feel sorry and say, 'It is unworthy for Zhejiang 
maidens to exchange their youthfulness for Hong Kong dollars (用青春換 
港幣)!，…We are just like robots when working and become wooden 
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statues after work (上班像個機械人，下班像個木頭人).In addition, we 
have a sense of crisis of being dismissed. Although we live a collective 
life, but I still have a feeling of melancholy for unknown reason." (A 
letter from a migrant Dong qiao hong in Anzi 1993: 217) 
Most of the migrants want to find a job in order to earn more money, but the 
prolonged, burdensome jobs make them feel disgusted. It doesn't mean that there is 
no migrant who can find a satisfactory job, but most of them are having jobs of low 
pay and prolonged working hours. What they can do is to tolerate until they are 
either lucky enough to find a better job, or become so impatient that they quit by 
themselves. 
2. The constraint of development 
Apart from the painful working experience, the future of the migrants for further 
career development is dim. Li (1999), in a research of the migrants' occupation 
mobility in destination, has found that although the migrants change their jobs quite 
frequently, 72.3% of them have only achieved horizontal mobility in social status. 
One of the reasons is that the migrants associate only with people of the same social 
status, but are completely isolated from the urban social networks which can help 
them achieve upward social mobility. Li's case has shown the importance of guanxi 
in China. A person who has no local guanxi is difficult to have any career 
development. Similarly, in Tianshen, since the migrants lack local social networks, 
their chances of getting a better job or having a promotion are limited, despite their 
high education level. 
Cheng is a university graduate from Sichuan. After he quitted the general work in 
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a factory, he became unemployed for a long time and was tired about finding a new 
job. Cheng exclaimed that the difficulty of getting a good job was mainly due to his 
lack of guanxi in the destination: 
“Nowadays, you have to depend on guanxi to get a job. Education 
certificate is not so important. You need to have guanxi before you rely on 
your education certificate. Guanxi is essential. Except you are exceptional 
outstanding, it is a must to have guanxi..My guanxi in here cannot 
compare with that in my hometown, where I have guanxi in different 
sectors, even with the government. However, in here, I know only my 
relatives, friends, laoxiang. What a poor guanxiV (Interview note) 
Certainly, the migrants can build up their guanxi in the destination by making 
friends with other migrants. However, since the lives of the migrants are very 
unstable and they are always in a state of floating, it is very difficult for them to 
maintain their friendship with others for a long term. Once they separate, their 
friendship would end. Zhang mentioned that his lack of guanxi blocked his road of 
career development and upward social mobility in the destination: 
have made some friends here, but we come and go in a hurry, brought 
together only by luck [緣聚緣散 ] . T o d a y I work here, maybe I go 
tomorrow, and then we will lose contact . . .We need to depend on 
ourselves. We have no guanxi and local relatives here, so that I will never 
dream of having further career development . . . I f you want to have any 
development, at least you need to have a road. However, our road here is 
blocked. No way! We have only a road for return. . .To us, we can only be 
workers. Apart from that, we don't have other ways.' ' (Interview note) 
Lacking guanxi is not only the problem of general workers, but also the problem 
of those migrants who are relatively well-off and professional. Hon. a university 
graduate working as a manager in a Hong Kong-invested electronic factory, intended 
to return to his hometown, because the lack of guanxi in destination has barricaded 
his plan of setting up his own business: 
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"You cannot do anything without guanxi. In my hometown, I have many 
classmates working for the government and the security bureau...When 
some of them have really “seized power,，，I will go back home. Here, I am 
so powerless that it is not good for starting my own business, unless 
everything goes smoothly without a hitch. However, things are very 
intricate to be handled when setting up a business. They cannot be done 
without the help of guanxi. Even I really have my own business here, I 
cannot put all the profit in my pocket. I have to give three yuan to other 
people for every ten yuan I earn. However, it will be different in my 
hometown. I can put at least nine yuan in my own pocket. Then, I will 
have less pressure and constraint, and can do my business more 
flexibly...If I were single, I could establish relationship with the locals by 
getting married with a local girl. Then I would probably have room for 
further career development in here. But that way is impossible now. [Hon 
is married]" (Interview note) 
Although the professionals and the workers have different concerns, their 
prospects are both constrained by the lack of guanxi. To professionals, no matter how 
successful they are in their jobs, they would also find it difficult to deal with the 
various government departments and officials if they want to set up their own 
business. Therefore, they may be not confident enough to realize their plans. To 
general workers, the problems of lacking guanxi are even more explicit. Due to the 
huge amount of migrants, the competition among them in finding jobs is extremely 
keen. They often need the introduction from relatives, friends or some middlemen in 
order to get in a factory. Those having no quanxi even cannot find a job. The 
competition among the male migrants is much more keener since most of the 
positions in factories recruit only female. Thus, they not only need an introduction, 
but also have to pay an introduction fee varying from 100 to 1000 yuan. 
Factories of relatively better conditions are highly preferred by the migrants, but 
only those who have guanxi can get in and have a chance of promotion. Guanxi is 
also very critical even in foreign-invested factories. Siu Mei, working in a large shoe 
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making factory which produces Nike, said: 
“On the surface, this factory recruits workers publicly, but it actually 
recruits from inside. When the factory is in need of workers, those who 
have good relations with the management staff are the first ones to hand 
on their relatives' identity cards. Those middlemen [management staff] 
can receive an introduction fee, which is 800 for female workers and 
more than 1000 for male workers. Whenever there are vacancies for 
promotion, those having power and influence select their laoxiang 
firstly...Inside this factory, there is a strong net of guanxi [|街係網].’， 
(Interview note) 
To put it briefly, the migrants who leave their hometowns and lose the support 
from their useful guanxi have become so helpless that they have very few chance for 
further career development in the destination^^. It is the reason why most of the 
migrants can only switch from one factory to another horizontally, remaining general 
workers without any rise in social status. 
III. Migration: a short stage of life 
Under the pent-up atmosphere of being despised by the locals and having dim 
future for further career development, the migrants cannot help having a sense of 
unsteadiness. They are only living an uncertain life from one day to the next (有~•日 
過一日）and can only exchange their youthfulness for money. However, one's 
youthfulness is limited, so they endure increasing pressure when they gradually get 
older. What is the way out (出路)？ What will be the future? These questions are most 
57 Undoubtedly, one's ability and education level are also very important for him/her to become more 
competitive in the labor market. However, I would like to emphasize that the labor market has not 
been totally marketized. Therefore, more ability and higher education level are not fully enough to 
promise a better prospect if lacking the support of guanxi. The significance of guanxi is especially 
obvious in the state-owned and collective enterprises, and the local governmental departments, where 
the locals are more favored and privileged than the migrants, even though their education level is 
lower. 
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perplexing to the migrants. In the following paragraphs, I would like to highlight the 
age limit of being migrants and the uneasiness of migration, which force them to 
return home. 
1. Age 25: the utmost limit of being migrants 
i. The preference for young female migrants 
Before we can understand the age limit of the migrants, we should firstly see the 
gender unbalance of the labor market, which provides the background insight. When 
walking around Tianshen, I could see many recruitment notices stuck everywhere. 
Most of them have very similar requirements, which are as follows: 
XXX large factory 
Recruitment: general workers 
Gender: female 
Age: 18-25 
Marital status: single 
Education level: junior middle school or higher 
Most production factories prefer young female to take up the production-line 
works. Although there is no exact information on female to male ratio in Tianshen, it 
is very common to see that among the several hundred workers in a factory, only 
several tens are male. They are mainly recruited to operate machines and handle 
some heavy works. The production-line workers are almost purely female. The 
preference to female workers has resulted in an extreme unbalance of gender ratio in 
Tianshen, and turns it into an "empire of female". 
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The employers' inclination to recruit female workers for production-line work is 
mainly for the reason of better management. From the viewpoint of employers, 
female, despite their hesitation and weakness, are compliant, malleable and patient, 
while male are strong and decisive, but impatient and impetuous. Whether these 
gender stereotypes are right or not, the employers assign works to their workers in 
accordance with these gendered characteristics. Therefore, they think female are 
more suitable to take up those tedious and ever-repeating works on production lines. 
Hon, the manager of an electronic factory, explained: 
“It is difficult for male to take up those production-line works. Male are 
impatient to sit still for longer than ten hours, they are unable to do that. 
However female are more patient. They are more industrious and 
manageable. In addition, female are timid. They will improve and comply 
to your commands if you blame them. Male are different, they sometimes 
quarrel with or even fight the managing staff... [But] it is safer for male to 
control machines, because they are braver, stronger and decisive to 
whether hold the machines or withdraw their hands, whereas female 
sometimes are careless. Their hairs are long and their motions are 
hesitated. It is so unsafe that their hands will easily be hurt by the 
machines." (Interview note) 
In most factories, production-line works have absorbed the majority of the 
workers. This is why the female migrants outnumber their male counterpart greatly. 
However, not all the female migrants have equal chance in getting a job. Only those 
who are single and under age 25 would be considered by the employers, since they 
are regarded as more energetic and have no family burden. The reason for the 
employers to opt for young female is also for the management reason. Hon further 
explained: 
"We recruit workers only from age 18 to 25 or 26. Since we have choices, 
we will not recruit those old workers if there are younger ones available. 
Young workers...are curious to the new things. They are more active and 
want to leam more, and thus they can do the works faster. On the 
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contrary, those married workers may be a little bit too old, and their mood 
is depressed...so that they work slower. Moreover, they have more past 
experience. Therefore, they like to speak. They have so many theories. If 
you speak one word to them, they will pay you back ten words^^...In 
addition, they have family burden. They usually ask for leave to deal with 
this thing and that thing, but those young workers seldom do that. We, 
managing staff, would arrange labor power for better effect and 
efficiency, so that there is not much surplus labor left. It is fixed that how 
many workers produce how many products on a production line. Even 
one or two workers' absence will affect the whole production...It is 
impossible for them to ask for a leave. We even have no time to let them 
have a sickness [無時間俾你病].” (Interview note) 
Mr. Liu, the local owner of an ice-cream production factory, only recruited 
workers aged from 18 to 23. He also excluded those married workers for the similar 
reasons as Hon: 
“It is very common to avoid recruiting married workers for general work, 
except they have special techniques. Those married workers are very 
trouble. They have families, so that they have to return home frequently. 
Besides, their working duration is very short, maybe because of getting 
pregnancy. They are useless! If their families or their children have some 
problems, they need to ask for leave and then no people do the work. The 
working performance of married workers is unstable. Their emotion is 
depressed and would not totally committed to the work." (Interview note) 
In the employers' eyes, age 25 is an indication of being “old” and “married’’. 
Since the works in factories are tough and require workers' total devotion, those old 
and married migrants are inevitably discriminated and avoided. 
Although it may be ridiculous to consider workers aged 25 to be "old" in most 
developed societies, it is the common understanding in the Pearl River Delta due to 
excessive teenagers inflowing from all over China. Since those production-line 
58 Normally, the workers are not allowed to talk to one another while they are working, because the 
management staff deem that it would lower their working efficiency. I have seen a notice on the wall 
of a factory. It writes, "Talking is not allowed during working. The offenders will be subjected to a 
penalty of 10 yuan." 
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works are mostly low-skilled and repetitious, employers need not to retain those 
experienced workers. Instead, they would like to replace those “old” and depressed 
workers with teenagers^^, aiming at sustaining the production vitality. Moreover, it is 
also a strategy of some employers to reduce the production cost by dismissing the 
original workers, whose salaries are higher. A traveling reporter recorded this 
situation: 
"The factory employers would recruit new workers in order to dismiss 
those original workers. How many new workers have been recruited and 
then the same amount of original workers will be dismissed. Those 
factories mainly produce by simple techniques and not much skill is 
needed. The new workers can take up the techniques in a few minutes and 
become experienced workers in one week�Therefore, employers tend to 
dismiss those high-waged original workers and replace them with 
low-waged ones in order to maintain low cost and high profit." (Ge and 
Qu 1990: 132) 
“25” is an invisible limit to most migrants. When they approach the age 25, they 
gradually find it more difficult, or even impossible, to get a new job. The Pearl River 
Delta is a world only for youngsters. “Old,，workers will be eliminated by the labor 
market, and thus will be trapped in the predicament of frequent and long-term 
unemployment. 
ii. The pressure of getting married 
Apart from the competition with the young migrants, the relatively "old" 
migrants also have to face the pressure of getting married, which makes them unable 
to stay in the destination for long. As I have indicated, most migrants are single 
59 The employers generally regard teenagers as "having more vigor and strength"(有氣有力），so they 
can work with higher efficiency. 
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female youngsters. They are at the right time to choose their mates and consider their 
marriage. In China, youngsters generally get married at early twenties^^. Although 
the official ages of marriage are 22 for female and 24 for male, most rural people get 
married at an earlier age regardless of the laws. In fact, it is a consensus in Chinese 
society that "25" is the utmost age for youngsters, especially for females, to get 
married. Otherwise, they will be regarded as “big age maidens"(大齡女古娘)or "late 
marriage"(晚婚)，which is a personal as well as a social problem. Therefore, how to 
arrange their future marriage becomes another inevitable constraint of most of the 
single migrants. 
Due to the extremely unbalanced gender ratio in the Pearl River Delta, most 
female migrants cannot find their ideal partners or even have no chance to make 
male friends. After they have been working for several years and have reached the 
age of 23 or 24, they would be very anxious about their future husbands. The locals 
are generally unwilling to marry the migrants, because they see the migrants as their 
subordinates. Moreover, the migrants without a local hukou are excluded from all 
local welfare, so that they are cold-shouldered by the locals because of the economic 
consideration^^ However, even if all local males are willing to marry the female 
6° There is a doggerel in China concerning the four stages of a female's mate choice: 
Girls of 18 are haughty; 
Girls of 20 are choosy; 
Girls of 25 are so worried; 
Girls of 30 are not welcomed [by boys]. See Chen (1997) Cong shunkouliu jiedu xin zhongguo: 168. 
The doggerel indicates that most of the girls get married before age 25. Otherwise, they would be seen 
as "old maidens". 
61 In chapter two, I have already explained the institutional barrier for a migrant to marry a local. This 
institutional barrier is to encourage the local males to marry the local females in order to avoid the 
social problem of "big age maidens". However, there are two kinds of locals, who would marry the 
migrants. The first ones are those rich enough to disregard the local welfare. They would consider the 
quality of their future mates more than the potential economic return. The second ones are those 
unable to find a mate locally, therefore they would marry a migrant even though they are unwilling to 
do so. Undoubtedly, there may be some locals who marry the migrants out of pure love. However, it is 
not suitable to overemphasize the power of pure love because of the great influences of institutional 
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migrants, the population of the locals would be too small to fulfill the large amount 
of the female migrants. 
Among the migrants, it is very common to have a lover in the destination for 
sentimental satisfaction, because the life of migration is very lonely. However, many 
of them are "just for fun and very few can get married at last" (interview note of 
Zhang). The main factors blocking the migrants' love affairs are the far separation 
between their hometowns and the disagreement from their parents. As Zhang pointed 
out: 
“In China, the wife has to move to her husband's home after getting 
married. If one of the lovers is from Hunan and the other is from 
Northeast, even the girl is willing to marry the boy, her parents may 
disagree. The girl may, therefore, give up if she doesn't want to hurt her 
parents... Generally, a girl disinclines to marry a boy very far from her 
hometown. If a Sichuanese [四川人]and a Northeastemese [東：(匕人]fall 
in love, they are just too boring, so that they temporarily stay together." 
(Interview note) 
The distance between the two lovers' hometowns is a critical factor deciding the 
result of their love affairs. Parents, especially of the girls' side, usually object their 
children going far away to get married, because it will barricade their close 
connection with their children. Zhang has a girl friend in Tianshen and they have 
decided to return home and get married this year. One reason for their success is that 
they are both Sichuanese and it only takes two hours to travel from one hometown to 
another by vehicle. Therefore, they parents agreed with their marriage. Zhang said, 
“if our hometowns are very far apart, they [parents] will reject our decision." 
constraint and economic attraction. 
123 
Besides the disagreement from the parents, the long physical distance between 
the two lovers' hometowns also hinder their mutual understanding, and make them, 
especially the girl, worry about being cheated by a philanderer. Siu Mei, a 25 female 
migrant, has considered finding a mate in Tianshen, but she has given up this idea 
finally. She explained that: 
“If I find a mate here, I know only him, but not his background. I don't 
know anything about his family...Some people [male migrants] have 
married, but they have another lover here. I have a roommate bom in 
1982. She has fallen in love with a security guard, who is in his thirties 
and has already had a wife and children...That girl is too addicted to 
playing and eating [愛吃愛玩].” (Interview note) 
In order to ensure the honesty of the lover, Siu Mei would go back home the 
next day after the interview, because her family members have already made an 
arrangement for her. Some female migrants are also afraid the lack of security if they 
find a lover who is also a migrant: 
“I am a girl floating alone for years. I am really tired, so I want to have a 
mate...in Shenzhen. However, those boys around me are also living like a 
floating cloud. I long for love, but I am scared of falling in love, because I 
am afraid to imagine how bitter the life of a floating couple will be..." (A 
letter from a migrant Ou yang fen hai in Anzi 1993: 217) 
Since there are many external obstacles and psychological concerns that affect 
the single migrants' choice of partners in the destination, most of them will put an 
end to their migratory lives at last and return to their hometowns in order to get 
married. Ge and Qu, two traveling journalists, have depicted the confusion of the 
female migrants in facing the pressure from love affairs: 
“Most female migrants are not lucky enough to get married in the 
destination. What they can do is to submit to their fate: return to their 
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hometowns to get married and bear children after several years of 
working. They have a common idea, ‘We just come out to work, to widen 
our horizons and earn some money for dowry and making up. That's all! 
We can never live the lives as those city girls, who were bom and grew up 
in cities and also set up their families there!' The pavilion is good, but not 
a place suitable for long staying [涼亭雖好，終非歸宿].When those 
female migrants reach the age of 23 or 24, they would leave their working 
destinations and go back homes." (1990: 164) 
"25" is a dreadful number, which puts an unbearable pressure on the migrants 
due to the worry of being eliminated by younger migrants and the urgency of getting 
married. Although there is a consensus among the migrants that floating in the 
outside world cannot last long, 25 is still too early for them to end everything and 
return home, because most of the migrants usually have not had much achievement 
at this age, and still feel quite attached to the urban life. 
2. The uneasiness of migration 
Although the migrants are free to go to the Pearl River Delta, it is almost 
impossible for them to become permanent residents in the local community. As a 
result, most of the migrants maintain a strong connection with their hometowns and 
always have a preparation to return, whether it is their own will or not. More 
specifically, the uncertainty and the unclear future of working outside make the 
hometowns mean not only a native place to the migrants, but also the final 
destination of their migration, or at least a last resort providing psychological 
comfort. 
The migrants always emphasize the instability of their lives during interviews. 
They frequently employ terms like "duckweed"(浮萍），"vagrancy"(流浪)， 
"rootlessness"(無根）and "passersby"(過客)，"uncertain for tomorrow"(今日口吾矢口 
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明日事),and ‘‘living from one step to the next"(見步行步）to describe their lives of 
migration. Zhang mentioned the uncertainty of his working life: 
“My aim of coming here is to earn some money, but there is little chance 
for my further development. Now, I just rap the bell when I am still a 
monk [當一天禾口尙打一天鐘].In fact, most migrants have this feeling. If 
the boss doesn't need you anymore, they can dismiss you whenever they 
want...What can I do? I am now under the others' eaves, so that I cannot 
help putting down my head [在人屋簷下，不得不低頭].They are the 
bosses. You have to do anything according to their willingness. If they 
need you, then you stay. Otherwise, you have to leave. That's all." 
(Interview note) 
Tang pointed out that the lack of social protection could not provide him with a 
sense of security in the destination: 
“I don't have a sense of belonging here. I even don't know what will be 
going on tomorrow [今曰唔知明曰事].If I can share some bonus and 
welfare from the factory, and enjoy some welfare provided by the local 
government, then I may have a sense of belonging and I will not go...No 
matter how poor the situations are, we need a sense of security. However, 
we have nothing apart from the wages. When you quit your job, you have 
nothing. How can I have a sense of belonging?" (Interview note) 
Jun expressed more concretely his alienation to the destination: 
"No matter how good here, it is the city of others and the place of others 
[SU人的城市，另U人的地方],where I cannot feel the same intimacy as 
that in my hometown. It seems that the closer to hometown, my mind can 
be settled down more...I have the feeling of vagrancy here, neither a 
sense of belonging, nor a feeling of at home." (Interview note) 
In other words, the unstable migratory life has hindered the migrants' desire in 
cultivating a sense of belonging to the destination. It makes them turn an indifferent 
manner to the local affairs, which are not related to their interests directly. The 
migrants generally have an idea that they may leave the destination at any time, and 
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once they leave, they will be totally unrelated to the local community. Therefore, it is 
meaningless to devote their time and energy to those trivial matters. Siu Mel was a 
typical example. She, even after working in village 1 for five years, could not tell the 
surname of the locals. "Where comes my time and mood to bother their [locals'] 
things!" She said disdainfully. Tang explained clearly the migrants's cold attitude to 
the public affairs from the angle of an outsider: 
“I am now working here. If the local government can do something good 
to us, I don't mind to pay it tax and am sure to stay here, because I have a 
sense of security and belonging. Therefore, if someone damages the road, 
I will think it is related to me, since I may become a member of Tianshen 
in future. However, I have no relation to it actually, so that I don't care the 
roads in Tianshen being damaged by someone. I may go tomorrow and 
will never use it again. You just damage them if you like!" (Interview 
note) 
Some migrants not only lack a sense of belonging, but also turn an exploitative 
manner to the local community. The locals frequently complain that some of the 
migrants litter everywhere and steal whenever there is a chance. It is because the 
migrants only see the destination as a temporary place to make money, and thus 
focus primarily on short-term interests. Some of them even try to make as much 
return as possible within the period of staying regardless to the negative 
consequences caused to the local community. There is a similar depiction on 
newspaper about the exploitative manner of the migrants in Shanghai: 
"Shanghai is a city like New York, where can never be cleaned up. Those 
migrant workers from Anhui throw the construction rubbishes on the 
roads without any concern; Sichuan girls toss the bones under the flower 
beds after they have finished their lunch boxes. Those migrants only 
know how to pursue what they want. Here is not their home, therefore 
they don't care everything in here. But in fact, it is also beyond their 
ability to care those things." {Zhongguo shipinbao 27/2/2000) 
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Certainly, under this highly uncertain situation, it seems impossible to require 
all the migrants to cherish everything as if it is their asset. Therefore, it makes not 
only the migrants, but also the locals and the local community become the victims of 
the uneasiness of migration, because the indifferent or even exploitative manner of 
the migrants has inevitably disturbed the living environment in the destination. 
Besides the general workers, some professionals or well-off migrants face the 
same problem of lacking a sense of belonging in the destination. While the general 
workers are mostly perplexed by the short-term economic constraints, those well-off 
migrants, who enjoy comfortable lives and high incomes, concern more about the 
social harmony and the long-term living security. Although with different 
considerations, the well-off migrants also cannot confirm their prospect of long 
staying, and it makes them reluctant to make long-term investment in Tianshen. Hon, 
as a factory manager, earned a wage of about ten thousand yuan a month. However, 
when his employer proposed to support him in buying a flat in Tianshen as an 
exchange for his longer staying in the factory, he rejected since he was very 
unsatisfied to the xenophobia of the locals: 
“I have no intention to stay here for long, because the local people are not 
kind.. .The situation may be better in cities, but it is quite poor in villages. 
For example, in this village [village 1], when the locals see you are 
outsiders, they treat you with different attitude...! don't want to invest too 
much in here. In other words, everything is temporary and fluid ...On the 
contrary, I have brought a shop front in the city of my hometown. My 
friends were very curious to what I did and asked me the reason. They 
said that, ‘You do so well outside, why do you came back and do this 
thing?' I told them I didn't like the people outside." (Interview note) 
Feng, an outstanding sale of an ice-cream factory, also earned a high salary of 
more than ten thousand yuan a month. Moreover, he was very optimistic and got 
128 
along very well with the locals. However, he thought that his economic success at 
present still could not provide him with a sense of security, especially for his future 
life. Being an outsider, he was excluded from the protection of social welfare and had 
to manage his future life by himself if he stayed permanently in Tianshen. Therefore, 
before he could guarantee himself a stable future in Tianshen, Feng, like Hon, was 
also unwilling to make any investment there. Instead, he brought a flat in his 
hometown for the preparation of return. Feng emphasized clearly the importance of 
the economic security when considering whether staying long in Tianshen: 
"Generally speaking, the sense of belonging is based on the economic 
conditions. If my development is very good and smooth, then I will go on 
staying here. However, if my development is very difficult and cannot 
achieve what I expect, then I will go back to my hometown. If there is 
something slightly unfavorable to me, I will go back. You ask me whether 
I will buy a flat here. I won't until I have found a way to survive and have 
decided to settle down in here. I am not the same as the locals, who need 
not worry the low wages, because they can enjoy welfare, pension and 
land sharing. However, I don't have such guarantees. Therefore, I have to 
consider my future life when I am too old to work. To me, if I cannot find 
a way to survive, I will not stay here even I have several hundred 
thousand yuan." (Interview note) 
From the cases of Hon and Feng, we can see that the uncertainty of migratory 
life does not only come from the economic constraints, but also from the social 
exclusion of the local community, which makes the migrants worry about settling 
down in Tianshen. The uneasiness of migration is clearly reflected in Hon's and 
Feng's reluctance to buy a flat in Tianshen. This is to make sure everything is 
moveable. In this way, they can adjust more flexibly to the fast changing 
circumstances by deciding whether to move to other places or to return to their 
hometowns if their situations become unfavorable. At the same time, their 
investment at their hometowns is an additional insurance to their unstable migration, 
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preparing a road for their future return. However, it doesn't mean Hon and Feng have 
decided to leave very soon or have a specific plan concerning when they will return. 
In fact, they still find Tianshen a good place to earn money and have no intention to 
leave in the near future. Their investment at hometowns is only a reserved resort for 
the worst situation. In other words, it is more for the psychological security than the 
practical urgency. 
The need for psychological security is more explicit in the case of Tian, a Hunan 
migrant. Tian was originally working in a state-owned enterprise (SOE) in Hunan, 
but he came to Guangdong in 1993 with a permission of tingxinliuzhi (suspending 
the salary while reserving the post 停薪留職)from his enterprise. Being a university 
graduate, he was a production manager in Shenzhen and is now working in an 
ice-cream factory as a financial comptroller, earning a wage of 3500 yuan a month. 
Tian，s career in Guangdong is much better that in the SOE, where the payment was 
only 200 to 300 yuan a month and the room for further career development was very 
limited. However, it is surprising that after leaving his hometown for several years, 
Tian has still maintained his tingxinliuzhi status in the SOE and is even willing to pay 
a monthly fee of 120 yuan for its maintenance. Although he has deemed that the 
wage in SOE is too low and it would be too shameful for him to go back after a long 
leave, the "sense of crisis" of working outside makes him unconfident to separate 
totally from the SOE. In fact, he is still quite worried about his future: 
“I don't know whether I am able to stay [in Guangdong] for long. If I lose 
this job and I cannot find a new one, then I cannot stay even I want to do 
so." (Interview note) 
Similarly, Tian's maintenance of the tingxinliuzhi status is also a reserved 
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protection for the worst situation. At least, Tian can still have a way out even if he 
"cannot find a way to survive" in Tianshen, borrowing the words from Feng. 
In brief, the migrants' lives are very unstable and their future is unclear. 
Therefore, they cannot develop a sense of belonging in the destination. Most of the 
migrants can only return to their hometowns after a temporary stay in "the city of 
others". To them, the outside world is splendid, but is also so ruthless that long 
staying is almost impossible. Returning home is their only choice even they are not 
willing to do so. 
IV. Concluding remarks 
The migrants floating from the inland rural areas to the Pearl River Delta are 
attracted by its prosperity and modernity. However, because of the locals' 
discrimination, tough working conditions and highly uncertain situations, most of the 
migrants end up with returning to their poor and backward origins sooner or later, 
generally at the age of 25. Therefore, it is common to hear the migrants to mention, 
consciously or unconsciously, about their hometowns and their future return. It seems 
they all have a desire for returning home. 
Cohen and Gold (1997), in a research of Israelis in Toronto, found that those 
Diaspora has generated a "myth of return" among them, expressing their desire of 
returning to Israel. Although the "myth of return" may only connote a wishful 
fantasy and will never be realized, the migrants hold it as a truth, and it reflects a 
collective nostalgia and a feeling of homesickness. The function of the “myth of 
return" is "a practical cognitive solution to a cognitive contradiction~or cognitive 
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dissonance—between their nationalist ideology and the fact that they are living in the 
Diaspora...[It] provides immigrants with a legitimate cognitive framework within 
which they can simultaneously maintain memberships in both homeland and 
Diaspora." (1997: 376) Besides, on the social level, the "myth of return" has 
enhanced the community solidarity and ethnic separateness. It makes the Israelis 
reject to integrate to the local society and resist to be assimilated in order to preserve 
their culture in a pure state. 
Comparing with the experience of Israelis in Toronto, the inclination of 
returning home of the migrants in the Pearl River Delta is not a self-exclusion, but a 
retreat from being excluded by the hukou system and the xenophobia of the locals. In 
other words, the migrants are not too nostalgic to integrate to the new environment, 
but are rejected to be permanent members by the local community. In fact, the 
migratory life is too harsh and too unstable to last long. The migrants cannot help 
putting an end to their vagabondage in some future time, mostly when they want to 
get married or when they are eliminated by the labor market. Therefore, returning 
home is a passive desire of most of the migrants, even they do not intend to do so. 
Despite different reasons leading to the inclination of return, the “myth of 
return" functions similarly to both Israelis in Toronto and the migrants in Tianshen in 
terms of dissolving the cognitive dissonance. While the Israelis' "myth of return" is 
to make themselves forgive their inability to realize the national ideology, the 
migrants' one is to convert themselves to accept the fate of returning home. As 
mentioned above, the perplexity of most of the migrants in Tianshen is that they 
don't want to leave behind the prosperity and modernity of the Pearl River Delta, but 
they are forced to return to their rural origins. Therefore, the fashion of the "myth of 
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return" among the migrants is in fact a process of self-persuasion, which may begin 
from the day when the migrants leave their hometowns, convincing themselves that 
the outside would is attractive, but not a good place for stable life. During the 
interviews, it is very common to hear the migrants contrasting the goodness of their 
hometowns to the badness of the destination such as being respected versus being 
discriminated; relaxing versus burdensome; stable versus vagabond. Through these 
contrasts, they romanticize their hometowns as well as smear the destination. Their 
assumptions are further proved to be true through their harsh experience of living and 
working in the destination, which in turn reinforces their psychological preparation 
to return. 
It is necessary to emphasize that we should not overestimate the effect of the 
"myth of return", since it can never completely release the migrants from the 
perplexity of their fated return. Generally, the migrants exclaim only because no 
other better alternatives are available. Although lives in the hometown are more 
stable, the chances for living improvement are much fewer than that in the Pearl 
River Delta. However, the "myth of return" can achieve a psychological comfort to a 
certain degree, making the migrants feel easier to accept the fact that working outside 
is only a temporary stage of life, and their hometowns rather than the working places, 
are their true terminal destinations. With the inclination to return, the migrants, on 
one hand, are more tolerable to the hardships they face in the destination, since all 
the hardships are only temporary and will be ceased once they leave; but on the other 
hand, they cannot cultivate a sense of belonging or loyalty to the destination, so they 
may turn an exploitative manner to it, regardless any social morality. 
133 
To put it briefly, the Pearl River Delta is “a post of the youths"(青春驛站严， 
where only the young migrants can have a temporary stay. Therefore, the migrants 
behave like migratory birds ({侯,藝)，which will certainly fly back to their homes at a 
certain time. Their returns are romanticized by the migrants as "the falling leafs 
returning to their root"(落葉歸根）in order to soothe their perplexity from the 
inevitable return. However, before the migrants conclude their migratory lives, they 
still have to face the hostile exclusion from the locals and the adverse exploitation 
from the employers. How can they handle the dissatisfaction? What are their living 
strategies in the destination? I would like to deal with these questions in the next 
chapter. 
62 "A post of the youths"(青春驛站）is the title of Anzi's first fiction. It depicts the migrants' stories 
in Shenzhen. See Anzi (1992) Qingchun yizhan: Shenzhen dagongmei xiezhen. 
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Chapter 5 
Exit and familism: the ways to accommodate dissatisfaction 
"They [migrants] are low in social status and position, so that they 
don't have human dignity; they are a marginal group, having poor 
self-protection consciousness. Therefore, they can only tolerate after 
being insulted and beaten, but carry no any reaction. Even they lodge 
a complaint against the offenders, the governmental departments are 
indifferent to the violation of the migrants ‘ legal rights. It is really 
difficult for the migrants to 'have a justice judgment'...“ 
—Lanzhao chenbao 18/10/2000 
After discussing the migrants' perceptions towards the exclusive, exploitative 
environment, and their unstable lives of migration, I conclude that they find their 
situations very unsatisfactory. A very critical and interesting question then is needed 
to be asked, "What are the strategies adopted by the migrants to react to the 
dissatisfaction?" From the viewpoints of the traditional Marxist Sociology and the 
classical theory of social movement, exploitation (or structural strain) and resistance 
are the two sides of the same coin. Therefore, class conflict or collective resistance is 
inevitable if the exploitative relation between the dominant and the subordinate 
classes has not been eliminated. However, in the Pearl River Delta, due to their 
marginal position and their floating nature, the migrants seldom take up direct 
confrontation with the locals or their employers in order to have the situations 
improved. Instead, tend to switch from a place (or a factory) to another and seek help 
from their family and kinship networks aiming at avoiding the extremely unfavorable 
conditions without putting any political pressure on the existing social order. 
In this chapter, I will first explain why direct confrontation is rarely seen in the 
Pearl River Delta, where the structural strain is very great. Then, I will focus on the 
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migrants' living strategies---exit and familistic support—and see how these 
non-violent means dissolve the potential political struggle between the migrants and 
the locals or their employers. Finally, I would like to introduce a case study, showing 
the stubbornness and the initiative of the migrants, despite their powerlessness in 
changing the unequal social conditions. It is essential to highlight that the following 
elaborations center mainly on the working aspect of the migrants' lives, but the 
nature and characteristics of their living strategies are applicable to other scopes of 
their lives as well. 
I. The infrequency of direct confrontation 
In market economy, labors are commodities rather than the owners of the 
society. Therefore, their values are governed by the supply-demand principle. If the 
supply of labors is larger than the demand, their value will decrease and vice versa. 
In the Pearl River Delta, the influx of the migrants has made the supply of labors 
largely exceed the demand of the market. The wages of general workers are therefore 
very low, but the competition of getting a job is still extremely keen. Under this 
adverse situation, the migrants' primarily concern is to ensure their own basic 
security instead of striving for better collective interest. In other words, the migrants 
see one another as competitors competing for the limited resources---the job 
opportunities. That not only blocks the unification of the migrants to form a 
formalized group, although they have the same experience of being excluded and 
exploited, but also weakens their collective bargaining power to the exploiters. 
Therefore, the employers can gain the upper hand to depress the migrants' wages as 
low as possible without worrying any radical protests. As a reportage writes that: 
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“...Workers in the eyes of them [employers] are only a part of variable 
means of production, that is cheap labor power. An employer has shown 
his disdain to workers, 'You can quit as you please to. There are still 
plenty of unemployed youngsters in your China."... (Luo 1986: 167) 
The existence of excessive surplus labors makes the migrants too powerless to 
reject the exploitation from the employers. Even sometimes they can cooperate to 
strike for their rights, they cannot get the expected return, but only coldhearted 
dismissal. A migrant worker has mentioned his experience in a letter: 
"We are a group of migrant workers from the areas outside Guangdong, 
and sell out our labor power in a foreign-invested factory. Recently, there 
was a middle level of fire happened in the warehouse, causing a loss of 
several hundred thousand yuan to the employer. However, he transferred 
the loss on us rascally, so that our daily wage standard was lowered. I was 
the manager of the production department. I tried to argue reasonably 
with the employer, but was dismissed by him. Then the other workers 
went on strike, but were also dismissed collectively. Only two days later, 
the garment-making factory was able to re-employ all new workers. Oh! 
There are too many migrant workers leaving their homes and working 
outside, just like us, and are too inexpensive! From your angle, should we 
put up our luggage and return home or continue our vagabondage in 
here?" (A letter from migrants Liang xin guo et al in Anzi 1993: 13) 
It is undeniable that striking is a powerful way for the migrants to defend their 
basic rights. Some migrants have told me some successful cases they have heard of 
or experienced. However, their strikes primarily focus on some instant and personal 
concerns such as excessive overtime working, deduction of overtime subsidy or 
postponing delivery of salary, instead of some conceptual ideas of labor rights. 
Therefore, those strikes are mostly small-scale involving only the victims. They 
cannot gain support from workers of other factories or even from other departments 
in the same factory. Moreover, since most of the migrants are in a marginal position, 
they generally hold an attitude of what an old Chinese adage depicted, “I don't care 
anything that is unrelated to me"(事不關己，己不勞乂L、）. They intend to keep away 
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from any trouble that may put their living at risk, and thus show an indifferent 
manner to the strikes which are not defending their personal interests. The only one 
exception is that victims can gain support from their laoxiang in the same factory 
more easily. In fact, worker strikes are mostly facilitated by the localistic network 
and normally in the form of localistic collective action. Nevertheless, the employers 
are also clever enough to take precautions against the potential calamity. They 
generally avoid recruiting too many migrants from the same hometown or province 
in order to prevent collective strikes. 
Apart from the infrequency of strikes, the migrants also seldom resort to the 
institutional ways in defending their entitled labor rights. Especially under the 
renting economy of Tianshen, the migrants commonly suspect the representation of 
the Labor Bureau and the Public Security Bureau, which are seen as the safeguard of 
the benefits of the locals and the foreign investors rather than those of the migrants. 
Besides, the migrants themselves are very weak in the knowledge of laws and are too 
poor to afford the necessary time and money for taking legal proceedings against the 
exploiters. As a result, except some extremely exploitative cases, such as serious 
industrial injury without reasonable compensation or prolonged delay of payments, 
which are really unbearable and cannot be effectively solved simply by quitting the 
factories, the migrants generally see the daily violation of labor rights as "normal". 
As a result, direct confrontations such as carrying out strikes or filing lawsuits 
against the exploiter are only occasional cases. Most of the time, the migrants have to 
face employers' exploitation on their own. However, they usually exclaim that they 
have "no way to improve the situations, because a general worker is too powerless to 
strive for anything", “It is not enough to depend on my effort alone [to bargain with 
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the employer]." The ineffectiveness of outer channels and self-perceived 
powerlessness make the migrants tend to handle the dissatisfaction in some personal 
ways like quitting the factories and seeking help from family members in order to 
avoid being further exploited. 
Under the market economy environment, the relationship between employers 
and workers is purely an exchange of money and labor power. Employers are free to 
recruit workers in the labor market and pay them the market prices. On the same 
token, workers are free to choose their jobs according to their expectation and their 
realistic situations. Therefore, the exchanging relationship between the employers 
and the workers are fluid rather than static, and they need not stick to each other. A 
female migrant has said: 
“...We, migrant workers, just want to earn some money, while those 
bosses just treat us as cheap labors. We don't sell out to each other, and 
don't owe each other. If we [workers] are satisfied, we will go on to work 
[for the boss]; otherwise, we will switch to another one. We [workers and 
the boss] choose each other and we are both free." (Ge and Qu 1990: 133) 
Li, in his research of migrants' job mobility, also depicts that: 
“If the exchange [between workers and the employer] is successful, then 
[the workers] would work here; if not, then [the workers] would leave. 
This market relation in itself gives rise to a high frequency of job 
changing. It is a completely different mode of job finding to that in the 
planned economy era." (Li 1999: 99) 
Job switching is one of the most general strategies employed by the migrants to 
handle the unfavorable working conditions. In the following paragraphs, I would like 
to clarify two types of job switching. The first one, quitting, is primarily to escape 
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the intolerable exploitation, and the second one, leap-trough (S兆槽‘严，mainly aims at 
pursuing an upward social mobility. 
II. Job switching as a form of self-defense 
1. Quitting: escaping the intolerable exploitation 
While the employers try to appropriate as much surplus value as possible and 
make the situations too adverse to be tolerated, the workers mostly can do nothing 
but simply quit the factory. They do not quit for pursuing a perfectly satisfactory job, 
but for avoiding of the hard and dull situations. Jiang has told his experience in a 
letter: 
"When I came to Shenzhen, I was introduced by my acquaintances to a 
medicament processing factory and then an electronic factory. Since I just 
graduated from the school and didn't have any experience, I could only 
take up the sundry duties. I was assigned to move things in both factories 
and had to work for 12 hours daily. However, my monthly wage including 
the overtime subsidy was less than 200 yuan...I could not bear the hard 
work any more after several months of working, thus I resigned from the 
jobs. Until January of this year, I was introduced by my elder aunt to the 
marketing department of her working company, where I sold aluminum 
foil. Although my wage has been increased in here, I have to sell above 
500 or 1000 kilograms of aluminum foil each day. There are only another 
migrant worker and I to lift the materials on the scale, move them to 
vehicles for clients and write receipts etc. Everyday after work, I am so 
tired that I just want to sleep after I have had my dinner and a bath. ..This 
kind of life is really dull, just rotating like an unconscious machine. 
Therefore, I have already noticed the manager of the marketing 
department that I will leave at the end of this month and he has accepted 
my request.. .，，(A letter from a migrant Jiang yuan in Anzi 1993: 11) 
Generally, the workers, like Jiang, quit their jobs for the prolonged working 
63 Leap-trough means leaving one's position to work elsewhere. It usually accompanies with an 
improvement of one's working conditions. 
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hours, excessively hard work or extremely low wages etc. These working conditions 
sometimes are not just poor, but greatly exceed the physical and mental capacity of 
workers, and make them unable to endure for a longer time, even though the wages 
are acceptable. Apart from the poor working conditions, another problem that 
perplexes migrants, especially those general workers, so much is the violation of 
dignity. Some migrants have aired their grievances about the rudeness and rascality 
of their employers and the management staff, who like to insult or even beat workers 
even only for their a small mistake^" .^ To some migrants, the violation of dignity is 
more intolerable than other poor working conditions, so they would rather quit the 
job in order to defend their dignity. There is a lively description on a working 
literature, depicting a conflict between a Hong Kong manager and a migrant worker. 
The worker finally left the factory as a protest to the insolence of the manager: 
To Lai Zhu [the Hong Kong manager] pointed her finger to Tuen Yu [the 
migrant worker], who was walking around and inspecting the production 
lines, and said “You, mazai [footman ；馬仔]! Sit down and do the work!" 
“I am the managing staff." Said Tuen Yu. 
‘‘Sit down, mazai\,, 
"What do you call me?" Tuen Yu asked To Lai Zhu. 
To Lai Zhu was surprised by his daring to talk back in defiance, so that 
she repeated the word loudly, ''mazaiV 
''MazaiV Tuen Yu also repeated that word. 
64 There was an interview of a male migrant in Hong Kong Connection 20/3/94. He complained the 
rudeness of the managing staff, "One night, here came a container. Since it was very late, except a few 
porters, all had gone to beds. He [the managing staff] woke up all male workers and told them to 
move the wares immediately. One worker running at the back had a cough. He [the managing staff] 
went to the worker and slapped him two times. He said that, 'the employer tells you to go there and 
then you just go there. You having a cough means you don't obey the order...’ We are completely 
contemptible in his eyes. To say it in bad words, [we are] the same as dogs, the same as slaves." 
In addition, some migrants I interviewed have also mentioned the poor manner of the managing 
staff. This makes them so angry, but they can only put up with it. 
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“Yes, mazail” 
About two minutes later, Tuen Yu threw a resigning letter to the Hong 
Kong woman To Lai Zhu in the presence of hundreds of workers. 
“If you resign now, 7 days' wages will be deducted!" 
“Only 7 days' wages? Tuen Yu asked with a smile. 
“7 days'. No one less!" 
Tuen Yu had a look to his colleagues and then turned back to To Lai Zhu 
still with a smile. “Miss To. I will not take even ten cents of the remaining 
200 yuan. I would like to trouble you to take it later and it is the tip I give 
you." Suddenly, Tuen Yu shrank his smile and pointed his finger to the 
nose of To Lai Zhu who was in extreme anger, speaking with emphasis on 
every word, “Tell you. I, your young master, am not called mazail My 
name is 1997.” (Zhang 1992: 29-30) 
Undoubtedly, quitting is a relatively effective and handful way to avoid poor 
working conditions and being insulted, but it is not realistic if we think the migrants 
would quit causally and arbitrarily without careful consideration. In fact, they have to 
bear the cost of quitting, which is much more than losing a job. In the Pearl River 
Delta, the recruitment of workers mostly includes the provision of accommodation 
and full board. Therefore, quitting a job means losing the two most basic necessities 
of living. Since the fierce competition of the labor market and the high prices of 
commodities in the Pearl River Delta, the migrants can hardly find a new job and 
afford their living expenses by their own saving after a rash resignation. Jun 
experienced the vagabondage after he had left a factory because of the prolonged and 
tough work: 
“After I had left the factory, I became a vagrant wandering for more than 
ten days, but I could not find a job. I had some money saved up when I 
was in the Taiwanese factory...For sleeping, about 10 yuan was enough 
for a night in the guest house, but I dared not misspend even for 10 yuan, 
so that I slept in the banana field...Although eating cost only about 2 
yuan a day, since I could not find a job, I was quite worried about what 
would I be if I went on in this way...” (Interview note) 
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Jiang yuan also has the same worry about his future life after he has decided to 
resign from the factory. In his letter, he continues to write that: 
“From next month, I will become unemployed. Being unemployed 
implies the starting of my vagabondage. It may be very romantic to 
someone who has not experienced the lives of vagrants. However, to me, 
vagrancy means to return to my hometown and puts an end to my 
beautiful aspiration in here. I am really unwilling to do that, but I have no 
alternative..." (A letter from a migrant Jiang yuan in Anzi 1993: 11) 
In facing the hardships of working, it is sure that "[t]he best way to do would be 
to quit, but it is not such an easy way to do when you have no money to leave and no 
one to help you while you look for another job.’’ (Letter 5 of a migrant, quoted in 
Thireau 2000: 20-21) Therefore, no matter how poor the conditions in a factory, it 
provides a relatively secure living, especially a place for sheltering and the guarantee 
of eating full, to the migrants. Thireau (2000), in a research of migrant workers and 
their mobilization of the labor law, has pointed out that the migrants don't mind to do 
long working time and hard work, provided that the work does not put their physical 
and mental health into danger, and their overwork is paid in time. Accordingly, 
migrants' capacity of toleration is so great that they will not rashly quit a job if the 
conditions are not much poorer than their lowest acceptable limit. Only when the 
conditions are extremely unacceptable, the workers would rather quit in order to 
avoid the excessive exploitation, even they have to bear the risk of becoming 
vagrants. 
2. Leap-trough: pursuing an upward social mobility 
Apart from quitting, leap-trough from one job to another is also very frequent 
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among the migrants in order to look for the better working conditions or higher 
wages. In fact, all migrants are opportunists. Whenever there is a better alternative 
available, they will try to grasp it if the potential benefit is greater than the cost. 
Tang's description of his working factory could show the high frequency of 
leap-trough among the migrants: 
“The resigning rate of workers is very high all the time. Many workers 
leave after working for only one to two or two to three months...Those 
workers all come from outside places aiming at earning money. If our 
factory pays 12 yuan per day, but the factory over there pays 13, then they 
[workers] will think there is better and leave here. When they have just 
arrived here [Tianshen], they are willing to join our factory. However, 
after one month when they know how to survive and how to earn more, 
they would like to change to another factory.. .They are not willing to stay 
if the welfare of this factory is not good. In other words, they choose 
factories..." (Interviewnote) 
The pure market relationship between the employers and the workers in itself 
cannot cultivate a loyalty among the workers to their factories. Therefore, the 
workers are totally rational when they consider whether to stay or not. What the 
migrants want to acquire from a factory is primarily to earn as much as possible 
within their short-lived staying. Hence, when there exists a relatively better factory 
and in which migrants can get a place, it is very reasonable that they perform 
leap-trough. As Ge and Qu writes that: 
"In those ‘boss factories'[老閲廠]situated in the Pearl River Delta, it is 
not surprising to see the migrants having leap-trough for three or four 
times, while those immutable and frozen [in a factory] will either be seen 
as incapable or suspected [of having special relationship with their boss]^^ 
by other people." (1990: 133) 
65 This description mainly refers to the female migrants, because there is a circulation that some 
beautiful female migrants can enjoy some privileges from their boss and thus they are unwilling to 
leave. 
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Surely, the migrants can improve their working conditions through leap-trough, 
but not all of them are capable enough to do that. As we know that the large amount 
of surplus labors in the Pearl River Delta hinders the improvement of their working 
conditions, because almost all factories will not pay their workers more than the 
market prices or entitle them the welfare according to the labor laws. Therefore, the 
horizontal switching between factories actually has very little room for the migrants 
to have their situations improved. Some migrants who have changed several factories 
sigh in their letters: 
“…'In fact, whichever factory you go nowadays, they are all the same. I 
am a little bit regretted that I should not change factories.’ (letter 25) 
'After switching around, I have only wasted my time, but have not earned 
any money. It is too late to regret.'(letter 26)...’, (Quoted in Tan 1998: 69) 
Job switching is only necessary but not sufficient in achieving an upward social 
mobility. In order to break the horizontal constraints, the most critical asset the 
migrants should possess is either effective quanxi (as discussed in the chapter 4) or 
some knowledge and techniques demanded by the labor market. The traveling 
journalists Ge and Qu have reported the leap-trough experience of a young migrant, 
Wan, who had switched four times within half a year. However, he still could not find 
a satisfied job. At last, he entered a garment production factory doing the sundry 
duties, where he knew the sewing machine repairmen were in great demand. Then, 
Wan decided to leam the technique: 
"...[H]e went to a machinery equipment installation company to work as 
an apprentice. Finally, he leamt the technique after spending 600 yuan. 
This technique was really welcome [by the employers]. Wan was hired by 
two garment production factories to repair electric sewing machines and 
could earn a monthly income of 800 yuan. He said proudly, ‘now, my 
boss treats me very well, but if there is a better one to hire me, I will go 
surely.'" (Ge and Qu 1990: 133) 
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With their knowledge and techniques, the migrants can strengthen their 
bargaining power to the employers and equip themselves with the ability to move 
upward in social status. Therefore, they can switch to a better job with less personal 
and external constraints whenever they find the existing conditions unsatisfactory or 
want to improve their income return. 
Since most of the migrants are only junior or senior middle school graduates, 
and lack specialized skills demanded by the labor market, they cannot effectively use 
leap-trough to improve their situations. They can only remain general workers and 
switch among factories horizontally. Undoubtedly, the migrants are eager to pursue 
further education, especially to leam some more practical skills such as accounting, 
business administration, computer usage or English, which may be useful for them to 
upgrade themselves from blue to white collars. However, the unstable lives and 
prolonged working hours do not allow the migrants to have spare time and energy to 
participate in extra study. Their study time can only “comes from squeezing the busy 
lives", so only those who are the most determined and persistent can succeed at last^^. 
Most of the others are hindered by their unstable lives and busy works, and thus are 
excluded from the opportunity of achieving upward social mobility through self 
improvement. On the whole, only a minority of migrants are capable to gain a better 
66 The most successful example is Anzi, who is praised as "The star of the migrant workers". Anzi 
came to Shenzhen from Mei County (梅縣）of Guangdong when she was 17 in 1984. Since then, Anzi 
has worked as a general worker in factories, servant in the hotel, secretary, manager assistant, 
temporary worker etc. Apart from working, Anzi has insisted to continue her study. She firstly took 
the correspondence courses beginning from the middle school level. Then she entered the "Sunday 
tertiary class" in Shenzhen University and finished her degree study at last. Meanwhile, she started to 
practice writing and submit her manuscripts for the publication on newspapers and magazines. In 
1991, she published her first fiction describing the living of the migrant workers and became very 
popular and famous. Then, Anzi worked for the radio station, newspapers and magazines, handling 
the letters and questions from the migrant workers. In 1999, Anzi was selected by the China Central 
Television Station as one of the twenty representatives of the 20 year China reform. The success of 
Anzi makes her become the idol of the migrant workers. 
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living by leap-trough. However, the fluidity of the labor market, at 丨east, has ensured 
a certain degree of social mobility, and has promised all the migrants a chance to 
achieve a brighter future if they can combine their own merits with the freedom of 
the labor market effectively. 
In a nutshell, the high frequency of quitting and leap-trough among the migrants 
show that they rely heavily on "exit" as the way to avoid the unsatisfied situations 
and to pursue better conditions. In fact, because of their powerlessness and the lack 
of institutional support, the migrants seldom strive for an improvement of their 
entitled rights by carrying out protests to the exploiters or resorting to lawsuits. On 
the contrary, the migrants tend to use "exit" as a response to the dissatisfaction, 
because exit is the handiest and the cheapest way, which can certainly be employed 
by the poor migrants. 
The domination of exit instead of voice in the migrants' living strategies in itself 
is an indication of their passiveness as well as their initiative. On one hand, the 
migrants are incapable in having an effective improvement to the whole adverse 
situations, but on the other hand, they are not totally submitted to the oppressor, and 
always try to avoid excessive exploitation and pursue better alternatives by switching 
around whenever possible. Therefore, exit is a rational strategy under the unfavorable 
situations. In the migrants' eyes, although exit cannot guarantee a better life, it can 
prevent them from staying in the worst conditions and involving in direct 
confrontation with the oppressor, which may put their marginal position more at risk. 
As we know, exit of the migrants is not a single-handed action, but largely 
depends on the support of their family and kinship networks. We are brought then to 
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other interesting questions: How migrants' family and kinship networks facilitate 
their exit? What special meanings these networks have to them during their 
migration? 
III. The significance of family support 
1. The strengthening of the extended family network 
Traditional extended family structure is always described as the victim or the 
barrier of modernization^^. As Inkeles and Smith in their famous book Becoming 
Modern (1974) have concluded, the experience of working in factories is the most 
powerful factor to modernize individuals, because factories not only teach new 
technical practices, but also change already established values, response patterns and 
habits in the individuals of rural origin. One of the effects of becoming modem is to 
weaken the extended kinship ties: 
“...[I]ncreasing urbanism and industrialism tended to diminish the vigor 
of extended kinship relations. We had little reason to doubt that when 
urbanism increased the physical distance between kin, and industrial 
employment decreased their economic dependence, the strength of 
kinship ties as manifested in common residence, frequent visiting, and 
mutual help in work would decline...” (Inkeles and Smith 1974: 26) 
Undeniably, the migrants, who come from rural areas, have experienced a new 
way of life in the Pearl River Delta, and have become much more modernized than 
their rural counterpart varying from living patterns to value judgment. However, is 
the traditional extended family structure really incompatible with modernization and 
67 Wilbert Moore (1965) in Industrialization and Labor sees the traditional kinship network as the 
barrier of modernization, while M.B. Deshmukh (1956) in "Delhi: A Study of Flowing Migration" 
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crumbled down by it at last? The answer may be sure in most urban areas, but not in 
the case of the Pearl River Delta. This exception is due to some specialties of the 
region, which contrast greatly to the assumptions of Inkeles and Smith's research. In 
the first place, Inkeles and Smith have romanticized the experience in factories, and 
that is totally out of the imagination of the workers in the Pearl River Delta: 
“."[T]he industrial worker is backed by the resources of a complex and 
powerful organization; his work is highly coordinated with that of others 
who have been selected on the same impersonal grounds, and whose 
performance is also judged by objective standards of skill and output; the 
work is regular and steady, and in developing countries the remuneration 
is likely to be well above the standard available to the average farm renter 
or small holder; he works under cover, protected from the elements; many 
of the latest advances of science, engineering, and technology are put into 
his hands to increase productivity; and he operates in a frame of rules and 
regulations which guarantee him at least the minimum of respect for his 
opinions, feelings, and personal dignity.,, (Inkeles and Smith 1974: 163, 
emphasis added) 
As we have discussed in the previous chapters, although the labor market 
emphasizes talent and ability, it is not totally meritocratic. Guanxi with the locals or 
the higher authorities is still very critical for people to get a job and achieve a 
promotion. In addition, the turnover rate of the migrants is extremely high because of 
the harsh working conditions and the infringement of personal dignity by the 
employers. The over-beautification of the experience in factories, like what Inkeles 
and Smith have described, deviates too far from the reality of the Pearl River Delta 
and thus cannot capture the tough experience of the migrant workers. 
The second weakness of Inkeles and Smith's analysis is that they mainly focus 
on the workers' experience inside a factory. However, the workers' experience is not 
sees it as the victim. 
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just limited in a factory, but also greatly affected by the external influences. 
Therefore, the workers working in the same factory but under different social 
backgrounds may have different experience. More specifically, Inkeles and Smith 
have assumed a completely urbanized social background, in which all people are 
treated equally by the same impersonal standards, and thus no social exclusion and 
institutional inequality to anyone of them. However, in the Pearl River Delta, the 
township-and-village areas such as Tianshen are on the stage of an "intermediate 
society”，where outsiders are generally excluded socially, institutionally and 
economically. Therefore, even though the workers have steady jobs and have been 
working in factories for a long time, they still don't feel being respected and have a 
sense of belonging. 
The various unfavorable conditions make the factory experience unable to 
provide the migrants with a stable and respectable life. As a result, the migrants 
depend heavily on their kinship and family network for mutual help in order to 
survive in the harsh situations. In this respect, although the experience of factory 
working surely has modernized the migrants, the negative influences outside the 
factory have made them attach more to the extended family rather than alienate from 
it. 
Clearly, although the migrants are far away from their hometowns, the long 
physical distance does not separate them from their family ties, since the migrants 
generally keep close connection with their kinship and family members in the 
destination. They often share recruitment information, accommodation and meals, 
job introduction, and even emotional support among one another. Therefore, the 
family and kinship network of the migrants is so elastic that it is not restricted only in 
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the hometowns, but expands across regions and maintains its supportive function to 
its members who are thousands kilometers away. This phenomenon, in fact, has 
indicated the harsh conditions of the outside world, in which the migrants cannot 
survive without their family support. If the outer environment has not been improved, 
or if the institutional protection is insufficient to replace the supportive function 
provided by their family members, the migrants' dependence on the extended family 
will never diminish. 
2. Exit facilitation and subsistence protection 
It is necessary to distinguish kinship and family network from laoxiang. 
Undoubtedly, laoxiang is more frequently and generally used by the migrants to 
describe their acquaintances coming from the same hometown (it may mean either 
the same village or the same province). The relationship of laoxiang can vary from 
family members to casual friends made in the destination. This over generalization 
has made the term laoxiang fail to specify the group of people the migrants find to be 
the most helpful and dependable. As some migrants have pointed out that their 
relationship with the so-called laoxiang they met in the destination is not stable. 
They just meet by chance like patches of drifting duckweed (萍水牛目逢）and their 
relationship will end when they are not working in the same factory or living nearby. 
Zhang said: 
‘‘If we are not true laoxiang (真正的老鄉)，our relationship is quite 
casual...Generally, all workers come and go in a hurry. Today we may be 
good friends, but tomorrow he may be fired and then we have no 
relationship anymore..." (Interview note) 
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Zhang has clarified that the true laoxiang are those coming from the same 
village or xiang (鄉)，while those met during floating are only casual friends. 
Although true laoxiang are more intimate, they cannot always stay together because 
they work in different factories or different places. Therefore, associating with some 
casual laoxiang is the migrants' primary social activities, in which they can speak in 
their native dialect, play some games with their regional characteristics or have a 
meal serving their native dishes. In addition, they would help one another in dealing 
with some minor setbacks in daily life such as lending money to those in need before 
the day of payment or taking care of those who are sick. However, owing to the 
unstable and temporary relationship between casual laoxiang, those trifles of social 
gathering and mutual help are all they can do to one another. When the migrants get 
into some big trouble such as becoming long-term unemployed or getting serious 
illness, those casual laoxiang will be incapable or not intimate enough to provide 
help. As Xia said: 
‘‘...Not all laoxiang will help you find a job. Sometimes, we are only 
brought together by lot, so we just have some casual talks in daily life. 
Nowadays, the competition is very keen, thus it is uncertain that laoxiang 
will help you get a job..." (Interview note) 
The aim of distinguishing the true laoxiang from the casual one is to clarify the 
supporting network of the migrants. True laoxiang, as reflected from the interviews 
of the migrants, is mainly composed of their kinship and family members. It also 
includes some very intimate friends such as neighbors and classmates from the same 
hometown, and the scope of hometown is generally not beyond the region of a 
county. Moreover, they often have known one another for a long time before their 
migration. Therefore, the true laoxiang of a migrant usually overlaps with their 
kinship and family network. This is exactly why it is the group of people who are 
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most willing to provide the final and utmost support whenever a migrant is in need. 
The support from true laoxiang is very important to a migrant, especially when 
he/she doesn't have a job. The laoxiang would provide the temporary 
accommodation and meals to him/her and these prevent him/her from becoming a 
vagrant. As Tang indicated: 
“Migrants nowadays are different from those of early years who would 
become street sleepers if they could not find a job, because they have 
many [true] laoxiang. If they think this factory is poor and quit, their 
[true] laoxiang can provide a place for them to stay, so that they need not 
scare." (Interview note) 
The support from the true laoxiang or the kinship and family network has 
served as a safety net for the migrants to strive for a better alternative elsewhere. If 
the working conditions are too poor to be tolerated, the migrants can quit and get a 
shelter temporarily from their kinship and family members before they can find a 
satisfactory job. Hence, the kinship and family network, in fact, has facilitated the 
exit of the migrants by lowering the cost of losing a job and making the migrants 
more willing to take the risk to look for a better alternative. In addition, the kinship 
and family members of a migrant always disperse in different factories or places. 
This enables them to exchange recruitment information and introduce jobs to 
relatives whenever any of them is unemployed or their working conditions are very 
poor. With the mutual help among kinship and family members, the migrants can 
switch from factory to factory more easily and need not tolerate the adverse working 
conditions indefinitely. That is why the turnover rate of the migrant workers is 
exceptionally high. 
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Again, it is necessary to emphasize that the support from the kinship and family 
network is not enough for the migrants to achieve an upward social mobility, but it 
serves well for the avoidance of the worst condition. Actually, the situations of most 
of the general workers are so poor that they cannot provide long-term protection to 
their relatives. Therefore, if the unemployed migrants cannot find a new job within a 
certain period of time, say one to two months, what can they do is to return to their 
hometowns. For example, Cheng had worked in a Taiwanese factory as a general 
worker, but he left later because of the unbearable infringement of dignity: 
“"•The overtime subsidy is only a little bit more than two yuan even in 
some good factories. Yah! In the bad words, the bosses are all capitalists 
and the workers are just like their slaves. That's true. In some factories, 
they [bosses] really violate the dignity of workers. For example, in this 
Taiwanese factory, those security guards sell out themselves to the boss. If 
they don't toady to the boss, they will be dismissed. Therefore, they treat 
workers in a fiendish manner. Even you just make a minor mistake, they 
will punish you by Taiwanese ways^^.. .，，(Interview note) 
After Cheng resigned from the factory, he became unemployed. At the time of 
being interviewed, Cheng was supported by his cousins who were working nearby. 
One of them paid the monthly rent of 150 yuan and the other provided meals for him. 
However, since Cheng could not get a job for a long time, he returned to his 
hometown, Sichuan, at last. 
Huang, a migrant also from Sichuan, who lived in the room next to that of 
68 Cheng has not explained concretely what the Taiwanese punishment is, but he has mentioned that 
the management in the Taiwanese factory is extremely strict. All workers have to receive military 
training when they get in the factory. This aims at maximizing the workers' working ability and 
patience. Jun has the similar experience in another Taiwanese factory, where the workers have to 
attend assembly in the morning of Monday, Wednesday and Friday. Sometimes, they would be 
required to do exercise and running. In addition, there is a department specially for monitoring the 
workers' performance. On every story of the factory, there is a monitor, whose duty is to make sure 
the workers are not lax. "Sometimes, you just have a yawn, he [the monitor] will catch and fine you. 
At that time, our wage is 380 yuan, but once you are caught, you would be subjected to a penalty 
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Cheng, had come to Dongguan for about a month, but still could not find a job. He 
was supported by his wife, who was working in a garment production factory as a 
skilled worker and earned about a thousand yuan a month. Huang exclaimed that it 
was very difficult for a male to find a job in the Pearl River Delta and he was almost 
forced to return home: 
“If I don't have a relative here, I may have already returned home, 
because it is impossible for me to sit idle until my whole resources have 
been used up 吃山空).’’ (Interview note) 
However, even Huang got his wife's support, his unemployment became a 
heavy burden to the couple's lives. They probably could not bear anymore if Huang's 
unemployment lasted for a longer time. About half a year later when I revisited 
Huang, we talked about his unemployment and he told me that: 
"When I just came here, I had been played [unemployed] for one month 
and twenty days. During that time, I had spent more than two thousand 
yuan including the transportation fee and living expenses from Sichuan to 
here. My wife told me that I should go back if I could not find a job 
anymore. It was because if we spent all the money here, we didn't have 
money to remit to our family in hometown.. .，，(Interview note) 
Lucky enough, Huang found a job in a factory at last. Although the wage was 
extremely low, only two to three hundred yuan a month, it, at least, released Huang 
from the hardship of being unemployed and enabled him to stay longer with his wife. 
The traditional extended family network has not only provided help for the 
migrants to survive in the destination, but has also served as the last resort for the 
migrants to retreat when they are really eliminated by the labor market, either 
equal to three days' wage. It is more than 30 yuan." Jun said. 
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because they are getting older or becoming long-term unemployed. Therefore, there 
are two orders of exit employed by the migrants to handle the excessively 
unfavorable situations. Firstly, when the migrants are young, normally under 25, and 
are still competitive in the labor market, they would like to quit or leap-trough from 
one factory place to another in order to defend their basic interests. Secondly, when 
the migrants have lost their survival abilities in the destination or found the situations 
too adverse to tolerate anymore, they will conclude their migration and return to their 
hometowns. 
In a nutshell, under the situations of lacking institutional support, but full of 
instability and exploitation, the migrants can only rely on the mutual help among 
kinship and family members in order to survive. In addition, the extended family 
network functions to facilitate the migrants' exit from excessive exploitation and 
provide them with the basic subsistence guarantee. Therefore, it is interesting that the 
migrants' employment of exit and the dependence on the extended family network 
are inter-reinforced. The more they intend to employ exit, the more they depend on 
the kinship and family network. It is because exit may be not so easy and smooth 
without the support from the extended family network. Similarly, the more the 
migrants depend on the kinship and family network, the more they intend to employ 
exit rather than voice or conflict to deal with the dissatisfaction, since exit is handier 
and lower in cost than other ways. Clearly, whether the migrants stay in the 
destination or return to their hometowns, they are remaining inside the scope of their 
extended family networks. It indicates that although the factory experience has made 
the migrants become more modem when compared with their rural counterpart, it has 
not reduced their dependence on the traditional extended families. It is contradictory 
to the analysis of Inkeles and Smith. 
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IV. A case study: the entanglement between survival and exploitation 
As we have discussed, the migrants, especially the general workers, in the Pearl 
River Delta are facing hostile exploitation by the employers. Since the migrants are 
powerless in improving the adverse conditions, they try to avoid the worst conditions 
by the tactics of quitting or leap-trough and gaining support from their extended 
family networks. The following is a story about the maneuvers between the 
employers and the migrants. It shows lively the living strategies of the migrants and 
their stubbornness in defending their marginal survival. 
The story happened in a candle production factory named Jin Hui, where Huang 
had been working for half a year. The factory is quite large in size, having recruited 
around one to two thousand workers, with all the products exported. Similar to many 
production factories, the skill requirement of the works in Jin Hui is so low that 
everyone can take up the works in several minutes^^. Therefore, it is not surprising if 
the wages of the general workers there are kept down at the lowest level of the labor 
market, normally around three to four hundred yuan a month. However, it is really 
incredible that the wages in Jin Hui are only around two to three hundred yuan^^, and 
the working time is extremely long, varying from 12 to 17 hours a day?�Huang was 
69 Huang has mentioned some kinds of works the general workers do, such as controlling the 
temperature of liquid wax, pouring liquid wax into molds, cleaning the workshops and taking up some 
sundry duties ordered by the managing staff. 
Huang had worked in the factory for six months. His monthly wages were 215, 200, 300, 305 and 
325 yuan for the second to sixth month respectively. The wage of the first month was taken as a cash 
pledge in the factory, and was confiscated when he resigned from the factory. 
71 Normally, the working hours are from 7:30am-l 1:30am, 12:30pm-4:30pm and 5:30pm-9:30pm. 
There are totally 12 hours. However, if the factory is going to finish an urgent order, the workers have 
to work for longer time. 
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very discontented about the hardships in Jin Hui, but he dared not protest or even go 
a little bit slow at work due to the severe punishment of the factory: 
"The wage was very low. It was less than ten yuan a day. However, we 
still had to work in that factory. We could not find another factory if we 
quitted, so that we could only tolerate [忍、耐]it. We had to work for 16 to 
17 hours a day. There was a month, during which I got off at one o'clock 
[at night] almost every day. I worked from eight o'clock [in the morning] 
until one o'clock or even to three o'clock [at night]...We didn't have any 
other alternatives. They [managing staff] told us that if we were absent for 
a day, they would sign a departure receipt for us immediately, which 
noticed we left on our own. Then we would lose two-month wages, the 
one-month cash pledge and the last month wage. They would arbitrarily 
label us that we had attempted a strike. Nobody dared to be absent!...All 
workers were in a hurry even when just walking or climbing up the stairs, 
but all were very low-spirited...” (Interview note) 
Although the working conditions are very poor, the employers need not worry 
about the shortage of workers, because there are plenty of migrants, who are 
unemployed and cannot afford the high living expenses in the Pearl River Delta. All 
of them are seeking a shelter anxiously to get themselves out of the difficulties. In 
other words, the employers can exploit the poor surplus labors easily by providing 
72 
them with a job and a shelter in exchange for their very cheap labor power • To the 
workers in Jin Hui, they are clever enough to see that the employer is looting a 
burning house, but they are all in a situation that is too unfavorable for them to quit 
or protest. Some of them fail to find a satisfactory job in other factories, while some 
72 According to Huang, it is very general in the Pearl River Delta that the employers try to maximize 
their profit by exploiting the poor surplus labors in different ways. For example, some factories 
require two-month probation without pay and promise the workers a wage of one to two thousand 
yuan after that. However, when the workers have finished their probation, they would be dismissed 
with a reason of being unqualified. Therefore, the workers could not get any money for their 
two-month working, except the accommodation and meals. After the migrants have been dismissed, 
the employers would recruit new workers immediately and repeat their strategy again. 
Huang told me an extreme case that one of his friends had worked in a toy production factory, 
where five-month wages were taken as a cash pledge. After six months of working, his friend was 
dismissed and he got only one-month salary, while the five-month cash pledge was deducted 
cunningly by the employer for compensating the damage during his working period. 
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who want to return home are too poor to buy a train ticket, and need to save up 
before they can return. Therefore, to those marginal workers, staying in Jin Hui is a 
choice better than becoming vagrants. At least, they can have a shelter and meals, 
although they are extremely poor in quality, and can avoid the threat from the 
security team. As Huang said: 
“All workers saw Jin Hui as a 'refugee center,[難民營]or a 'detention 
center'[收容戶斤]accepting those poorest people...We tolerated [the poor 
conditions] inside the factory in order to muddle along [、混生活]. 
Anyway, we needed not to scare there was security team checking 
zhanzhuzheng...I met two [casual] laoxiang there. They were tertiary 
graduates but could not find jobs, so that they went into Jin Hui to take 
refuge.. .No other alternatives.. .,，(Interview note) 
Huang himself, after one month and twenty days of unemployment, also went to 
Jin Hui to muddle along. Although the wage was very low, and he could have not 
much money left every month after his own expenses , he, at least, could manage 
his own living and needed not be a burden of his wife anymore. Therefore, before 
Huang could find a better job, staying in Jin Hui was his best choice. 
Owing to their marginal situations, workers in Jin Hui were more tolerant to the 
adverse working conditions than other ordinary workers. Even though they were very 
discontented to the hardships in Jin Hui, they dared not protest to the managing staff 
or the employer, since it would incur the risk of being dismissed. In addition, the 
workers found it ineffective to complain to the Labor Bureau. It was not only for of 
the indifference of the labor bureau officials, but also because of the poorness of their 
73 The workers of Jin Hui have their dinner at 4:30 pm before the night shift. After that, the factory 
would not provide food for them, even though they have to work overtime until mid-night. Therefore, 
the workers usually have some night snack after work at the eating stalls nearby, and can keep the 
account until the date of payment because of their acquaintanceship with the stallholders. Huang said 
that some workers would use up all their money every month after they paid the fee of night snack. 
159 
own knowledge. As Huang mentioned: 
"We haven't complained to the labor bureau. It is useless if you complain 
alone. Useless! At least, you go to the Labor Bureau in six or seven 
persons. We Sichuanese don't know about laws, so that we are incapable 
to protect ourselves. However, being floating migrants, we have no steps 
to take. If we want to file a lawsuit against him [the employer], we don't 
have enough knowledge to write those [lawsuit] materials ".At last, we 
can only quit the factory. If we cannot stay any longer, then we quit and 
find another one." (Interview note) 
Huang added that only Gansuese (甘肅人)in Jin Hui dared complain to the 
Labor Bureau, and they were so united that they never quitted the factory alone but 
in a group of several tens. Therefore, it was also only Gansuese who could get back 
their one-month cash pledge from the employer when they quitted the job. However, 
what the employer paid them back was that no Gansuese would be recruited in the 
future time in order to avoid any potential trouble. To most of the other workers, 
voice or complaint was too costly and ineffective to express their discontent. Instead, 
they would like to tolerate as much as possible if the conditions were not too adverse 
to stand with. Otherwise, they would exit or quit the factories. In other words, 
workers in Jin Hui were willing to be exploited, provided that the exploitation did 
not go beyond the utmost limit of toleration, in order to exchange for a temporary 
security in the harsh environment. 
It is necessary to emphasize that although the workers in Jin Hui seldom 
protested in action in defending their rights, they were not totally passive under the 
unfavorable conditions. In fact, from the angle of the workers, they also took 
advantage of the factory by treating it as a "sheltering harbor"(避難戶斤)，where they 
They were even too poor to buy a pack of cigarettes, which cost only one yuan. 
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could hide away from the vagabondage. In addition, they were all unwilling to stay 
long in Jin HuL Whenever they were capable to grasp a better alternative or when the 
conditions outside the factory had been improved, they would leave without any 
hesitation. According to Huang, all the workers in Jin Hid were opportunists, who 
were always "looking for the horse while riding on the cattle"(騎牛搵；馬）： 
“".Once we got the wages, several hundreds of workers would leave. In 
only one factory, there were at least three to four hundred workers in 
floating every month...Many workers came and many workers left also. 
Some old workers '^^  got two to three hundred yuan this month, they 
would leave to find another job, because the wages were enough for them 
to survive for a certain period of time. Some workers had come and gone 
for two or three times. When they used up all the money, they returned to 
the factory again. In Jin Juai, if you left on your own, you could return 
again in later time^^ Hence, it was a ‘detention center,, a 'sheltering 
harbor,, and a 'refugee center'." (Interview note) 
Jin Hui is a place where the employer tries to make the maximum surplus value 
from the workers, and the workers try to secure their marginal survival by borrowing 
a temporary job and a sheltering place. The employer and workers are mutually 
utilized, but simultaneously they take advantage of each other. This kind of weird 
symbiotic relationship commonly exists in the Pearl River Delta. However, this 
relationship is so unbalanced that the workers can never be the true beneficiaries, 
because the most they can get is also the least they can accept—the maintenance of 
their subsistence level. However, the employer can maximize their profit by paying 
the workers much lower than the market prices. Therefore, to those poor workers, 
74 The term "old workers" does not indicate their age, but the original workers who have been 
working in the factory for a period of time. According to Huang, he, with half a year working 
experience in Jin Hui, is also an old worker because of the high turnover rate of the workers. 
75 Normally, a factory does not accept those workers who have resigned from the factory in previous 
time. It aims to prevent the free floating of the workers. The exception of Jin Hui may be a 
compromise between the employer and the workers that the employer allows the free floating of the 
workers in exchange for their acceptance of the extremely low wages. 
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staying in Jin Hui is only a choice next to the worst. If they are so unlucky that they 
cannot find a better job elsewhere for a long time, say half a year, they may lose their 
tolerance to the adverse conditions, and thus would quit at last. Huang, who quitted 
Jin Hui after six months of hard working, is an example. He found the experience 
very unpleasant: 
“I was unhappy there. On one hand, I could not earn any money; on the 
other hand, the working hours were too long. Oh! I soaked in the water 
everyday that made my hands and legs become white in color, just like 
those of a dead person. How terrible!...I would rather go back home than 
do that job anymore. If I keep doing that job, I must get rheumatism when 
I am old...” (Interview note) 
Quitting Jin Hui, Huang was employed as a cleaning worker in village 1. 
However, he was dismissed one month later due to a misunderstanding with the 
cleaning team leader^^. Huang was depressed by his repeated unemployment and 
worried very much about his future. What he could do was to rely on the support 
from his wife again: 
“It is very difficult to make a living by working outside, very difficult to 
survive! If I can find a factory paying four to five hundred yuan, I would 
rather work outside for my whole life than return to my hometown, 
because if there are four to five hundreds, I can spend one to two 
hundreds and remit one to two hundreds to my family . However, what 
can I find now are those factories paying only one to two hundreds, that is 
only enough for myself^^. If I work outside alone, I will even have no 
money for returning home. Lucky enough! I have my wife here. 
76 Huang was told to work at 6:30am by the local introducer, but the team leader set the working 
schedule starting from 6:00am. Therefore, Huang was blamed for being late for work and was 
dismissed by the team leader. 
77 Huang has parents and a son at his hometown in Sichuan. 
78 The interview was conducted at the end of February when was about one month after the Chinese 
lunar New Year. Huang said that from the eleventh day after the New Year onwards, it would be very 
difficult to find a job, because almost all factories have already recruited enough workers within the 
ten days after the New Year. The factories, which still recruit workers, would pay very low wages as 
there are plenty of surplus labors looking for jobs. 
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Otherwise, I cannot imagine what I will be..." (Interview note) 
Although Huang did not want to return hometown, the great pressure of being 
unemployed made him very upset. Undoubtedly, the support from his wife was his 
safety net, ensuring his marginal living, but it was not supportive enough to save him 
for a long time. Therefore, he decided that if he could not find a job in a month, he 
would exit again by returning to his hometown, his last resort and ultimate 
destination. 
“Nowadays, it is not easy to make money in Guangdong, it becomes more and 
more difficult to make money in Guangdong." Huang said. It is also the common 
feeling of many migrants. 
It is not just the story of Huang. In fact, many migrants are experiencing what 
Huang has experienced and are repeating his story. Surely, some professional 
migrants are very successful in the destination, but most migrants are only cheap 
labors in factories, being exploited by the employers and are forced to return home 
after devoting their invaluable youthfulness to the economic development of the 
Pearl River Delta. 
V. Concluding remarks 
From the traditional Marxist Sociology and the classical theory of social 
movement, we know structural strain or exploitation will generate discontent among 
the oppressed, who would finally carry out collective action to have their situations 
improved. However, I would like to question, “Is collective action the only way of 
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the migrants to react to the exploitative conditions?,. As we have discussed above, 
the Pearl River Delta is a very unfavorable place for the migrants to organize 
collective action or direct confrontation to the oppressor, not only because of the 
ruthless oppression of the employers and the indifference of the Labor Bureau, but 
also because of the lack of solidarity among the migrants and their safety-first 
inclination. As a result, the migrants tend to secure their basic survival rather than 
carry out collective action to strive for more, even though they find the situations 
really unsatisfactory. In fact, collective action cannot be realized only from the 
subjective aspiration of the migrants. It requires outside supports such as leadership, 
organization and resources, which are obviously in shortage among the migrants, and 
are out of the scope of this study. Therefore, it may be a bit too far for me to discuss 
the infrequency of the migrants' collective action here. I would like to make an 
amendment to the question above by borrowing Hirschman's conception that “How 
do migrants respond to the exploitative conditions? By voice or exit? (political or 
economic mean?) “ If I assume that both collective action and voice belong to the 
explicit and political reaW^, then the latter question does not deviate from the 
previous one, but has expanded the possibilities of the migrants' reactions to the 
dissatisfaction. 
As we have seen that exit dominates the migrants' reactions to the adverse 
I • 
conditions in the Pearl River Delta. It is because on one hand, the fluidity of the labor 
market and the existence of various factories have entitled the migrants freedom to 
choose, which in turn promotes their employment of exit (the economic mean) to 
avoid excessive exploitation; on the other hand, the potential risk on subsistence 
79 Although "voice" and "collective action" are not equal, voice is always the first step of a collective 
action. If voice is ignored or no satisfactory response is obtained, the further action may be carried out 
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level resulting from voice out their discontent (the political mean) dampens the 
migrants' initiative to protest to the management or complain to the Labor Bureau. 
Besides, being outsiders and lacking loyalty to the local community or factories, the 
migrants don't have any commitment to seek for improvement in the adverse 
conditions, since it may cost much more time and money than just having an exit. In 
other words, under the conditions of market economy and lacking loyalty, the 
migrants are totally rational by employing the market principle to defend their own 
interests, but do not intend to have the adverse conditions improved by the political 
mean. 
Clearly, the migrants would like to retreat rather than resist in response to the 
structural strain. Retreat is ineffective in striving for better conditions. As indicated 
above, except a small group of migrants, who are able to achieve an upward social 
mobility through leap-trough, most others can only quit or switch horizontally from a 
factory to another factory in order to avoid the worst conditions. However, among 
the limited alternatives, exit is the most rational choice and the handiest way, by 
which the migrants can secure their subsistence level in the exploitative environment. 
Another interesting phenomenon concerning the migrants' reactions to 
exploitation is the revival of the traditional extended family structure. As Lau (1978b) 
in a research of Chinese refugees in Hong Kong has indicated, the institutional 
vacuum of Hong Kong society in 60，s and 70，s has reinforced the interdependence 
among the refugees' family members, who help one another mutually so as to 
survive in the hostile and unpredictable environment. Surprisingly, the latent function 
of this familism has reduced refugees' demand for institutional supports, and thus has 
and result in a collective action. 
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absorbed their political discontent to the government (Lau 1978a). Similarly, the 
migrants in the Pearl River Delta mostly rely on the support from their family and 
kinship network in order to stand with the adverse situations. Whenever they are in 
trouble, they would first seek help from their kinship and family members in the 
destination. Through their mutual help, the traditional familial ethos which 
emphasizes the "sharing of happiness and suffering" among extended family 
members is manifested obviously. It is not only a rational practice of the migrants, 
but also a performance of morality and responsibility constrained by social norms. 
With the help from their extended family, the migrants disincline to struggle with the 
locals, the employers and the government for improvement of their adverse situation. 
On the contrary, they make use of their extended family network to facilitate their 
exit from the factories or living places so as to avoid excessive exploitation, and also 
to pursue better conditions. Therefore, as Lau's indicated, the extended family 
network has resolved much political discontent of the migrants "through the process 
of ‘familization, of politics within the familial groups." (Lau 1978a: 32) 
In some extreme cases, when the situations are too harsh to be tolerated and are 
beyond the ability of the kinship and family members in the destination to offer help, 
the migrants will finally exit to their hometowns. Although they are poor in their 
hometowns, most of them, at least, are capable to secure their basic living. Here I 
would like to highlight the function of their hometowns as the safety net in the last 
resort, by which the migrants need not stick to the destination and tolerate the 
adverse conditions if they are in subsistence crisis there. Instead, they can simply 
return to their hometowns and protect themselves from any further exploitation. 
Therefore, it is the faraway families at hometowns rather than the local community 
or the governments which secure the migrants' subsistence level in the destination, 
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and thus have dissolved the migrants' potential struggles to the oppressor. 
Contrasting to the rapid industrialization and urbanization of the Pearl River 
Delta, the revival of the traditional extended family structure among the migrants 
indicates a phenomenon of anti-modemization. Clearly, it is not a result of the 
reemergence of a strong sense of nostalgia, but is a kind of “passive familism" 
resulting from the threat of the highly uncertain and hostile environment, which 
forces the migrants to go back to the protection of their extended family network. In 
this way, the traditional family networks of the migrants are supporting the fast 
economic development of the Pearl River Delta. Their protective function has made 
the migrants more tolerant to the employers' exploitation, and thus has reduced the 
production cost. Moreover, it has led the migrants to dissolve their discontent 
through the economic mean (exit option) rather than the political mean (voice option), 
so it has maintained the social stability of the Pearl River Delta for economic 
development. 
In a nutshell, the adoption of exit and family support shows the safety-first and 
retreatism orientations of the migrants in reacting to the dissatisfaction. Therefore, 
the migrants' living strategies of exit and family support are not limited to their 
response to the exploitation of the employers, but also to the exclusion of the locals, 




Economic retreatism: the basic reason of the social stability 
in the Pearl River Delta 
The migrant workers have fuelled the rapid economic development of the Pearl 
River Delta, but they are excluded and exploited socially, economically and 
institutionally in the township-and-village areas. What are their perceptions to their 
predicaments? What are their strategies to survive in the adverse situations? This 
study tries to shed light on how the availability of exit and family support channel the 
migrants' discontent to economic retreatism rather than to political resistance. This 
would show some clues on how the social stability of the Pearl River Delta can be 
maintained, although the migrants there are exploited seriously. 
By using the methods of participant observation, in-depth interviews and 
content analysis, together with the references to the sociological theories, I have 
shown in the previous chapters the migrants' living under the influences of 
institutional inequality, renting economy and traditional xenophobia in the 
township-and-village area in the Pearl River Delta. In the following paragraphs, I 
would like to compare this study with the cases of Scott's The Moral Economy of the 
Peasant (1976) and Popkin's The Rational Peasant (1978). Although the social 
background of this study is very different from those of Scott and Popkin, these 
contrasts will indicate the particularities of this study, and through the comparisons, I 
hope to make the theoretical reflections of this study clearer and more explicit. 
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I. A comparison with Scott's and Popkin's cases 
1. The absence of moral economy 
Scott's conception of moral economy claims that the social norm of justice rests 
on the principle of reciprocity and the balance of exchange. There is a moral 
constraint to both peasants and landlords, emphasizing mutual help and requiring the 
well-off members to share their resources with the poor counterpart of a community, 
especially in the time of difficulty. As a result, the economic interactions between the 
peasants and the landlords are not totally rational, but are under a high degree of 
social considerations. The peasants think that securing a living standard higher than 
the subsistence level is their right. Therefore, they see the ruthless exploitation of 
landlords, which threatens their subsistence level, as a violation of morality and it 
entitles them the right to resist. 
Obviously, moral economy has provided a protection to the peasants' marginal 
living as well as a prevention of the excessive exploitation of the landlords. However, 
the morality consensus is not a natural endowment, and exists only under certain 
conditions. In the case of Scott, the social background is a closed community, in 
which the peasants and the landlords are interdependent to each other8�. In addition, 
their common religious belief—Muslim---requires morally the rich people to be 
generous and sympathetic to the poor by donating some money, foods or gifts to the 
poor in religious rituals, and giving them a hand when they get into serious illness or 
The peasants depend on the landlords for living security, while the landlords depend on the 
peasants for cultivating farmlands and harvesting the paddy crop. Since the demand for harvest labors 
is great during the harvest periods and the combine-harvesters are not easily available, the landlords 
would like to maintain a good relationship with the peasants so as to make sure that they can have 
enough labor power to harvest their crop in time. 
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dearth. These donations and help offered have become the landlords' subsidies to the 
poor8i. In a word, it is the closure of community, interdependence and shared 
collectivity of the peasants and the landlords that have inhibited individual 
opportunism and promoted the moral reciprocity between them. 
In the Pearl River Delta, the social background is very different from that in 
Scott's case. Firstly, the townships and villages are not longer closed communities, 
but are open to outsiders including the migrants and the foreign investors. As the 
influx of migrant workers largely exceeds the demand of labors for the industry 
development, the local people and the foreign investors need not worry about the 
shortage of labor force. Therefore, the well-off members (the locals and the foreign 
employers) and the less fortunate ones (the migrants) are not interdependent to each 
other, but are in an absolutely unequal relationship, in which the locals and the 
foreign employers are in total domination, while the migrants are only their 
dependents. Secondly, since the migrants are outsiders, they are not recognized as 
permanent members of the local community. While the locals can enjoy the fruitful 
results of the economic development, the migrants are completely excluded from any 
local benefits, although they are the main contributors of the local economy. 
Therefore, if we consider the welfare system to be one of the aspects of the moral 
economy, it is certainly identity-selective, and does not extend to those who are not a 
"full citizen" of the local community. Thirdly, there is no a universal religious belief 
in China, and therefore the well-off people have no moral obligation to look after the 
poor counterpart. Instead, the traditional spirit of localism and familism have made 
the locals restrict their generosity and sympathy specifically to those of the same 
community, or more precisely, only to the members of one's kinship network. Hence, 
81 See Scott (1985) Weapons of the Weak: 169-178 for the discussions on the religious rituals. 
170 
although the locals and the migrants are living in the same district, the social barrier 
has separated them into two impermeable groups, and has hindered the achievement 
of a shared collectivity between them. 
Without a closed environment, interdependence and shared collectivity between 
the locals and the migrants, it is almost impossible to cultivate a moral economy in 
the Pearl River Delta. The transient relationship between them creates a one-shot 
game situation (Axelrod 1984). As a result, their interaction becomes purely rational. 
On one hand, the local governments and people try to take maximum advantage from 
the migrants; on the other hand, the migrants merely want to make as much money as 
possible and have no loyalty to the local community. Some of the migrants even try 
to achieve their aims by illegal means such as cheating, stealing or robbing, which 
have worsened the public security seriously. It indicates clearly that the locals and 
the migrants are mutually exploitative rather than morally reciprocal. 
Under this highly fluid labor market, cultural discourse like morality and 
identity confine only within the migrants' family networks, in which the mutual help 
among the family members, to certain degree is seen as important familistic 
responsibility. Outside the family networks, unless the migrants can establish a stable 
relationship and independence with the locals or the employers, rational choice will 
inevitably dominate their mode of interaction. 
2. Safety-first principle as a manifestation of rationality 
In the depiction of Scott, although the peasants are subordinated to the landlords, 
they are conservative and reluctant to resist because they are satisfied with the 
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landlords' fulfillment of their moral obligation and lack an aspiration to improve 
their living standards. On the contrary, Popkin holds an opposite point regarding the 
peasants' living strategies. He believes that the peasants maintain the patron-client 
relation with landlords is only for the security of short-term subsistence. However, 
for the long-term subsistence, the peasants are very aggressive to make risky 
investments in order to raise their living conditions. In Popkin's eyes, the peasants 
are rational rather than conservative. Whenever the subsistence level is secured, they 
are no longer willing to attach to the landlords, and would try to carry out resistance 
or revolt to gain more benefits from them. 
Comparing with the contrasting conception, moral and rational, of Scott and 
Popkin on peasants, we can see that the migrants in the Pearl River Delta are closer 
to the description of Popkin. As we have discussed above, the migrants are extremely 
rational under the pure market situation. They, with their primary aim of achieving a 
better living, are always eager to make more money. The migrants' always think, 
"money will never be too much."(錢永遠不會嫌多)Therefore, they are by no 
means satisfied with the status quo and will not hesitate to quit or leap-trough 
whenever there is a better alternative elsewhere. However, although we recognize the 
rationality of the migrants, we cannot overemphasize the migrants' aggressiveness in 
making risky investments so as to pursue an upward social mobility. As Popkin has 
pointed out, the peasants would like to take risk only after their subsistence has been 
secured. Since most of the migrants are in a marginal position and their living is so 
unstable that they are always under the threat of being unemployed, it is always their 
first priority to maintain their basic living, similar to the peasants in Scott's case. In 
fact, due to the adverse situations, the safety-first principle surpasses all other 
considerations of the migrants. Their safety-first intention is very explicit when we 
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examine their frequent adoption of exit, and discover that it is mainly to avoid 
ruthless exploitation rather than to pursue a better job. 
Despite their different understanding on the peasants' orientation, Scott and 
Popkin share the idea that the landlords are the last resort of the peasants in securing 
their subsistence level. However, in the case of the Pearl River Delta, the local 
community does not extend its safety net to the outsiders. Therefore, the migrants 
cannot enjoy any social or institutional protection from the locals or the foreign 
investors even they have already failed to maintain their basic living. Without the 
outer dependable resort, the migrants can only rely on some personal means such as 
the adoption of exit and family support in order to survive. As we know, the 
patron-client tie between the peasants and the landlords rests on the foundation of the 
peasants' dependence on the landlords for a living. Since the locals or the foreign 
investors in the Pearl River Delta are all undependable to the migrants, there is not 
any patron-client tie between them, and it results in the migrants' purely rational 
manner when they consider their basic living. 
To put it briefly, the migrants are rational, but their rationality mainly focuses on 
the defense of their subsistence level. However, the holding of the safety-first 
principle does not imply the migrants' total compliance to the domination. It is 
actually a calculated living strategy under the most unfavorable situations. In fact, 
the migrants are not as conservative as the peasants described by Scott. On the 
contrary, they are all opportunists, eager to improve their living conditions whenever 
chances are available. 
3. The floating nature of the migrants 
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In the cases of Scott and Popkin, the subject matter is peasants in an agricultural 
community. The peasants are anchored to the soil, so they are unable to move freely, 
unless they leave their farmlands. Moreover, the community is relatively closed that 
the landlords monopolize the whole economic system and working opportunities. 
Therefore, establishing a patron-client tie with those well-off landlords is the only 
way for the peasants to secure their basic living in bad time. On the same token, the 
landlords become the only targets of confrontation when the peasants cannot uphold 
their subsistence level (Scott's case) or when they want to gain more (Popkin's case). 
In other words, in both cases of Scott and Popkin, the relationship between the 
peasants and the landlords has dualistic characteristics that if they are unable to 
maintain a harmonious association, they will be in direct conflict. Therefore, social 
and political instability is inevitable if the peasants are dissatisfied with the landlords 
and are capable to resist, since there is no alternative way for the peasants to achieve 
their goal, either moral or rational, except disputing with the landlords. 
Contrasting with the cases of Scott and Popkin, the subject matter of this study 
is the migrant workers in an industrial community. Needless to say, the migrants are 
floating in nature, and do not stick to anywhere. In addition, the economy system in 
the Pearl River Delta is a large open market. Although the locals and the foreign 
investors are rich and can enjoy various privileges, no body can monopolize the 
whole economy and all the working opportunities. Therefore, the migrants, being the 
general workers, are subordinate to the locals and foreign investors, but not 
necessarily to be their fixed patrons. They can float freely to avoid excessive 
exploitation and thus secure their basic living. Hence, in the Pearl River Delta, the 
locals and the foreign investors are not the only resort of the migrants for subsistence 
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guarantee, and their relationship is only temporary and fluid. 
Furthermore, the migrants, as passersby in the Pearl River Delta, have no 
expectation of moral obligation from the locals and the foreign investors. It is their 
casual relationship that makes the locals and the foreign investors not the targets of 
asking for help when the migrants are in difficulties. As Huang has mentioned, “they 
[the locals] are rich, but it is the matter of them, nothing related to us." Therefore, 
even if the migrants are in an adverse situation, they do not put the blame on the 
well-off locals and the foreign investors even they do not offer any help, since 
turning an indifferent manner to a stranger is also recognized as normal by the 
migrants. Comparing with the stable but fragile relationship between the peasants 
and the landlords in the cases of Scott and Popkin, the fluid relationship between the 
migrants and the locals or the foreign investors is more elastic. They will not turn 
into direct conflict easily even if they cannot maintain a good association. 
In short, the floating nature of the migrants has lessened their request for moral 
obligation from the locals and the foreign investors, and most importantly, has 
relieved the locals and the foreign investors from being the targets of confrontation. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that strong request for living security and welfare 
benefits is rarely seen among the migrants. Since the migrants' dissatisfaction to the 
oppressor can be dissolved through the non-violent ways of exit and family support, 
direct conflicts with the oppressor are not necessary, no matter how poor the 
situations of the migrants are. 
4. The revival of familism 
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While Scott emphasizes the moral reciprocity from the viewpoint of collective 
interests, Popkin specially focuses on the rationality of individual actions. They both 
have not mentioned the mutual support among the members of a kinship and family 
network82. 丁^�one-sided emphases on collective interest and individual rationality 
by Scott and Popkin have hidden the importance and functions of the middle-level 
organization—the kinship and family network—to the peasants' living. Here, I do 
not intend to criticize Scott and Popkin, because their foci may be more applicable to 
the social background of their cases. What I want to add in this study is that the 
kinship and family network is very critical to the migrants. It not only supports the 
migrants' living, but also promotes the social stability in the Pearl River Delta. 
As we have seen in the previous chapters, the institutional vacuum and the 
highly unpredictable environment force the migrants to seek help from their kinship 
and family members. Therefore, the more adverse the outside environment is, the 
more dependent the migrants are on the kinship and family help. It strengthens the 
traditional familial ethos of mutual support and introversion among the members of 
an extended family. The general revival of familism among the migrants is clearly 
contradictory to their increasing urban experience in the Pearl River Delta. However, 
since the kinship and family support is the migrants' only backup, relying on it 
becomes the necessary survival skill under the extremely unfavorable situations. 
There are three functions of the kinship and family support to the migrants. 
Firstly, it facilitates the exit of the migrants, because one's kinship and family 
members in the destination can provide temporary accommodation and job 
82 Popkin has briefly mentioned the collaboration among family members (Pp. 21) and the priority of 
family welfare and security (Pp. 31), but his primary concern is individual rationality. See Popkin 
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introduction. These lower the cost of being unemployed and increase the migrants, 
incentive to seek for a better job. Secondly, one's remote family at his/her hometown 
serves as the last way out. If a migrant fails to survive in the destination, he/she can 
always return to his/her hometown and needs not go into a dead end. Thirdly, the 
kinship and the family network, either in the destination or at hometown, actually has 
secured a migrant's subsistence level. It supplements the institutional vacuum and 
acts as the last safety net to a migrant. 
In other words, at the individual level, the kinship and family networks have 
promoted the migrants' adoption of exit when dealing with their predicaments, and 
have shielded their lives from subsistence crisis. At the social level, the kinship and 
family networks of the migrants have also had a positive effect on the maintenance 
of social stability of the Pearl River Delta by reducing the migrants' demand for 
institutional protection and their intention to carry out political struggles to the 
government or the oppressor. Therefore, the traditional extended family has not only 
secured the migrants, but has also stabilized the social environment for the rapid 
economic development in the Pearl River Delta. 
In this study, since the migrants are not recognized as permanent members of 
the community by the locals, we should not think that the migrants and the locals are 
of the same group acting for collective interests as what Scott proposes. 
Simultaneously, the migrants rarely work in the Pearl River Delta alone，and have 
mostly maintained close relationship with their kinship and family members. 
Therefore, it is also not suitable to consider the migrants as individual actors 
performing purely rational behaviors. On the whole, it is better to see a migrant as a 
(1978) The Rational Peasant. 
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member of his/her extended family, in which his/her performance is neither 
collectively moral nor individually rational, but highly correlated with other kinship 
and family members. Therefore, we should not neglect the importance of the 
migrants' extended families. Otherwise, we will never understand why the migrants 
come to Tianshen but not other townships, why they choose exit instead of voice, 
why they switch to factory A but not B, and why the Pearl River Delta can still 
maintain social stability even there is a large pool of migrants being under excessive 
exploitation. 
5. From political resistance to economic retreatism 
The ultimate concern of this study is about how the social stability of the Pearl 
River Delta can be maintained, while a large pool of migrant workers are being 
adversely excluded and exploited. This question can be understood by investigating, 
firstly, the perception of the migrants to their predicament and secondly, the 
strategies by which the migrants deal with the unfavorable conditions they are 
encountering. As I have discussed in chapter 4, most of the migrants find their 
situations very unsatisfactory. However, due to the institutional vacuum and their 
identities of being outsiders, they think themselves are too powerless to have the 
poor conditions improved. Moreover, the migrants who are close to the margin of 
subsistence level are reluctant to take risk to protest, and the pro-investor and 
pro-local inclination of the Labor and Public Security Bureaus further dampen the 
migrants' sense of efficacy to file a lawsuit against those adversities. Therefore, 
direct confrontation of the migrants to the locals and the employers is very rare. 
According to the case of Scott, when the peasants cannot secure their 
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subsistence level and the landlords haven't fulfilled their moral obligation to give a 
helping hand, the peasants would identify the landlords as the "responsible", and see 
resistance as morally justified. However, from Popkin's angle of rational choice, cost 
and benefit calculations are emphasized, and the peasants would resist if the potential 
return is greater than the cost. Apart from their difference in moral and rational 
consideration, both Scott and Popkin deem that the only mean of the peasants to 
achieve their aim, either moral or rational, is to struggle with the landlords, whether 
in the form of individually hidden way83 or explicitly collective movement. It is not 
surprising in their cases, since the peasants are anchored to the soil, they can only 
choose either to “resist” or “not to resist". Leave their village so as to avoid further 
exploitation is never one of their choices. 
The case of the migrants is very different from those of Scott of Popkin. Owing 
to their floating nature and the fluidity of the social setting, the migrants can leave 
the working or living places instead of resisting to excessive exploitation. As 
discussed before, resistance is too costly and ineffective for the migrants, so the 
employment of exit becomes their main strategy to handle the adverse situations. 
Moreover, when the migrants are eventually eliminated by the labor market, they 
would even exit to their hometowns. Undoubtedly, exit is a form of retreatism, which 
aims at defending the subsistence level rather than striking for more economic return. 
To migrants, exit is the handiest strategy and it will not bring any bad consequence 
that may put them into a worse situation. 
Comparing with those political means such as voice and resistance, exit is an 
83 See also Scott (1985) Weapons of the Weak, which has detailed description on the peasants' 
everyday form of resistance. 
179 
economic reaction to the adverse conditions. It doesn't project any political threat to 
the established social order. Therefore, even excessive exploitation exists in the Pearl 
River Delta, it seldom arouses direct confrontation between the migrants and the 
locals or the foreign investors, since the political discontent of the migrants has been 
dissolved by their economic retreatism, which is not possible in the cases of Scott 
and Popkin. It is necessary to emphasize that the lack of direct confrontation doesn't 
mean that the migrants are satisfied with or are totally compliant to the adverse 
conditions. In fact, the economic retreatism can only atrophy the migrants' intention 
to take up political action, but can never eliminate their discontent completely. In 
other words, the social and political stability of the Pearl River Delta is only a 
surface tranquility. The endless “peaceful conflict", borrowing Weber's term, 
between the migrants and the locals or the foreign investors is really and implicitly 
existing. 
II. A supplement to previous studies concerning Chinese migrant workers 
Apart from the primary concern of social stability, this study is also a 
supplement to the previous studies concerning the migrant workers in China. Firstly, 
most of the previous studies focus only on the migrants in cities, at which the hukou 
system and rural-urban inequality have given all the explanations to the predicaments 
of the migrants. However, in township-and-village areas such as Tianshen, the 
traditional xenophobia of the locals and the renting economy are also very influential 
to the migrants' living. Therefore, the previous studies have not provide a fiill 
analysis to the migrants in the non-urban areas, where the social and the economic 
factors, in addition to the institutional factor, cannot be neglected also. In this study, I 
have shown how the migrants are excluded as outsiders from the local community in 
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order to preserve the privileges among the locals, why the exploitation is more 
serious due to the pro-investor inclination of the renting economy, and what 
disadvantages the migrants have to face in pursuing upward social mobility because 
of the lack of local guanxi. These elaborations have demonstrated the characteristics 
of the township-and-village, which are seldom mentioned in the previous studies. 
Secondly, in most existing literature, the researchers only try to understand the 
migrants from the viewpoints of the officials and the urbanities, who despise the 
migrants, regarding them as "blind wanderers" and a group of poor quality. This 
approach has neglected the subjective perceptions of the migrants. Moreover, in the 
township-and-village areas, the locals' superiority complex comes mainly from their 
economic advantage but not higher education level or being more civilized. 
Therefore, it is not suitable to apply the viewpoints of the officials and the urbanities 
on the migrants in the non-urban areas. Capturing the migrants' subjective 
perceptions is necessary in understanding how they see the fact that they are of 
higher ability but of lower social status. In this study, using the methods of 
participant observation, in-depth interview and content analysis, I have revealed the 
migrants' perceptions on their living, working and migration. From these, we can see 
the migrants' world from their viewpoint and leam how they consider their problems. 
This ethnographic approach hopes to bring the migrants' voice out instead of simply 
putting our interpretation on them. 
Thirdly, many previous studies have described the high resignation rate and the 
close connection of the migrants of a localistic or familistic network. These 
descriptions are only confined to the individual level of the migrants, concerning 
their living and working difficulties and their mutual help. However, they have not 
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taken one step forward to examine the social significances of these frequent 
resignation and familistic support to the large society. In this study, I have tried to 
push the discussions further by elaborating how the employment of exit and 
familistic support can dissolve the political conflicts between the migrants and the 
locals or the employers, and how these contribute to the maintenance of social 
stability in the Pearl River Delta. 
To put it briefly, this study has broadened the scope of the previous studies 
concerning the migrant workers from urban to the township-and-village areas in 
South China. In addition, it has put emphasis on the subjectivity of the migrants as 
well as on the significance of their living strategies to the social stability of the whole 
society. 
III. Suggestions 
In this study, I have discussed how the economic (the market), the institutional 
(the state) and the traditional (the society) factors have affected the migrants' 
situations. However, apart from these three factors, there is still one aspect which 
may be very influential to the migrants' reaction to the structural strain but hasn't 
been systematically elaborated. That is civil society. 
In their theory of resource mobilization, MaCarthy and Zald (1977) emphasize 
the importance of the social movement organizations (SMOs) for aggregating 
resources (money and labor), identifying the goal of the social movement and 
attempting to implement the goal. In addition, the SMOs provide leaders and help 
solidify adherents for starting a social movement. The development of SMOs 
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depends on the degree of autonomy of the civil society. In a democratic society, 
people have rights and freedom to set up their trade unions, pressure groups or 
various forms of interest groups, which may become SMOs and facilitate people to 
defend their interests by collective action. It is also the viewpoint underscored by 
Popkin. However, in China, the development of civil society is hindered by the fact 
that the social organizations, especially trade unions and pressure groups, are either 
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prohibited by the state or are incorporated by the governmental departments . 
Therefore, people can hardly rely on the help of SMOs to strive for their benefits, 
and thus their collective bargaining power is very weak. 
In the case of the migrants, their situation is even poorer, since apart from the 
restriction from the state, their floating nature is unfavorable for them to set up stable 
social organizations. From my general observation, the connection among the 
migrants is mostly limited within their informal family and kinship networks, and 
there are no any formal social organization representing their interests in Tianshen 
Township. That may be one of the reasons why the migrants are so powerless relative 
to the locals and the employers, and why social movements seldom occur in the Pearl 
River Delta. 
This study focuses on the migrants' subjective perception of social exclusion 
and exploitation that may partly explain why civic organizations among migrants are 
not developed. But since the development of civic organizations may affect migrants' 
perception in another way around, and there are many factors determining the 
84 See Chan and Qiu (1997) "Small Government, Big Society: Social Organizations and Civil Society 
in China"; Xia (1993) "Shimin shehui: Zhongguo jinqi nanyuan de meng" for the discussions on how 
the state constrains the development of the civil society in China. 
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development of these organizations, civil society should be treated as an independent 
factor for further study. 
IV. Prediction 
The empirical findings of this study argue that the fluidity of labor market and 
the revival of familism lower the resistance consciousness of the migrants, and thus 
maintain the social stability of the Pearl River Delta. How will the situation change 
in the future? Will further social and economic development empower migrants to 
resist? 
Migrants' heavy dependence on their extended family network is mainly due to 
an "institutional vacuum". If there exist some social institutions providing migrants 
with labor protection and social welfare, these institutions may take away some 
protecting functions of family network and thus release migrants from familistic 
dependence. Moreover, further economic development may sow the seeds of civil 
society in China. The emergence of the autonomous trade unions and pressure groups 
may unite migrants and motivate them to defend their interests through collective 
actions. Undoubtedly, these two social changes will increase migrants' resistance 
consciousness and their bargaining power. Unless migrants' expectations are met by 
rapid improvement of situation or are satisfied by the social institutions, the further 
development of the civil society may promote migrants to ask for institutional 
protection from the government or take up collective action to struggle with the 
exploiters. 
Therefore, the discussion above shows a paradox that the more improved the 
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social environment is, the higher the probability of social conflicts between migrants 
and locals or even the government. With the aim to maintain social stability, the 
government may continue to suppress the development of civil society. Migrants 
may remain as a subordinate class who use economic retreatism to respond to the 
predicament for a while. But how long will this last will depend on the dynamic 
development of state-society relation in China. 
V. Epilogue 
The fieldwork of this study was first conducted in the summer of 2000, and had 
lasted for about two months. During that period of time, I had stayed in the house of 
a local, situated in an alley of village 1. On both side of the alley, there were seven 
houses belonged to six local families, which were all members of the same 
patriarchal clan. Among the seven houses, three of them were new buildings, two 
had been reconstructed and two were old. Only four local families were living in the 
alley, and all houses were either partly or wholly rented to the migrants^^ Therefore, 
the alley accommodated several tens of migrants, who came from different places of 
China and worked for different jobs nearby. 
Clearly, the migrants largely outnumbered the locals in the alley, and the locals 
were embraced by the migrants living around. However, their physical proximity did 
not turn them into acquaintances, because they were reluctant to interact with each 
other. During my staying, I always saw several local neighbors sitting around and 
85 One of the new buildings is three-story high and the other two are five-story. The owners occupy 
only one apartment and rent the remaining apartments and shop fronts to the migrants. The two 
reconstructed houses are two-story high. Part of them are partitioned from the main buildings and 
rented to the migrants. While the two old houses, are also rented to the migrants. 
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chatting in the alley, while some migrants did the same at the gate of the next house. 
But the two groups of people only talked within their groups and treated the other 
party coldly as if they were all strangers, even though they could recognize each 
other. Some locals and migrants were of the landlords and tenants relationship, but 
when they met, they, at most, had a very slight and formalistic greeting, which 
showed their alienation rather than their acquaintanceship. It gave me an odd feeling 
to see the dualistic segregation in such a small environment. 
Before I started the fieldwork, I expected that I could contact some migrants 
through the introduction of the locals. However, I soon discovered that it was not a 
reliable way, because the relationship between the locals and the migrants was not so 
good. Luckily, I could initiate dialogue with some migrants, who later provided me 
with abundant information about their living and working experience. At the 
beginning, when I tried to talk to the migrants, they were quite hesitated and were not 
willing to reply. But once the dialogue started, the strangeness between us vanished 
and we could talk freely. It was my identity as a Hong Kong citizen that helped me a 
lot in approaching them, since in the migrants' eyes, I was also an outsider of the 
local community and not the same as the locals. Therefore, they would not put their 
detestation to the locals on me, and most importantly, they did not hesitate to tell me 
their discontent to the locals' discrimination and exclusion. Thanks to my outsider 
identity, which brought me closer to the migrants. Otherwise, the anticipated 
facilitation—my connection with locals—would become the barrier of my fieldwork. 
It is commonly heard that the hukou system is the source of the migrants' 
predicament, and only after the hukou system has been reformed, the situation of the 
migrants can be improved. Surely, the hukou system is the Chinese ‘‘caste system" 
186 
that stratifies the migrants and the locals according to their birthplaces. However, 
before the reform of hukou system can entitle a better situation to the migrants, they 
still need to encounter the excessive exploitation from the employers and the 
exclusion from the locals every day. In fact, the migrants seldom talk about the 
reform of hukou system. Instead, they are longing for the legal protection for labors, 
which will entitles them the basic right as workers and the basic respect to their 
dignity. In China, we have perfect labor laws, but they are generally ignored by the 
official departments such as Labor and Public Security Bureaus, which actually have 
become accomplices of the investors in exploiting the migrants, making them have 
no way to complain. 
I revisited the field site about half a year later at the end of February 2001, and I 
stayed at the same place. I surprisingly found that all the migrants I made 
acquaintance to, except Huang, had moved away. I could not help recalling the term 
“coming and going in a hurry"(來去匆匆)，which was the living style of the 
migrants. According to Huang, some migrants had already returned homes because 
of the hard works or the prolonged unemployment. Some had gone to other places to 
find jobs. Huang was still staying in the small woodblock room with his wife. During 
the past six months, his working was extremely hard, and by the time I met him, he 
was unemployed again. Huang was quite sorry for having come to Guangdong and 
was considering about going back home. He told me that he had stayed for such a 
long time because of his wife's stable job in Tianshen. Otherwise he should have 
gone too. It showed clear that employment of exit and family support were still the 
main living strategies of the migrants. 
What will happen to the migrant workers in the Pearl River Delta in the later 
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time? One interesting phenomenon is that the migrants are very elated to the hot 
topic of Northwestern China Development. Although the development project is still 
on its very early stage, the migrants, especially those from Sichuan, generally have 
an optimistic anticipation that the project will benefit their hometowns and create 
more working opportunities there. At that time, they need not leave their families and 
work far away. If this anticipation can be realized, there will be a huge change of 
labor market in South China. "Millions of migrant workers going down to the Pearl 
River Delta"(百萬民工下珠江)may not happen anymore, since the trend of 
population floating may shift to Northwestern China. It is still uncertain whether 
there will be labor shortage in the Pearl River Delta, but at least we can be sure that 
the amount of surplus labor there will decrease. In this circumstance, the employers 
may raise the salary and improve the working conditions so as to retain their workers. 
Similarly, the locals may relinquish their arrogance and rudeness in order to keep 
their tenants. In fact, it is difficult to predict precisely the influences of Northwestern 
China Development on the migrants in the Pearl River Delta at this stage. But I 
believe this project will reduce the over-concentration of surplus labors in South 
China, which will then ameliorate the migrants' situation by increasing their 
bargaining power to the employers and the locals. 
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Appendix A. List of Interviewees 
一 Pseudo name Sex Age Origin Occupation 
~ Cheng Male Eaiiy-20 Sichuan Unemployed  
~ Fa Male Late-5Q Local Retired  
10 Male Early-30 Sichuan Shop keeper  
4 Feng Male ^ Guangxi Sale executive  
3 Fong Male About 30 Local Driver  
~ Hon Male ^ Guangdong Factory manager 
16 Huang Male 29 Sichuan General worker  
~ Hui Female Mid-20 Local Clerk  
~ Jun Male Early-20 Shangxi Clerk  
8 Ling Female Early-20 Jiangxi Shop keeper  
9 Mr. Liu Male Mid-40 Local Factory owner  
Shu Male About 70 Local Retired  
11 SiuMei Female 25 Hubei General worker  
12 Tang Male Mid-3 0 Guangdong Engineer  
13 Tian Male Early-30 Hunan Financial comptroller 
U Tin Male Mid-20 Local Civil servant  
15 Wah Female Late-30 Guangdong (married Housewife 
to a local)  
17 ^ Male Mid-30 Hubei Construction worker 
18 Yueng Female Mid-50 Local Housewife  
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Appendix C: Cartoon 
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5. Caiyuan de yiju 
‘{Wailaigong No.84: 36) 
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Appendix D: Map 
Map : Geographic location of Tianshen Township 
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